

STATESMEN SERIES.

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THE MARQUESS WELLESLEY, K.G.

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STATESMEN SERIES.

LIFE OF
THE MARQUESS WELLESLEY, K.G.

BY

COLONEL G. B. MALLESON, C.S.

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PREFATORY NOTE.

FOR the purposes of this little compilation I have consulted, chiefly, Pearce's *Memoirs and Correspondence of the Marquess Wellesley*; *The Despatches, Minutes and Correspondence of the Marquess Wellesley*, edited by Mr. Montgomery Martin; Torrens's *The Marquess Wellesley, Architect of Empire*; Torrens's *Memoirs of Viscount Melbourne*; Bulwer's *Life of Lord Palmerston*; *The Quarterly Review*; *The Calcutta Review*; *The Annual Register*; *The Asiatic Annual Register*; Wilks's *History of Mysore*; Thornton's *History of India*. I have indented, also, on notes made in India when I was contemplating a life of the Marquess Wellesley on a larger scale.

G. B. M.

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LIFE OF THE MARQUESS WELLESLEY, K. G.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

1760-1797.

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“SOME men are born great, some achieve greatness, some have greatness thrust upon them.” The two brothers Wellesley, the great Marquess, as he was called in India, and his illustrious brother, whose name is inseparably connected with the final defeat of the greatest warrior the world has ever seen, combined in their own persons two out of the three categories mentioned by Shakespeare. They were born great, and they achieved greatness. Writing of such men it becomes possible to dispense with a pedigree stretching back, though that pedigree may, far into the earlier age of English history. It will be sufficient to state that the family of the

Wellesleys can be traced back to the year 1239 ; that it is of Saxon origin, deriving its name from the manor of Wellesley, anciently Welles-leigh, in the county of Somerset ; that, in 1339, the representative of a branch of the family, Sir William de Wellesley, was summoned to Parliament as a Baron of the realm, and received from King Edward II. a grant by patent of the custody of the castle of Kildare ; that, on transferring that castle to the Earls of Kildare, he was granted by Edward III., in 1342, the custody of the manor of Demor ; that thenceforward, for services rendered to the Crown, the successive representatives of this branch of the family increased their possessions and influence until the year 1745, when Garret Wellesley, or Wesley, as the name was then often spelt, dying without issue, bequeathed all his possessions to his cousin, Richard Colley or Cowley. The Cowleys, an old Staffordshire family, had settled in Ireland in the reign of Henry VIII., and had prospered. The Richard Cowley, who succeeded, in 1745, to the Wellesley property, had inherited his father's estate of Castle Carbery in 1700. He was cousin once removed of Garret Wellesley, and in his veins there flowed the blood of the Wellesleys and the Cusakes, descendants from Dermot Macmorrough, King of Leinster. On his accession to the Wellesley estates, Richard Cowley assumed, as required by the testator, the family name, then spelt Wesley. He was shortly afterwards raised to the peerage by the title of Baron Mornington. His son, Garret, who succeeded him, was further advanced to the dignities of Viscount Wellesley of Dengany Castle, and Earl of Mornington, of County Meath. This nobleman had, by Anne, eldest daughter of Arthur Hill Trevor, first Viscount Dungannon, six sons and two daughters. Of these sons the subject of this memoir was the eldest.

Richard Cowley Wellesley—it will be convenient to give the names as they were subsequently spelt—was born on June 20th, 1760. His father, who had a passion for music, and who attained some eminence as a composer, placed him at an early age at Eton. There the young Irishman speedily developed abilities of no common order. His contributions to the three volumes of *Musæ Etonenses* give evidence of very considerable classical attainments, and he had achieved a great reputation as a scholar when he went up to Oxford. He matriculated as a nobleman at Christ Church, on December 24th, 1778. There, likewise, he was much distinguished for his proficiency in classical literature, and for the capacity he displayed to deal with large questions. His father dying in May, 1781, Wellesley, called away to important duties in his own country, could not stay to take his degree. He returned to Ireland, and, having attained his majority, entered at once upon the duties of his position. “His first act,” writes the author of the *Wellesley Memoirs*, Mr. R. R. Pearce, “on becoming of age, was characteristic of the generosity and integrity of his manly nature. He voluntarily took upon himself the numerous pecuniary obligations of his deceased father, and exhibited his filial affection towards his surviving parent by placing the estates, to which he had succeeded, under the management of his mother. His Lordship also directed his attention to the intellectual training of his brothers, who were all greatly indebted to him for his watchful and prudent care in early life.” His brother Arthur was then twelve years old.

That same year the young Earl of Mornington took his seat in the House of Peers, in College Green, Dublin. The Irish Parliament had passed, the year preceding, the memorable resolution: “That the King’s most excellent

Majesty, and the Lords and Commons of Ireland, are the only power competent to make laws to bind Ireland." Following this resolution, a body of volunteers, 50,000 strong, demanded from England the recognition of the legislative independence of the island. Lord Mornington, though imbued with a sterling love for his native country, could not tolerate proceedings which appeared to him to strike at the very root of orderly and constitutional government. The fact that an armed assembly should hold regular sittings in the vicinity of the Houses of Parliament, with the object of dictating to, or overawing, the members of those Houses, was in his eyes a monstrous proceeding, not to be endured. He took, then, a leading part in the debate on the Address of both Houses to the Crown, declaring "the perfect satisfaction which we feel in the many blessings we enjoy under His Majesty's most auspicious Government, and our present happy Constitution; and to acquaint His Majesty that at this time we think it peculiarly incumbent upon us to express our determined resolution to support the same inviolate with our lives and fortunes." The resolution was carried. The support accorded to it by Lord Mornington must not be interpreted to imply that he was perfectly satisfied with the social or political condition of Ireland. On the contrary, he was, even at that early period, a strong advocate for the removal of the disabilities which weighed on the Roman Catholics, and for the extension of the liberties of the Press. In his eyes, too, the position of the Irish Parliament, powerful for discussion, but powerless for action, was eminently unsatisfactory. His support of the resolution, then, was prompted solely by his desire to place on record his disapproval of the practice of intimidation sanctioned by the volunteers.

It was impossible that a man with his original and

daring mind, a man born for action, should for long be content with the limited sphere within which the duties of the Irish Parliament were confined. At the General Election of 1784, then, Lord Mornington stood, and was returned for the borough of Beeralston, in Devonshire. It is strange that his first speech should have been on an Indian subject. He attacked Lord North for his support of Warren Hastings, in the face of his declaration that the Court of Directors had condemned every one of his actions; and he called upon that Lord to explain how, with that opinion before him, he had arrived at the conclusion that it would be wrong to recall the Indian Governor. This speech, and the speeches which followed, were delivered with so finished an elocution, and were marked by so much spirit and point, that Lord Mornington was speedily recognised as a speaker who had to be reckoned with. His promotion, then, was unusually rapid. In 1785 he was sworn a Privy Councillor for Ireland. In September of the following year he was nominated a Lord of the Treasury. In the February following, then member for Saltash in Cornwall, he supported, in a most able speech, the measures proposed by Mr. Pitt for a commercial treaty with France; and, in 1788, as member for Windsor, he supported, alike in the English House of Commons and the Irish House of Lords, the measure regulating the Regency proposed by Mr. Pitt. Four years later he earnestly supported Wilberforce in his efforts to extinguish the slave-trade. He opposed, the year following, Mr. Grey's motion for a reform of the English House of Commons. He showed how, notwithstanding the admitted imperfections of the then existing system, the nation had, under its auspices, made a marvellously quick recovery from the humiliation and misfortunes caused by the result of the war with the American

colonists; and contrasted the state of France, emerging red-handed from a drastic revolution, with that of prosperous and contented England. Grey's motion was defeated by 232 to 41, and shortly afterwards (June 21st, 1793) Lord Mornington was sworn a member of the English Privy Council, and nominated a Commissioner for the Affairs of India, that is, a member of the Board of Control. This was the first step, and a most important step, to the important post which he was to fill in India.

On February the 11th, 1793, England, Spain, and Holland had joined Austria and Prussia in the first coalition against France. A resolution brought forward early in the session in the House of Commons condemning the war was lost by 270 to 44 votes, and there can be no doubt that that vote truly represented the feeling of the majority of the nation. On the reassembling of Parliament in January of the following year, another important debate took place, during the discussion of the Address, on the policy and progress of the war. In this debate there was assigned to Lord Mornington a leading part. Speaking early, he argued that, if the original necessity for the war had ceased, he would be the first to recommend a return "to the secure and uninterrupted enjoyment of a flourishing commerce, of tranquil liberty at home, and of respect and honour abroad," but that, in fact, the necessity not having ceased, there was no alternative before Parliament. The choice lay between the vigorous prosecution of hostilities, and an ambiguous state neither of open hostility nor of real repose—a state in which the nation would suffer most of the inconveniences of war, and enjoy none of the solid advantages of peace. He pointed out that the aggressive action of the French Republic had roused not England only, but all Europe; that, in the decree of November 19th, 1792,

she had made to the subjects of the several sovereigns of the European States offers of universal fraternity and assistance, and had ordered her generals everywhere to aid and abet those citizens of foreign countries who had suffered, or might hereafter suffer, in the cause of what she called liberty. "Her sense of liberty," continued the speaker, "as applied to England, was shown by the reception of seditious and treasonable addresses, and by the speeches of the President of the National Convention, expressing his wish for the auspicious institution of a British Convention." After quoting several instances of the infraction by France of international law in the case of Belgium, of the United States, and of Constantinople—the declaration of Brissot that his object in freeing and arming the negroes of the French West India Islands was to accomplish the destruction of the British colonies in that part of the globe—Lord Mornington urged that at the time when war was declared the men who governed France had hatched an extensive conspiracy against the order of society and the peace of mankind. Invoking in support of this charge the words and acts of the accused, proving that the plan was not peculiar to one faction, but had been accepted by all, the speaker proceeded to show how such language had been understood in Europe; the dangers which were threatening the British Empire, and which could only be averted by timely recourse to defensive measures; and the absolute necessity of a policy which should be open and undisguised. It is very remarkable, looking at his subsequent career, that he should have illustrated this part of his argument by a reference to India and to the Sultan of Maisur. • He said:—

"In India the French have been expelled from all their possessions except Pondichery, the capture of which could not (according to the latest advices) be long delayed. The acquisition of the port of

Mahé, on the coast of Malabar, is of the greatest advantage to our new territories on that coast, both with a view to the commerce and good government of those countries; in a political view it is obviously of considerable importance that the French should not continue to hold a possession which afforded them the means of so direct and easy an intercourse with Tipu Sultan."

Lord Mornington then entered into a long enumeration of the acts of the French Government, both at home and abroad, and concluded with the following appeal, a speech which for more than two hours had captivated the attention of a full House:—

"All the circumstances of the case are now before you. You are now to make your option. You are now to decide whether it best becomes the dignity, the wisdom, and the spirit of a great nation to rely for existence on the arbitrary will of a restless and implacable enemy, or on her own sword. You are now to decide whether you will entrust to the valour and skill of British fleets and British armies, to the approved faith and united strength of your powerful and numerous allies, the defence of the limited Monarchy of these realms, of the constitution of Parliament, of all the established ranks and orders of society among us, of the sacred rights of property, and of the whole frame of our laws, our liberty, and our religion; or whether you will deliver over the guardianship of all these blessings to the justice of Cambon, the plunderer of the Netherlands, who, to sustain the baseless fabric of his depreciated assignats, defrauds whole nations of their rights of property, and mortgages the aggregated wealth of Europe;—to the moderation of Danton, who first promulgated that unknown law of nature which ordains that the Alps, the Pyrenees, the ocean, and the Rhine should be the only boundaries of the French dominion;—to the religion of Robespierre, whose practice of piety is to murder his own Sovereign, who exhorts all mankind to embrace the same faith, and to assassinate their Kings for the honour of God;—to the friendship of Barrère, who avows, in the face of all Europe, that the fundamental article of the Revolutionary Government of France is the ruin and annihilation of the British Empire;—or, finally, to whatever may be the accidental caprice of any new band of malefactors, who, in the last convulsions of their exhausted country, may be destined to drag the present tyrants to their own scaffolds, to seize their lawless power, to emulate the depravity of their example, and to rival the enormity of their crimes."

The House was attracted not so much by the graceful elocution, the sonorous yet manly voice, the high-bred manner, and the self-reliant attitude of the speaker, as by the strength and cogency of his arguments. It is almost supererogation to say that those arguments would not, in the presence of accomplished facts, influence the existing generation. To understand their effect in the past, we must carry our minds back to the state of affairs when they were spoken. The French Revolution was just beginning its career of aggression. It was certain that the nearest neighbours of France, the most ancient and most reliable allies of Great Britain in her wars with the princes of the House of Bourbon, would be the first victims of the new crusade. Danton, then a ruling power in France, and supposed by many to be the man of the future, had openly claimed for France boundaries, which England had refused, which Germany and Holland had refused, to Louis XIV., in the days of his greatest power. Brissot, the mouthpiece of a more thoughtful school of Frenchmen, had placed the annihilation of England as the first article of his programme. The fever was not confined to individuals; it had roused to superhuman action the whole nation. That the speech of Lord Mornington only interpreted in elegant language the thoughts which were burning in the minds of the great majority of the members of the House, was proved by the fact that although the Opposition put up their most eloquent orator, the brilliant Sheridan, to reply, he failed to make an impression on the House. Even Mr. Fox, who spoke later, could only say that, if the principle of the speech were accepted, it would mean that "while the present or any other Jacobin Government exists in France, no propositions for peace can be made or received by us." The division was decisive. Two hundred and seventeen members voted for the vigorous

prosecution of the war ; only fifty-seven for the amendment, moved by Mr. Fox.

On November the 29th following, Lord Mornington was married, at St. George's, Hanover Square, to Mademoiselle Hyacinthe Gabrielle Roland, a native of France, only daughter of Pierre Roland and of Hyacinthe Gabrielle Daris, of the city of Paris, who had for nine years lived with him and borne him children. Notwithstanding the beauty of the lady, her wit, her wonderful fascination, the marriage was not a happy one. I may state, in anticipation, that when Lord Mornington proceeded to India, he felt that under the circumstances he could not take her. Nor did she live long with him after his return. For reasons which have never been given to the public they agreed to live separately. The lady died in 1816.

It is not necessary to quote from other speeches which Lord Mornington delivered in the course of this session, or of the sessions that followed. His reputation as an orator was made, and he was in a fair way of adding to it that of an excellent man of business. To this end he attended with industry to his duties at the India Board ; thoroughly mastered the peculiar details which distinguish the affairs of our Indian Empire ; and gave evidence on more than one public occasion of the interest with which he watched the dangers threatening it from the ambition of France. The public were not surprised, then, when the announcement was made that Lord Mornington had been selected by Mr. Pitt to succeed Sir John Shore as Governor-General of India.

The selection was not made without some uncertainty on the part of the Prime Minister. The retiring Governor-General had succeeded Lord Cornwallis in 1792. The selection of a civil servant of the Company to fill so lofty a post had been a bitter disappointment to Lord Hobart,

Governor of Madras, who had given proofs of capacity, and who, it was understood, had accepted the lesser appointment on the understanding that he was to have the reversion of the greater. Upon the retirement of Sir John Shore, Lord Hobart had then regarded his succession as certain. But Mr. Pitt, as soon as he heard of the vacancy, recommended to his sovereign the reappointment of Lord Cornwallis to the joint posts of Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief. Lord Cornwallis actually accepted the two posts, and then, after a brief interval, that is, the interval of two or three weeks, resigned them. The announcement of Lord Cornwallis's resignation was accompanied by the statement that, "under the circumstances and for reasons of a peculiar nature," the Earl of Mornington had been appointed Governor-General. Naturally the public were mystified, and the mystification was not at the time cleared up. But the author of the Wellesley Memoirs, Mr. R. R. Pearce, gives the following explanation of the transaction:—"The truth," he writes, "appears to be this. Lord Teignmouth [Sir John Shore] was desirous of enjoying his newly-acquired honours at home; Lord Hobart, who had been involved in some unpleasant altercations with the Supreme Government and the Court of Directors, was not an acceptable person to the Company; and Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas clearly saw that the exigencies of the times required greater energies than Lord Cornwallis was then capable of bringing to bear on the Government of India."

This explanation affords honourable testimony to the reputation which Lord Mornington had acquired. He was then in his thirty-eighth year, the period of life to which the late Lord Beaconsfield referred "as the prime, if not the perfection, of manhood;" had served upwards of thirteen years, during a troubled period, in the House of

Commons; had acquired, at the Board of Control, a thorough knowledge of all the details of Indian Government, of the policy pursued by his predecessor, and of the dangers which might threaten the stability of British interests from the independent action of native princes in the very centre of the peninsula, at a time when Great Britain was engaged in a war conducted with more than ordinary bitterness with a revolutionary power. He had many qualities which peculiarly fitted him for the post. He was gifted with a strong will; possessed the faculty of quick decision; an intelligence which enabled him to arrive, almost by intuition, at the point of a question, however involved, or however hidden by oriental phrases; a capacity, unmarred by the faintest tint of jealousy, which enabled him to distinguish merit in others, and to select for particular employments the men who were most capable of bringing the allotted task to a successful issue. When I add that Lord Mornington had a gracious presence, and was gifted with a charm of manner capable of impressing, I might indeed add, of almost always winning, those with whom he came in contact, I shall have said enough to prove the deep insight into character displayed by Mr. Pitt in selecting such a man, at such a crisis, to proceed to India as virtual representative of the Crown. The appointment bore date October the 4th, 1797.

CHAPTER II.

GENERAL VIEW OF THE STATE OF INDIA ON THE
ARRIVAL THERE OF THE EARL OF MORNINGTON.

1784-1796.

Treaty of Mangalor—Defeat of Tipu Sultán—Negotiations with the French—Ripaud's intrigues—The assistance of Malartic—State of affairs at Haidarábád—The Nizam's dealings with the French—War with the Maráthás—Increase of the French contingent—The Maráthás—Condition of the North—Character and policy of Sir John Shore.

LORD MORNINGTON quitted England November the 7th, 1797. He landed at Madras April the 26th, 1798. It is well, whilst he is making that long sea voyage, that the reader should examine the state of affairs in the country, which would demand the earnest attention of the new Governor-General on his landing. I propose to take him in the first instance to India south of the Vindhya range, generally known as Southern India.

There, not very many years had elapsed since Haidar Álí, the Muhammadan Ruler of Maisur, had dictated terms of peace to the English shut up in Madras; and, although during the struggle which followed at a somewhat later period, the fortune of England had prevailed, yet to the last hour of his life Haidar, a man of innate genius, had been a very formidable enemy. His son and successor, known as Tipu Sultán, not only did not possess

a particle of his father's genius, but was saturated with prejudices from which his father had been free. The war, which was still waging on his accession, languished with varying fortunes for fifteen months; and it is a proof of the extremity to which our countrymen were reduced, that at the end of that period they were glad to conclude a treaty—the Treaty of Mangalor (March 11th, 1784)—by which the contracting parties agreed to restore all places, and all prisoners, taken during the war.

The interval of peace which followed gave abundant and repeated evidence that genius no longer directed the affairs of the only State in India which had waged war not unequally with the English. Haidar would have husbanded his resources, and have paved the way for new alliances against the Foreign Power, which he had felt during his lifetime would otherwise swallow the estates of the native princes in detail. Típu, swayed by prejudice and bigotry, listened only to his passions. Instead of conciliating, he molested his neighbours. At last, he was rash enough and foolish enough to attack a protected ally of the English, the Rájah of Travankúr. War followed. In that war Típu was worsted. Bangalor fell into the hands of the English. Seringapatam was invested; and within two years Típu was glad to obtain peace by the sacrifice of one-half of his dominions, and the payment of an indemnity of upwards of three millions sterling.

Only six years had elapsed between the signature of this peace (March 19th, 1792) and the landing of Lord Mornington at Madras (April 26th, 1798), and six years do not count for long in the memory of a prince, the main aim of whose life was to recover all that he had lost. Such was the aim, the constant, unwavering aim, of Típu Sultán. Scarcely was the ink dry with which the peace of 1792 had been signed than he began to strengthen the

fortifications of Seringapatam. He provided for the accruing to his soldiers of advantages in the shape of pension, or in the bestowal upon them of grants of land. Then, in 1793, he opened negotiations for a general alliance of the native princes against the English with Madhaji Sindhiá, the ablest of all the Maráthás, whose death, the year following, was a fatal blow to their cause. To aid in bringing about the same result, he found means to correspond with Zamán Sháh, ruler of Kábul; and a little later he played the card which brought matters between himself and the English to extremities—he reopened negotiations with France. As one consequence of these negotiations was exactly contemporaneous with the arrival of Lord Mornington at Madras, I propose to deal with it somewhat in detail.

Previous to the war, which terminated so disastrously for the Maisur ruler in 1792, Típu had, in 1788, despatched by the hands of a Frenchman, whose name is entered in the Maisur Manuscripts as Monsieur Macnamara, a letter to Louis XVI., in which he stated his apprehensions of immediate war with the English, and his confidence that in that event the French King would assist him. To this letter he received in due course a reply to the effect, that whilst the King wished him well, and was desirous in every legitimate way to promote his views, should opportunity offer, there were reasons, which the letter set forth, why it was impossible that France should, at the moment, declare war against England. After the French Revolution had broken out, and the French armies had begun that career of victory which it required the combination of all the Powers of Europe to stop, Típu was persuaded to renew his offers to form a league for the expulsion of the English. It would seem that the first overtures direct to Paris were made through

the intervention of a Frenchman named Pierre Moneron, an adventurer long resident in Maisur, in 1795 or 1796; but it is certain that indirect communications were opened at an earlier period, for the same purpose, with General Cossigny, Governor of the Isle of France, and by him transmitted to Paris. The fact that England and France were in 1795 actually at war, had imparted to the Sultán a confident belief that the alliance, so long hoped for, might at last be consummated.

His mind was in this buoyant condition when, early in 1797, a French privateer from the Isle of France put in, dismasted, into the port of Mangalor, and solicited the means of repair. It happened that the Lord of the Admiralty at that port was one Ghulám Álí, one of the men who had accompanied Macnamara to France in 1788, and had acquired some facility in the speaking of the French language. He at once gave the required permission to repair damages. Then—after much conversation with the master of the vessel, a man named Ripaud,—he reported to his sovereign that the arrival was most opportune, for that Ripaud represented himself to be the officer second in authority at the Isle of France, and that he had been specially instructed to touch at Mangalor, for the purpose of ascertaining the Sultán's wishes regarding the co-operation of a French force with the troops of His Highness for the expulsion from India of their common enemy. Ghulám Álí was promptly instructed to bring Ripaud to Seringapatam.

It can easily be conceived that Ripaud was nothing more than a common impostor, and as such he was recognised by the officers of Típu's Court. They even proceeded so far as to write a memorandum on the subject to their master, and to represent it as quite possible that Ripaud might be an English spy. But it

was one of the weaknesses of Típu to believe that to be true which he wished to be true, and he answered his counsellors with the platitude, of which he was in the habit of making daily use: "Whatever is the will of God, that will be accomplished." Ripaud's vessel was purchased, and the purchase-money was made over to one of his companions, to be taken to the Isle of France. Ripaud himself was directed to stay at Típu's Court in the quality of ambassador, and four envoys from the Sultán, posing as merchants, were directed to proceed to the island, to solicit from its Governor the despatch to Mangalor of a fleet and army. With that fleet and army one of them was to return, whilst the other three were to continue their journey to Paris, there to execute the functions of ambassadors. An event of a ludicrous character disconcerted these proceedings. The four native ambassadors were on the eve of starting from Mangalor, accompanied by the Frenchman who had been deputed by Ripaud to convey to the Isle of France the purchase-money of the disabled privateer, when the Frenchman and three of his compatriots absconded in a boat, taking with them the money. Nothing more was heard of them, and it was supposed that they had been captured by the English. Of this, however, there is no record, and the probabilities are that they perished with their ill-gotten gains.

Such an occurrence ought to have opened the eyes of Típu to the true character of the class of foreigners with whom he was dealing, and it is only due to him to state that at the moment he felt heartily ashamed of himself and of Ripaud. Charging the latter with collusion with his absconding countrymen, with the view to obtain double payment, he placed him under restraint. But reflecting, a little later, that if the vessel should arrive in the Isle of

France without the purchase-money he had paid for her she was liable to be confiscated by her owners, he determined to release Ripaud, and to send him to the island with the ambassadors, now reduced to two, taking from him a bond for the money he had received, and for which the vessel was declared to be a collateral security. These questions and considerations caused delay, and the privateer, which was to have sailed in April, did not quit Mangalor until October.

She had scarcely lost sight of the coast when the two ambassadors of the Maisur Sultán had a fresh experience of the style of Frenchman whom their sovereign had delighted to honour. No sooner was he sure that he was beyond the control of Maisur than Ripaud collected his European crew, numbering five or six, and, addressing the ambassadors, reproached them for the treatment he had received from their master, and insisted that they should place in his hands the letters they were carrying to the island, threatening that unless they should comply he would proceed on a privateering cruise. After much demur and protestations the ambassadors complied. Ripaud at once opened the letters, read their contents, and finding that these did not confirm the apprehensions he had formed, continued his course for the island, and cast anchor in Port Louis, January 19th, 1798.

The Governor of the Isle of France was General Malartic, a very distinguished officer of ancient lineage and high reputation. His power in the two islands was absolute; for, when the Directory, jealous of his popularity, had despatched two commissaries from France to watch him, and restrict his authority, it was only with difficulty that Malartic saved them from the fury of the populace. His Council refused to recognise them, and they were sent back to France as soon as possible. Never

again was the authority of Malartic interfered with or controlled from France. His power remained absolute till his death, in July, 1800.

Learning from Ripaud the real quality of the two Maisurians who had arrived, Malartic sent some gentlemen of his suite to wait upon them, and to arrange the time of their landing. When they did land they were received with full honours, conducted to Government House through a double line of troops, received there with ceremonious distinction, and assigned a public dwelling. Malartic found that the despatches contained the project of a treaty between the Sultán of Maisur and the Isle of France, the main point of which was the co-operation on Indian soil of a corps of from five to ten thousand French troops, backed by from twenty to thirty thousand Africans. The Sultán engaged that these, on landing, should be joined by sixty thousand Maisurians; the object of the joint operation being, according to the proposal of Típu, to take Goa from the Portuguese, and Bombay from the English, on the western coast; to reduce and raze Madras on the eastern; then to subdue the Maráthás and the Nizam; and, finally, to expel the English from Bengal. Malartic could not object that the scheme was not comprehensive. But he was without the necessary means of complying even in part with the requisition. He could spare no troops from the already too small garrison of the islands. The best he could do was to forward the proposals of the Sultán to France. This he did promptly, despatching the Sultán's letters in duplicate in two frigates, and meanwhile comforting the ambassadors with the assurance that the Mother Country would most certainly comply with the requisition. Meanwhile, despite the protests of the ambassadors, who told him that they required an army, and not a few recruits only, he issued

a proclamation in which he invited the people of the islands to enlist to serve under the banners of Típu. Ultimately, the ambassadors re-embarked for Mangalor, on March 7th, 1798, on board the *Preneuse* frigate, taking with them ninety-nine men, including civil and military officers, for the service of the Sultán. The capture of two English Indiamen, in the Tellicheri Roads, detained them a few days, and they reached Mangalor on April 26th, 1798, the very day that Lord Mornington landed at Madras.

I have been somewhat minute in recording the proceedings of Típu and his allies, in order to show that the things which he did do were not done in a corner: that not only was he contemplating the waging of war with the English in India, but the waging of it on a scale which should place the result beyond a doubt, in concert with, and largely aided by, the hereditary enemy of England, then at war with England, and whose troops at the moment, though Típu knew it not, were preparing to embark to make a raid on Egypt, as the first step to India. It is true that he would have been glad had his negotiations been conducted with greater secrecy and discretion. But, secret or published, they were still negotiations; and, in point of fact, the proclamations of General Malartic, the language openly held by him in the presence of the ambassadors, and repeated and confirmed by them, were sufficient to publish to the world the hopes, the designs, the hostile manœuvres of the Sultán of Maisur. He gave a further proof of his intentions by according to the ninety-nine volunteers a brilliant reception, and by giving them quarters in his fortress of Seringapatam.

Whilst, thts, the condition of the still powerful kingdom of Maisur was of a nature to demand the earnest attention of a Governor-General fresh from Europe, the state of

the dominions of the Nizam, the second great native power in Southern India, was but little more assuring. Up to the year 1759, the country known under the term Haidarābād, comprising then an area of 95,337 square miles, had been for many years completely under French influence. But when, in that year, Colonel Forde, acting under the inspiration of Clive, expelled the French from the country known as the Northern Sirkars, he forced upon the Nizam of the day, then called the Subahdar, who had marched to the assistance of the French, a ~~treaty~~ whereby he renounced the French alliance, agreed never to allow a French contingent within his dominions, and ceded a large territory to the English.

Had the conditions of that treaty been always insisted upon the Haidarābād difficulty would never have arisen, or, at least, it would never have assumed an aggravated form. But, in course of time, the position of the English in Southern India became often very precarious. It is true that occasionally they were able to make their authority felt. Thus, in 1768, they made a new treaty with the Nizam, whereby, in return for certain important considerations, they agreed to furnish him, upon requisition, with two battalions of sipāhis and guns, on condition of his paying their expenses. Eleven years later, in 1779, the brother of the Nizam, Basālat Jang by name, who, despite the Treaty of 1759, had taken French levies into his service, pressed by Haidar Ālī, had implored the aid of the English, and to obtain it had agreed to substitute for his French levies a detachment of English troops, and to yield to the English the district of Guntur. In spite of the protests of the Nizam, the Governor of Madras had assented to this arrangement. But the Home Government had disapproved the act, and had recalled the Governor. The Nizam, however, had been so outraged,

that in the interval he had negotiated with Sindhiá and Haidar Áli for a common alliance against the English; and, what is more germane to the present subject, he had taken into his employment French officers to drill his troops. This was in direct contravention of the Treaty of 1759. But the English were then threatened by Haidar, and they had not the power at the moment to notice the infraction; and it remained unnoticed. It is a proof of their waning influence at this period, that although, on the death of Basálat Jang, in 1782, the district of Guntur lapsed by treaty to the British, they allowed the Nizam to seize it, and to hold it for six years.

When, in 1789, the first war broke out between the English and Típu Sultán, the Nizam was forced to take a side. He distrusted Típu, and the English promised much. He declared, therefore, for the English; and, when victory crowned their efforts, he received as a reward territories bearing, then, an annual revenue of 52,64,000 Rs., besides a third of the amount in cash, amounting to three millions sterling, levied from Típu. To that war the Maráthás had likewise been a consenting party, and they, too, had had their share of the plunder. With the division of the spoil with them came danger to the Nizam, and in spite of the proffered mediation of the then Governor-General, Sir John Shore, which the Peshwá refused, war ensued between the rival claimants. The campaign was short but decisive. Rejecting the bold advice of the Commander of his French contingent, Monsieur Raymond, the ablest of the adventurers in the service of the native princes, the Nizam, after fighting not unequally a pitched battle, retreated during the night that followed, was pursued, and forced to accept a treaty which cost him three millions sterling in money, and territories yielding an annual revenue of £350,000.

During that short war, the Governor-General, at peace with both parties, had, whilst refusing active aid to the Nizam, carried his compliance beyond the bounds of true propriety, by allowing British sipáhis to guard the Nizam's dominions, whilst that prince should take the field with his own troops. Notwithstanding this compliance, the refusal of the Governor-General to lend him active assistance rankled in the mind of the Nizam, and his first step, after he had signed peace with the Maráthás, was to dismiss the British battalions at the same time, that he increased the number of French sipáhis and of their officers. Suddenly, however, there occurred one of those outbreaks to which the native States of India were prone in those days. The British battalions had actually started on their return journey when the eldest son of the Nizam, *Álí Jáh*, broke out in rebellion. The French contingent was despatched against him, and succeeded in bringing him back a prisoner. But, meanwhile, the British battalions, hearing of the crisis, had returned, and the Nizam, terrified and unnerved, determined then to retain them.

Still the French force was there, and what is more, its numbers had been increased to 14,000 men. The sipáhis composing it were well drilled and efficient, and they were commanded in chief by a man of great ability, animated by a national hatred to the English. Raymond was born at *Sérignac*, in Gascony, in 1755, and at the age of twenty had engaged as a sub-lieutenant in a French corps, commanded by the Chevalier de *Lassé*, in the service of *Haidar Álí*. His distinguished conduct on several occasions had attracted the notice of the commanders of the army, and he obtained the rank of captain in the regular service of France. When *Bussy* came out to India in 1783 to co-operate with *Haidar* against the English, he made Raymond his aide-de-

camp. On Bussy's death, the then Governor of Pondichery recommended Raymond to the Nizam as an officer upon whom he could entirely rely. Raymond soon justified the recommendation. Commissioned to form one regiment, he soon produced a body of men, the equal of whom, in efficiency and drill, the Nizam had never seen. Gradually the number was increased to fourteen, and it had just arrived at that strength, when, on March the 6th, 1798, he died, not without suspicion of having been poisoned. Seven weeks later, April the 26th—a day of many striking coincidences—Lord Mornington arrived at Madras.

But if, on that date, there was an accumulation of evidence that Maisur was conspiring with an European Power with which Great Britain was at war; that the Nizam, secretly unfriendly, was acting in contravention of the terms of a treaty which still existed; there was little in Northern, North-Western, Central, or Western India to reassure the mind of the incoming Proconsul. In those parts the Maráthá influence was everywhere, preponderant. The chief cities of the west and of the north-west, cities and centres such as Puna, Bárodah, Ásirgarh, Nagpúr, Burhánpúr, Indur, Ujjén, Gwáliár, Ágra, Dehlí, and Áligarh were firmly held by one member or another of the powerful confederacy. The armies of Sindhiá and Holkar were to a large extent trained and commanded by Frenchmen. Dáolat Ráo Sindhiá, the most powerful of the Maráthá chiefs, was known to entertain no friendly feeling towards the British. He was still very young, and it was still possible that he might yet take up the threads of that secret negotiation for union against the foreigner, which had been the dream of his immediate predecessor.

The chance that he would not take up that thread con-

stituted, at this period, the one hope for the English. Mādajhí Sindhiá had died but four years earlier, just as he had succeeded in the difficult, the almost impossible, task of giving one direction to the foreign policy of the five Powers who formed the Maráthá Confederacy, the Peshwá, the Bhonslá, the Gaikwár, Holkar, and Sindhiá. His adopted son and successor, Dáolat Ráo, had, up to the moment of which I am writing, displayed neither the ability nor the will to follow in his track; whilst Jeswant Ráo Holkar, who had but just succeeded the wise and prudent Tukají, seemed animated chiefly by a desire to wreak his vengeance for past insults on his powerful neighbour, Sindhiá.

Nor, if a glance were directed at the provinces outside the range of Maráthá influence, was the prospect of a nature to reassure. The recognition by Sir John Shore of the claims of Saadat Álí to the vacated *masnad* of Oudh, though strictly in accordance with justice, had left a strong party in that province which viewed with great disfavour the interference of the British; whilst in the adjoining province of Rohilkhand, inhabited by a brave and war-like race, who had suffered from that same interference, there prevailed a strong hope that the ruler of Kábul, Zamán Sháh, would repeat, and even surpass, the achievements of Nádir Sháh and Ahmad Sháh.

Such was the condition of India, and such were the feelings of the princes, and, to a great extent, of the peoples, of India, when, on April the 26th, Lord Mornington landed at Madras to assume the office of Governor-General of India. The reader would, however, fail to grasp the nature of his position in its fullest extent, unless he had some knowledge of the character of his predecessor; some distinct idea of the kind of policy which that predecessor had attempted to pursue.

Sir John Shore, created on his retirement Lord Teignmouth, was a man possessing great amiability of character, and was actuated in all his dealings by a determination to pursue the course which to him was the "right" course. But he was an idealist, a philosopher, who shaped his policy, not from the standpoint of things as they were, but from the standpoint of things as, in his opinion, they ought to be. Believing that the British dominion in India had reached its limit, no hostile combination of native princes ~~would~~ have induced him to extend it. He wished that all the native States of India should be maintained in their integrity. Consequently, throughout his tenure of office, he had not only proclaimed, but had maintained, a policy of non-interference. The more ambitious Princes of India, Tipu, Madajhi Sindhiá, and, to a certain extent, the Nizam, had derived from this policy enormous consolation, for they had found it only necessary to protest to be believed. Indeed, it is a very curious fact that the very day Lord Mornington landed at Madras, a letter from Tipu, who had openly allied himself with the French Republic for the expulsion of the English from India, reached the Governor-General, containing the Sultan's assurance of his desire to strengthen the "foundations of harmony and concord established between the two States." Sir John Shore never realised the fact that although, throughout his incumbency of office, he had maintained peace, yet that that very peace had been largely instrumental in bringing about a revolution of thought in the minds of the native princes; that very generally they had substituted, for jealousy of one another, a desire to combine against the foreigner. This policy had, it is true, been temporarily interrupted by the death of Madhají Sindhiá (February the 12th, 1794) just as it was about to mature, and by the character of the Madhají's successor.

But it was certain to revive. It had become a principle never to be forgotten, though, in consequence of the impetuous passions incident to youth, often to be neglected.

Such was the state of India at the time of the arrival of the new Governor-General. Such were the subjects which forced themselves upon his attention. I propose to consider in a separate chapter the spirit in which he met them.

CHAPTER III.

TÍPU SULTÁN, THE NIZAM, AND THE PESHWÁ.

FEB.—DEC. 1798.

Lord Mornington's policy towards the Nizam and Típu defined—Necessity of readjusting the balance of power—Lord Mornington at Madras—Governor Malartie's proclamation—Negotiations with the Nizam—Signature of the new treaty—Dismissal of the Nizam's French contingent—Subjection of the Nizam to English influence—Lord Mornington's negotiations with the Peshwá.

IN the course of his voyage from England, Lord Mornington touched at the Cape (February, 1798). There he not only received despatches, giving him the latest Indian news, and dealing especially with Típu Sultán and the Nizam, but he met Major Kirkpatrick, an officer who had filled the office of British Resident at Haidarábád, and who was well acquainted with the political position of the several native princes of India. Assisted by this competent adviser, Lord Mornington set diligently to work to master the situation, and it is a proof of the clearness, the comprehensiveness, the quickness of his intellect, that in his despatches from the Cape to the President of the Board of Control he laid down the policy for dealing with the Nizam and with Típu on the precise lines on which he subsequently carried it out. Thus, writing on February 23rd, he enclosed a copy of the questions he had put to Major Kirkpatrick, and the written answers he had received from that officer, on the position at

Haidarábád ; and, drawing his own conclusions, stated that as the existence and the augmentation of the French contingent might easily be made the basis for establishing a French party in the very heart of Southern India, means ought to be taken to check its influence. Glancing rapidly at the result of the last war between the Nizam and the Maráthás, and the consequent decline of the *prestige* of the former, Lord Mornington, believing that a loyal Nizam would constitute a powerful mainstay of British power in Southern India, expressed his conviction that it would be a wise policy to check by timely aid the rapid declension of the Nizam's weight among the Powers of Hindustan. This, he thought, could be done in no manner so effectual or unobjectionable as by furnishing him with a large increase of the British force then in his pay ; the pay of the augmented force to be secured in the manner best calculated to prevent future discussion and embarrassment. "In granting this force to the Nizam, we ought," he said, "not only to stipulate for the disbanding of Raymond's corps, but we ought to take care that the officers should be immediately sent out of India."

One other point is mentioned by Lord Mornington in the same letter, as a point of much difficulty and danger connected with the Nizam. He referred to the desire expressed by that Prince to obtain a British guarantee of his possessions against the Maráthás and against Típu. That it should be necessary to consider such a point, and to regard it as one of great difficulty and danger, indicates most clearly the vital difference between India of the present day and the India which Lord Mornington went to govern. In that India, Great Britain was only one Power amongst many others, all equally jealous of their independence. Far from being supreme, she was not admitted even to be preponderant. Haidar Álí had

within twenty years waged with her a not unequal war, and the son of Haidar Álí was an independent prince, allying himself with the enemies of England. Equally independent, and possessing a predominating influence in Western, North-Western, and Central India, were the five Maráthá Princes already enumerated, one out of the five, at least, considering himself predestined to be the successor to the Mughul, and already occupying both his capitals. The Nizam was not so independent, for his treaty obligations fettered his action; but, as had been shown in that very decade, he was free to wage war with the other native princes. In fact, he was but just emerging from that disastrous war with the Maráthás which had followed the defeat of Típu in 1792. And now he, as a condition of dismissing his French sipáhis, that is, as a condition of placing himself and his territory more absolutely under British control, was demanding a guarantee of his possessions against the independent native princes of India, and, in addition, the right previously denied to him, of employing against those native princes the sipáhis, drilled by British officers, furnished to him by the British Government. No wonder that Lord Mornington, writing from the Cape of Good Hope, should regard this proposal as involving much delicacy and danger. Yet even then he grasped the position, and he grasped it in the same decided and statesmanlike manner which at a later period characterised all his dealings with native princes on the spot. A one-sided guarantee he at once rejected as impracticable, unless Great Britain were to have absolute control over the foreign relations of the Nizam. Típu's hostility had even then been too clearly manifested to permit Lord Mornington to entertain the idea of any engagement with him. But, writing from the Cape, before he had set foot

on Indian soil, he thought it might be expedient to induce the Maráthá powers to enter into such a joint guarantee ; that he might prove to them that it was to their interest to agree to respect the actual dominions of the Nizam, provided the British should guarantee them, against any attack from that prince. Even then he discerned that Típu was the first enemy he would have to encounter. In fact, in this conception regarding a mutual guarantee, we can discern the earnest desire, that in the contest which seemed to loom in a very near future, Típu should stand alone, unaided by either of the two powers, the Nizam and the Maráthás, his rivals then, but possibly under other circumstances his allies.

Details, such as he could gather from Major Kirkpatrick, regarding the Maráthá princes, followed in this remarkable letter. It was followed by another, of an equally statesmanlike character, giving a comprehensive review of the occurrences in India during that decade ; showing how the policy of abstention from all interference with native powers, adopted by his immediate predecessor, had changed the relative positions of England and the independent native states, and had made it all but impossible to assure such a combination against Típu as had been conducted with such marked success in 1788. He pointed out, further, how the declension of the influence of the Peshwá among the Maráthás, and the consequent rise of that of Sindhiá, had not tended to improve the relations between that people and the English. Arguing then, the possible effects of an invasion of India by Zamán Sháh, and an alliance of that prince with Típu, he arrived at the following conclusion—a conclusion thoroughly warranted by the circumstances of the period—“that the balance of power in India no longer exists upon the same footing on which it was placed by the

peace of Seringapatam. The question, therefore, must arise, how it may best be brought back again to that state, in which you have directed me to maintain it." He then proceeded to discuss that question.

I have dwelt at some length upon these interesting letters, because they go far to prove how thoroughly Lord Mornington had examined the position of affairs in India, in their various and varying details, before he set foot in the country; how he had mastered the principles of action which had animated Típu on the one side, and the Nizam on the other; and how he had arrived at the conclusion that at the present time, in the face of new difficulties arising in consequence of the war with France, it would no longer be possible to pursue the non-intervention policy of his predecessor. With respect to the Maráthás, he could only write vaguely; but even with respect to these his acute mind had arrived at a right conclusion. He had already recognised that the death of Madhají Sindhiá had weakened that formidable branch of the Confederacy, and had deprived the five powers of a man who could have bent their united strength in one direction. He had not heard of the death of Tukaji Holkar, which occurred only in that year, nor could he presage the advent to power of so formidable a successor as Jeswant Ráo. He saw, however, that with the Maráthás there would be, in all probability, no immediate difficulty, and that he would be at liberty, on landing, to concentrate all his attention on the Nizam and Típu Sultán.

The information, then, which reached Lord Mornington when, on April 26th, he landed at Madras, was not of a nature to surprise him. He arrived fully armed, and fully resolved to solve the difficulties in accordance with the principles he had laid down in his letters to Mr.

Dundas from the Cape, viz., to restore to England the relative position she had occupied in 1702. For the moment he did not go further. The reader will watch with interest the circumstances which compelled him to assure to his country a position, not of equality merely, not even of preponderance, but of predominance.

April 26th, 1798, was, I have already intimated, a day of coincidences. On that day, Lord Mornington arrived at Madras; the ninety-nine French auxiliaries for the service of Tipu landed at Mangalor; and the Calcutta Government received from that potentate a letter full of professions of friendship for the East India Company. At Madras Lord Mornington stayed but a few days. He had been requested by the Court of Directors to endeavour, whilst there, to prevail on the Nawáb of Arkát to agree to a modification of the Treaty of 1792. The result of the negotiation proved how greatly the non-interference system of the preceding six years had lessened the influence of England. The Nawáb of Arkát owed all he possessed in the world to English influence. The efforts of Lawrence and Clive had made valid the somewhat shadowy claims of his father against the pretensions of the candidate supported by the French. He and his family had since been regarded as the special *protégés* of the English, and though they had paid somewhat extravagantly for the protection, it had saved them alike from the raids of the Maráthás and the hatred of Haidar Álí and his son. Under the circumstances of ten years previously the modification required by Lord Mornington would have been granted at once; but, although that nobleman conducted the negotiation in a manner such as to inspire General Harris, the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras army and Acting-Governor of Madras, who was present, with the greatest respect for his abilities, the Nawáb

refused to give way ; nay, more, when Lord Mornington drew attention to the fact that his debt to the Company, of long standing, still remained unliquidated, the Nawáb declined to make any provision for its repayment. It became evident to the new Governor-General that if a petty prince could thus refuse to attend to the wishes of the power which had made him, the prestige of England must have fallen very considerably indeed.

Lord Mornington stayed at Madras but thirteen days. On May 9th, he continued his journey to Calcutta, and arrived there the 17th of the same month.

There he found, or rather he brought with him for settlement from Madras, one or two matters of some importance which required immediate settlement. The first of these related to the succession to Tanjúr, a province in Southern India, the capital of which, also called Tanjúr, was situated some forty miles from Trichinápalli. Fourteen days after his arrival he had settled this question by the nomination of the candidate whose claim was, really, beyond question, though interested parties had chosen to question it. He was then on the point of turning his attention to the position of the Nizam, when, on June 8th, he was startled by reading, in a Calcutta newspaper, copies of the proclamation issued by Governor Malartic, in the Isle of France, relative to the envoys of Típu, promising material aid from France, and inviting enlistment for that purpose. At first, Lord Mornington was disposed to think that the extracts might be forgeries, but further reflection, leading to the belief that they might be true, he wrote to General Harris the day following, requesting him to adopt the precautionary measure of turning his "attention to the means of collecting a force, if necessity should unfortunately require it, but it is not my desire that you should

proceed to take any public steps towards the assembling of the army before you receive some further intimation from me."

Ten days later, Lord Mornington received proof of the authenticity of Governor Malartic's proclamation. It was established, further, to the satisfaction of the Governor-General, that Típu had despatched two envoys to the Isle of France; that the proclamation had been issued subsequently to their arrival, and during their residence in the island. He also learned that succours, small in number indeed, but composed of Frenchmen or French subjects, had actually landed in Maisur territory; and that Típu Sultán, aided by Malartic, had made offers of alliance to the Directory at Paris, and that he was hoping that his request might be responded to by a further and a larger despatch of troops. It was even quite possible that such a force might have been already despatched.

To Lord Mornington, to his Commander-in-Chief, Sir Alured Clarke, and to all the other members of his Council, the situation seemed threatening, requiring prompt and energetic action. There was no electric telegraph in those days to bring instant information. The communication between the Malabar coast and Calcutta was even long and difficult. It had been only by extraordinary efforts that, on June the 18th, Lord Mornington had heard of the arrival of the levies from the Isle of France on April the 26th. For aught he knew further levies might have landed, and an army might be on its way from France. Lord Mornington then, backed by all his Councillors, resolved to take precautionary measures—measures which would not precipitate a catastrophe, but would meet it when it should arise. Bookworms have blamed him for taking even such

a precaution. Had he not taken it, he would have imperilled the Empire.

Accordingly, on June the 20th, two days after he and his Council had satisfied themselves that the proclamation was authentic, Lord Mornington wrote thus to General Harris :—

“I now take the earliest opportunity of acquainting you with my final determination. I mean to call upon the allies without delay, and to assemble the army upon the coast with all possible expedition. You will receive my public instructions in the course of a few days. Until you have received them, it will not be proper to take any public steps for the assembly of an army; but whatever can be done without a disclosure of the ultimate object, I authorise you to do immediately, intending to apprise you by this letter that it is my positive resolution to assemble the army upon the coast. I wish to receive from you, by express, a statement of the force you can put in motion immediately, and within what time you can make large additions to it.”

It may be added, that the allies referred to in this letter were the Nizam and the Maráthás.

As, in all probability, some weeks or even months must elapse before General Harris could complete the preparations necessary for a long campaign, Lord Mornington resolved to lose no time in dealing with the Nizam. The information of the action of Típu had, indeed, brought his case into the greater prominence, because madness itself could only have excused the entering upon a war with Típu, supported by French troops, and leaving to the disposal of the Nizam 14,000 sipáhis, drilled and partly officered by Frenchmen.

In a preceding page I have shown how the Nizam, angry with the English on account of their refusal to render him active support in the war which he waged in 1794 with the Maráthás, had actually dismissed the two battalions of English sipáhis, stipulated by the Treaty of 1790, when the rebellion of his son, Áli Jáh, had induced

the English commander of those battalions to stay his march; and how the Nizam, suspicious of everybody, but less suspicious of the English than of others, had retained them. The French contingent, counting 14,000 men, besides a numerous artillery, also remained, strong in its numbers, and especially strong in the affection of the French party at the Court of the Nizam. Desirous to render the Nizam relatively stronger, to assure to him a force upon which he could rely under all circumstances, and which yet should be exclusively an English force; equally resolved to remove from the flank of a British army, on the eve of engaging with an enemy who might be backed by French troops, a powerful corps of trained sipáhis commanded by Frenchmen; Lord Mornington, in July, directed the Resident at Haidarábád to negotiate with the Nizam a new Treaty, the main provision of which should be the augmentation of the English subsidiary force to six battalions of infantry with a powerful artillery, and the dismissal of the corps commanded by French officers in His Highness's service. It is probable that if such a demand had been made seven months before, whilst Raymond was yet alive, it would have been treated by the Nizam in a manner not dissimilar to that in which the Nawáb of Arkát had replied to Lord Mornington in the preceding April. But the experience of three months of the firm and resolute government of the new Proconsul had convinced the native princes that the supine methods of Sir John Shore had been departed from; that there was a man at the helm who saw for himself, who judged for himself, and who was as resolute in action as he was clear and decided in the expression of his views. The sound of an approaching contest with the ruler of Maisur had gone over Southern India. Under the circumstances, the Nizam felt that he had but one alternative. He must

absolutely refuse, or he must absolutely accept. Absolute refusal meant alliance with Típu, whom he detested, and the certainty of having to sustain the first attack of the English—possibly, even, to be abandoned by his ally. He could not hesitate.

The Treaty which the Nizam signed on September the 1st, and which was ratified at Calcutta on the 18th of the same month, declared in its preamble that the augmentation of the British force to the extent above indicated was conceded at the express desire of the Nizam himself; that it was a necessary complement to the Treaty of 1790, which required the allies to take immediate measures for the defence of their respective dominions. It contained, likewise, a stipulation for a Treaty of a triple guarantee of the said possessions between the English, the Nizam, and the Peshwá. Should the latter refuse his assent, then authority was conceded to the English to mediate between the Nizam and the Peshwá—such mediation to be, in its terms, binding on the Nizam. Finally, the Treaty confirmed all existing Treaties between the English, the Peshwá, and the Nizam, and declared the free assent of the latter to similar subsidiary engagements between the English and the Peshwá, in case the latter should express a desire for such an arrangement. The reader will observe that this Treaty was drawn up on the lines of the recommendations made by Lord Mornington in his letters from the Cape to Mr. Dundas.

The first question which presented itself to the Governor-General, after he had ratified the Treaty (September the 18th), was how to carry out its main provision, the disbanding of the French contingent, with promptitude and success. Here there was no hesitation. In anticipation of the agreement of the Nizam to the proffered conditions, Lord Mornington had directed the

march of the four additional battalions and the artillery to a point on the border of the territories of the Nizam, whence, at a given signal, they might march on Haidarábád. The commander of those battalions, Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts, received the order to march the moment the information should reach him that the Treaty had been ratified. He obeyed those orders to the letter, marched instantly on Haidarábád, and joined the two battalions stationed there on October the 19th. Then began the hesitations of the Nizam. He was a timid man, and, on the eve of a possible contest between the numerically inferior force of British sipáhis, whom he had brought in, and the superior number of the French contingent, he began to reckon how he might fare in the event of the victory of the latter. But Captain Kirkpatrick, still Resident at his Court, insisted upon the immediate execution of the Article of the Treaty relating to the French contingent, and a movement made by Colonel Roberts having convinced the Nizam that the disbandment would under any circumstances be attempted, he gave the necessary orders. On the evening of October the 21st, a proclamation was issued and distributed in the lines of the French contingent, informing the sipáhis that the Nizam had dismissed the French officers from his service; that they were relieved from obedience to those officers; and that all who should support them would be punished as traitors. This proclamation excited the greatest commotion in the lines. The sipáhis, to whom considerable arrears of pay were due, turned upon their officers, imprisoned them, and threatened them with the forfeiture of their lives, unless those arrears should be met. Information of these proceedings having reached Colonel Roberts, that officer proceeded to act with judgment and promptitude. At daylight the following morning, with

his own battalions and the Nizam's cavalry, he surrounded the French lines; then, addressing the revolted sipáhis, he offered them full payment of all arrears, and future service under other officers, on condition of laying down their arms. After some discussion, the sipáhis assented to these conditions. "Thus," wrote Sir John Malcolm, who was present in his capacity of assistant to the Resident, "in a few hours, a corps, whose numbers were nearly fourteen thousand men, and who had in their possession a train of artillery and an arsenal filled with every description of military stores, was completely disarmed without one life having been lost." The French officers quietly surrendered. They were not treated as prisoners of war, but were sent, by way of England, to France.

Thus successfully was carried out the first great operation of Lord Mornington's administration. The importance of it can scarcely be over-estimated. It was not only that on the eve of a war with a prince, whose influence on the western coast was preponderant, it secured for the English on the eastern coast the absolute security of their right flank. It accomplished much more. It compelled the Nizam to be not only our ally, but our submissive ally. It virtually deprived him of the right which he had exercised but four years before, of making war on other princes of India, except as an ally of the British. The Treaty brought him in fact within, just within, but still within, the category of protected princes, in which his successors have since remained. It was the thin end of the wedge, inserted at precisely the right moment by a master hand. From that hour the Nizam, in his difficulties, could appeal to none save to the English. From that hour the control of the English over his external relations was absolute.

Nor was Lord Mornington less successful in his nego-

tiations with the Peshwá. At the Court of that prince Dáolat Ráo Sindhiá—young, passionate, and inexperienced—had been unable to maintain the influence acquired by his immediate predecessor, Madhájí. He had one rival in Náná Farnávís, supposed to be friendly to an alliance with the English; another in Bálájí Ráo, a secret agent of the Peshwá, who intrigued in the manner best calculated to advance the personal interests of the latter. For the moment, then, it was not difficult to persuade the Court of Puná to express a guarded approval of the arrangements entered into between the Nizam and the British, so far as it affected the interests of the Peshwá. The neutrality of the Maráthás was thus secured for the coming war with Maisur, and although the Peshwá personally wished well to Típu, and even despatched negotiators to communicate with him towards the close of 1798, the intrigue was discovered and frustrated by Náná Farnávís before it had had time to bear fruit.

In this manner Lord Mornington, within seven months of his arrival in India, had restored the prestige of the British name. Finding amongst the three independent princes but one who was a determined, an irreconcilable, and a dangerous enemy, he had made of one of the others a protected ally, bound to follow the fortunes and obey the orders of the Governor-General, and had for the moment neutralised the opposition of the third. In the next chapter I shall show how he dealt with the prince whose irreconcilable hostility, and whose alliance with France, made him at that moment supremely dangerous.

CHAPTER IV.

TÍPU SULTAN AND THE FALL OF SERINGAPATAM.

JUNE, 1798—JANUARY, 1799.

Lord Mornington's despatch to General Harris—Consternation at Madras—Lord Mornington's reply—His minute—Disbandment of the sipáhis—Correspondence with Típu—Forward movement of the troops—Lord Mornington's proclamation—Fall of Seringapatam—Division of the conquered territory—The Peshwá declines his share—Restoration of the Hindu dynasty—Success of Lord Mornington's policy.

IN the last chapter I have told how, on June the 8th, Lord Mornington, deeply impressed by the revelation of the negotiations of Típu Sultán with the Governor of the Isle of France, and prescient of the danger which might arise to British interests from a serious alliance between that prince and revolutionary France, had requested General Harris to adopt the precautionary measure "of turning his attention to the means of collecting a force, if necessity should unfortunately require it; but," he had added, "it is not my desire that you should proceed to take any public steps towards the assembling of an army before you receive further intimation from me." I propose now to accompany Lord Mornington's despatch to Madras, and to record the effect it produced in the Council Chamber of that Presidency.

Historically, the record of the result produced is of the greatest importance. It affords the clearest proof of the

state of abject terror which had been produced in the minds of official Englishmen by the memory of the wars with Haidar Álí, notwithstanding that in the interval they had forced his son, Típu, to sue for a peace which had cost him half his dominions. The recollection of the earlier miseries remained, whilst the memory of the subsequent triumph had been obliterated. It was not the least of the many services rendered by Lord Mornington to British India that he knew how, by his courageous initiative, to rouse his countrymen from a torpor which, if permitted to rule the counsels of Madras, might have caused the loss of India.

On the arrival, about June the 20th, of Lord Mornington's despatch to the Madras Government, the Acting Governor's Secretary, Mr. Lushington, carried it to Mr. Webbe, the principal Secretary to the Government, with a view to its being considered in Council. In his life of Lord Harris, Mr. Lushington records how Mr. Webbe, on reading the letter, gave expression to his disapprobation in the strongest terms:—

Our unprepared state for war, he adds, in the absence of a large portion of our troops in the Eastern Islands: our empty and bankrupt treasury at Madras;—all the horrors of Haidar's merciless invasion of the Karnátik,—of Típu's sanguinary destruction of Colonel Baillie's detachment,—Sir Hector Munro's disgraceful retreat to Madras, and the first failure of Lord Cornwallis against Seringapatam, rushed at once into Mr. Webbe's mind, and he exclaimed with bitterness and grief: 'I can anticipate nothing but shocking disasters from a premature attack upon Típu in our present disabled condition, and the impeachment of Lord Mornington for his temerity.'

In India, appointments to responsible situations, such as that of Secretary to the Government, are almost invariably given to merit. At Madras, the Secretary is, in fact, the most important personage, next to the Governor, in the Government; and, even of the Governor, he is the eye, the

ear, and often the guiding mind. In using the language I have quoted, Mr. Webbe was probably then but expressing the general opinion of the official class in Madras. Even the Acting Governor, General Harris, a man not given to panic, thinking clearly, and acting always with decision, was startled by Lord Mornington's letter. Replying to the Governor-General, on June 23rd, he stated, that although he was satisfied that Típu's inveteracy against us would end only with his life, and that he would certainly seize any opportunity to annoy us, he still thought it worthy of serious consideration whether "it would not be better that he should be allowed to make the *amende honorable*, if he be so inclined, than that we should avail ourselves of the error he has run into, and endeavour to punish him for his insolence." The reader will not fail to gather from this remark of the member of Council, the most favourable to Lord Mornington, that the entire Council had misunderstood the real meaning of Lord Mornington's letter. That letter spoke merely of preparation. It requested General Harris to turn his attention to the means of collecting a force, if necessity should unfortunately require it. Nor did the letter of June 30th, which followed at an interval of three weeks that of the 8th, though more explicit, pass the boundary of preparation. It simply called upon the Governor to state the number of men he could place immediately in the field, and the time he would require to increase that number. This letter was before the Madras Council when they adopted a memorandum drawn up by Mr. Webbe, earnestly protesting against the orders of the Supreme Government.

Few things show more clearly the difficulties Lord Mornington had to overcome than this opposition, coming from the men to whom would be entrusted the carrying

out of his instructions. General Harris, indeed, belonged to that order of men who, whatever their opinions, are ready to carry out implicitly the lawful orders of their superiors. "On my part," he had written to Lord Mornington, "your Lordship may depend on my following your instructions implicitly." But, in forwarding Mr. Webbe's memorandum, approved by his Council, even General Harris showed that he dissented from the opinions of his chief. In that memorandum the writer, reviewing the history of the past, came to the conclusion that, under existing circumstances, an attack upon Típu Sultán "is more likely to end in discomfiture than in victory." He added his conviction that any hostile preparations on the part of the British Government would produce immediate invasion by Típu Sultán. He concluded thus: "If war is inevitable, and the present are judged the most advantageous circumstances under which it can commence, I fear our situation is bad beyond the hope of remedy." The other members of the Madras Council adopted the views of Mr. Webbe.

The expostulations of the members of a Government, without one dissentient voice, against the policy he had not only warmly espoused, but directed to be executed, would have been sufficient to induce an ordinary man, stranger than any of the remonstrants, to the country and to the ancient method of dealing with native princes, to pause and reflect. But Lord Mornington was no ordinary man, and the times were troublous beyond comparison. He saw that the dangers which threatened Southern India were caused by that very policy the continuance of which was advocated by Mr. Webbe in his memorandum. The Treaty of 1792 with Típu Sultán, though it had deprived him of one-half of his dominions, had yet left him that portion which he could use most adversely to the interests

of Great Britain. The possession of the seaboard on the Malabar coast had enabled him, at a moment when all Europe was threatened by the ambitious designs of one great power, to open negotiations with that power, and to offer to it the means of landing in his dominions, unmolested, any amount of auxiliaries. The intrigues of Típu with France, with Zamán Sháh, his attempts to negotiate with the Peshwá, were well known to the English world in India; were well known to the native princes of India. The danger arose from the possibility of any one of these alliances taking effect in an untoward moment, when the English were totally unprepared; when the Madras army, which would have to meet the first attack, should still be in that state of unreadiness which was urged by Mr. Webbe as a reason for absolute inaction. Such a sudden combination was possible. It would have been worked before that moment had there been a sufficiently large body of French troops in the Isle of France, or had the French Directory responded immediately to the invitation of Típu. Had Lord Mornington known that the French Directory had actually responded to that invitation; that, at the very moment he was ordering that the Madras army should be placed in a state of preparation, a French fleet and army, commanded by the brilliant chief who had made the immortal campaign of 1796, had taken Malta, and were progressing towards the other stepping-stone to India, the land of the Pharaohs, he could not have felt more strongly than he did feel the critical nature of the situation. That was then happening which he foresaw might, in some form or other, happen at any moment, and his mind was made up, that whenever that unknown danger should arrive, he would be, as far as lay in his power, ready to meet it.

The arguments of Mr. Webbe and the Madras Council

produced, then, on his mind, an effect the exact opposite of that they were intended to convey. Mr. Webbe had urged the unprepared condition of the Madras army, and, therefore, the danger of provoking Típu, lest he, hearing, as he would be sure to hear, of the preparations of the English, should invade Madras, and repeat the horrors perpetrated by his father. To Lord Mornington's mind no other argument could have appealed with stronger force in favour of his own views. The case of the supporters of the non-interference policy, the civilians who had been bred in the school of Cornwallis and Shore, had been clearly put by Mr. Webbe. But what did it amount to? Simply that British India, which had been won by the sword, was to be maintained solely by appealing to the good feeling and forbearance of the native powers; that the Governor-General was to respect their susceptibilities to the extent of leaving his coast-army weak and unarmed, even when he possessed the certain knowledge that the most powerful native prince in its vicinity was moving heaven and earth to form a hostile alliance against him—an alliance on the one side with a foe England was actually combating, and on the other with the son of the northern chief who had sacked Dehlí. Lord Mornington's reply to the Madras Government pointed out the extreme danger of such a policy. Reminding that Government, in a few dignified words, that he had not invited a discussion of his orders, he added, writing for himself and his Council:—

“If we thought it proper to enter with you into any discussion of the policy of our late orders, we might refer you to the records of your own Government, which furnish more than one example of the fatal consequences of neglecting to keep pace with the forwardness of the enemy's equipments, and of resting the defence of the Karnátik, in such a crisis as the present, on any other security than a state of early and active preparation for war. But being resolved to exclude all

such discussions from the correspondence of the two Governments, we shall only repeat our confidence in your zealous and speedy execution of those parts of the public service which fall within the direct line of your peculiar duty."

He therefore reiterated his orders for bringing the coast army into a state of efficiency.

Had that army been ready, he would have struck at the instant. He had in his hands ample proof of Típu's negotiations for the formation of a hostile league against the British. Any moment might make of those negotiations an accomplished fact. To strike, then, before that consummation should arrive, whilst Típu was still unsupported save by his ninety-nine Frenchmen, was, he felt, the truest policy. He could not pursue it, because the weapon in his hand was not yet, by the admission of those who forged it, strong enough even for defence. He had, therefore, to temporise, to wait, endeavouring, till that weapon should be ready, to strengthen his position by other means.

How he found those means, first, by the disbandment of the French sipáhi corps at Haidarábád; secondly, by the neutralisation of the powerful Maráthás, I have told in the last chapter. Meanwhile, he did not communicate to Típu the knowledge he had obtained of his intrigues, but continued, without a word of reproach, to receive from that prince letters expressive of the warmest regard and admiration for the English. This action he justified in a luminous minute, dated August 12th—a minute so declaratory of the reasons which prompted his policy, that I feel compelled to extract largely from it:—

"If the conduct of Típu Sultán," wrote Lord Mornington on that date, "had been of a nature which could be termed ambiguous or suspicious; if he had merely increased his force beyond his ordinary establishment, or had stationed it in some position on our confines, or on those of our allies, which might justify jealousy or alarm; if he

had renewed those secret intrigues at the courts of Haidarábád, Puná, and Kábul; or even if he had entered into any negotiation with France, of which the object was at all obscure, it might be our duty to resort in the first instance to his construction of proceedings, which being of a doubtful character, might admit of a satisfactory explanation. But where there is no doubt there can be no matter for explanation. The act of Típu's ambassadors, ratified by himself, and accompanied by the landing of a French force in this country, is a public, unqualified, and unambiguous, declaration of war, aggravated by an avowal, that the object of the war is neither explanation, reparation, nor security, but the total destruction of the British Government in India.

To affect to misunderstand an injury or insult of such a complexion, would argue a consciousness either of weakness or of fear. No state in India can misconstrue the conduct of Típu; the correspondence of our residents at Haidarábád and Puná sufficiently manifests the construction which it bears at both those courts; and in so clear and plain a case, our demand of explanation would be justly attributed either to a defect of spirit or of power. The result of such a demand would therefore be the disgrace of our character, and the diminution of our influence and consideration in the eyes of our allies, and of every other power in India. If the moment should appear favourable to the execution of Típu's declared design, he would answer such a demand by an immediate attack; if on the other hand, his preparations should not be sufficiently advanced, he would deny the existence of his engagements with France, would persist in his denial until he had reaped the full benefit of them, and finally, after having completed the improvement of his own army, and received the accession of an additional French force, he would turn the combined strength of both against our possessions, with an alacrity and confidence inspired by our inaction, and with advantages redoubled by our delay. In the present case the idea, therefore, of demanding explanation must be rejected, as being disgraceful in its principle and frivolous in its object.

In the same minute, Lord Mornington thus defined the grounds of complaint of the Government of India against the Sovereign of Maisur:—

“We complain, that, professing the most amicable disposition, bound by subsisting treaties of peace and friendship, and unprovoked by any offence on our part, he has manifested a design to effect our total destruction; he has prepared the means and instruments of a war of

extermination against us ; he has solicited and received the aid of our inveterate enemy for the declared purpose of annihilating our empire ; and he only awaits the arrival of a more effectual succour to strike a blow at our existence.”

In conclusion, the Governor-General thus defined the effect which the action, thus set forth, of Típu Sultán, was bound to produce on the administrators of the British authority in India :—

“ Neither the measure of his hostility, nor of our right to restrain it, nor of our danger from it, are to be estimated by the amount of the force which he has actually obtained (from France), for we know that his demands of military assistance were unlimited ; we know that they were addressed, not merely to the Government of the Mauritius, but to that of France, and we cannot ascertain how soon they may be satisfied to the full amount of his acknowledged expectations. This, therefore, is not merely the case of an injury to be repaired, but of the public safety to be secured against the present and future designs of an irreconcilable, desperate, and treacherous enemy. Against an enemy of this description no effectual security can be obtained, otherwise than by such a reduction of his power, as shall not only defeat his actual preparations, but establish a permanent restraint upon his future means of offence.”

The last sentence expresses in clear and forcible language the actual intentions of Lord Mornington with respect to the ruler of Maisur. He desired, by depriving him of the Malabar coast line, to render it impossible for him to communicate with the foreign nations of Europe. The action of Típu had proved most clearly that the maintenance of that line by a native prince was fraught with ever-continuous danger to British interests—a danger which those who have only known the British India of the present day, with all its native princes acknowledging the supremacy of the British, can hardly realise. To remain passive under the action of Típu was, in the opinion of Lord Mornington, to court destruction. There was no knowing when the French might land, as in the

days of Lally and Bussy they had landed, in considerable numbers. There was no certainty that the neutrality of the five Maráthá powers would be long continued. Above all, there was the imminent danger that Típu, learning, as assuredly his father would have taken care to learn, the unpreparedness of the British, might make a dash at their weakest points, and appear before Madras before the news even that he had moved could reach Calcutta. Haidar had done the very thing, and it was not known then how greatly Típu was, in all the essentials of a daring leader, inferior to his father. In directing, then, the Madras Government to place the coast army on a war footing, to be ready to defend, or, if necessary, to strike, Lord Mornington was taking a precaution which, it would have been thought, should have recommended itself even to the most timid. We have seen that, on the contrary, it alarmed even the boldest, in Madras. We have witnessed the same kind of timidity in our own time—the timidity which may be expressed in the words that a nation must not take defensive precautions lest it should alarm its neighbour and provoke invasion; but it has always brought about the humiliation of the nation that was influenced by it. Happily for the British India of 1798–9, the prescient and courageous mind of Lord Mornington adopted, unhesitatingly, the straight course dictated by common sense.

To clear the British position, to deprive the prince, whose territories would flank an army operating against Típu Sultán, of the power to impede the movements of that army, Lord Mornington carried out in October the measure of disarming the auxiliary corps of sipáhis, officered by Frenchmen, described in the last chapter. This bold action produced an immense effect throughout India. It had a potent influence in securing the neutrality of the Maráthás, and it carried the conviction

to every native prince in India, great and small, that the principles of the Shore Administration had been cast to the winds. The effect upon Típu I shall presently relate.

Four days before the disbandment at Haidarábád of the French contingent, that is, on October the 18th, Lord Mornington had received a despatch from the Secret Committee of the India House, informing him that a French fleet and army had sailed from Toulon on the 19th of May. The time of the departure of that fleet and army corresponded so very closely with the date, upon which an answer in force might be given by the French Directory to the urgent requests of Típu, that Lord Mornington recognised the necessity of further pressing the preparations of the Madras Government. A fortnight later, a despatch from England brought him information of the landing of the French in Egypt, and of the destruction of their fleet by Lord Nelson in Aboukir Bay. Up to that time the correspondence of Lord Mornington with the Sultán of Maisur had been of a character which might be termed conciliatory. Some claims made by Típu to lands in the Wainád district had, after examination by two commissioners on the spot, been courteously admitted. Lord Mornington had made no remonstrance regarding the negotiations of the Sultán with France, because remonstrance might provoke hostilities, and, whilst the English at Madras were not ready, he had to take into consideration the existence of the French contingent of the Nizam. But the news of the destruction of the French fleet at Aboukir strengthened his position enormously; and as at that time the preparations at Madras were progressing, and orders had been issued for the disbandment of the French contingent at Haidarábád, he found himself in a position to speak very plainly. Yet, even then, Lord Mornington did not depart

from the courteous and friendly tone of his previous communications. On November the 4th, he addressed to Tipu a letter, in which he informed him of the unprovoked attack made by the French on the dominions of the Sultán of the Turkish Empire and the destruction of the French fleet. Whatever may have been the thoughts of Tipu when he read this letter, he allowed no evidence of concern or annoyance to appear in his reply. Four days later, November the 8th, the Governor-General, having in the meantime received information of the perfect success of the measures he had taken with respect to the French contingent at Haidarábád, wrote again to Tipu, and on this occasion, for the first time, in a tone of remonstrance. Beginning by expressing the pleasure with which he had deputed two officers to examine on the spot into the validity of the claims made by the Sultán to some lands in the Wainád, Lord Mornington proceeded to state that he was well informed of the negotiations which had taken place between the Sultán and the French. Then, after mildly expostulating with him for entering upon friendly relations with a people who had shown themselves to be the inveterate foes of public order and the enemies of the British; assuring him that his own views on this point were shared by the Peshwá and the Nizam; and that his and their one desire was the permanent security and tranquillity of their own dominions and subjects; he informed him that to ensure this end he proposed to depute to him an officer, Major Doveton, well known to him, who would explain to him more fully his views, "and particularly the sole means which appear to myself and the allies of the Company to be effectual for the salutary purpose of removing all existing distrust and suspicion, and of establishing peace and good understanding on the most durable foundations."

It is curious that the two Powers who distrusted each other should have expressed their alarm just about the same time. Lord Mornington's letter, of November the 8th, had not reached Típu when, on the 18th, that Prince wrote to the Governor-General to ask him whether the reports which had reached him that he was making warlike preparations were true. The tone of the letter was most friendly, indeed almost affectionate. The delays caused by the defective means of transit in those days may be gathered from the fact that this letter, dated November the 18th, reached Calcutta only on December the 15th following.

Típu was a bigot and a fatalist. The news of the destruction of the French fleet at Aboukir had not in the least impressed him. What concerned him most was that the French were in Egypt, and that Egypt was well on the road to India. The news that the English were arming disturbed him a little, for early action on their part might interfere somewhat with his plans. Still, he thought the balance between good and evil was in his favour. He wrote, then, in reply to Lord Mornington's letter of the 18th, to say that he did not care to see Major Doveton, as existing treaties were a sufficient security for him, and that he could imagine no other means more binding. Then, having a presentiment that the object of the Governor-General was to deprive him of his coast-line, so as to cut off his direct communication with France, he sent envoys to Puná, to Kábul, to the Isle of France, even to Constantinople, to solicit prompt co-operation. He was resolved to use the opportunity which seemed to him to occur by the proximity of the French to strike a blow for his lost dominions. Lord Mornington's letter, of November 8th, produced then but little effect upon him. "If the evil must arrive to-morrow," he said, "let it rather arrive to-day."

He was more disturbed by a second letter from the Governor-General, dated December 10th. In that letter Lord Mornington, who had not then received Tipu's reply to his letter of November the 8th, earnestly pressed for an answer to that letter, and stated that he was about to proceed to Madras to be near at hand for the purpose of negotiating. Tipu still trusted so much to his power to deceive that, though startled by this information, he believed that a fabulous story of his negotiations with France would impose upon the Governor-General. But when he heard that Lord Mornington had reached Madras, December the 31st, for the purpose of dealing with him in person, his courage somewhat gave way. It receded still further when, a few days later, he received from that lord a letter, dated January 9th, remonstrating with him for his rejection of the proposed envoy; reciting in full detail the whole of his hostile proceedings at the Isle of France; enclosing a Persian translation of General Malartic's proclamation; explaining the necessity imposed upon himself and his allies of seeking relief from this ambiguous state of supposed peace, which was in reality no peace; adding his serious and solemn admonition to assent to the reception of the envoy he was sending; urging him not to postpone an answer for more than one day; and concluding by warning him that "dangerous consequences result from the delay of arduous affairs."

This despatch was, in very deed, a revelation to Tipu. Up to that moment he really believed that his impudent fables had imposed upon the credulous Frank. It seemed to arouse him, as it were, from a dream. Engrossed by the sense of additional importance accruing to himself from having as an ally a Power which had defied combined Europe, he had never allowed his imagination to dwell on the consequences which might follow a premature

disclosure of his negotiations with that Power, before he should have received from her any substantial assistance. And now those consequences were, he realised as he read Lord Mornington's letter, at his very door. A true despot of the oriental type, he sought in the first moments of his anger to wreak his vengeance on the instruments he had employed, through whose imprudence, he persuaded himself, the secret had transpired. Finding, however, but little relief in such action from the necessities imposed upon him by the still unanswered letter; recognising that the practical result of all his intrigues was absolutely fruitless; he was sorely tempted, and had almost resolved, to throw himself upon Lord Mornington's mercy, and to receive the envoy. But, with the indecision of a fatalist—who believes that the next throw of the dice may be in his favour—daily receiving from the French agents at his Court assurances that the French force intended to assist him must by that time have sailed from Suez, and might arrive at any moment, he hesitated and hesitated. Day followed day, and he had despatched no reply. It was to no purpose that, five days later, he received from Lord Mornington a copy of a letter from the Sublime Porte to his address, a letter in which the French were denounced as enemies of all true Muhammadans, and which enclosed a copy of the declaration of war on the part of Turkey against the aggressive Republic. Lord Mornington, in despatching these documents to Tipu, had added an earnest appeal to his better nature.

“May the admonitions of the head of your faith,” he wrote, “dispose your mind to the pacific propositions which I have repeatedly, but in vain, submitted to your wisdom. And may you at length receive the ambassador who will be empowered to conclude the definite arrangement of all differences between you and the allies, and to secure the tranquillity of India against the disturbers of the world.”

Still, Típu could not bring his mind to the point of coming to a decision. All January, Lord Mornington's letters remained unanswered. And when, early in February, the necessity of acknowledging the receipt of the letter from the Sublime Porte could no longer be postponed, the ruler of Maisur attempted to evade a direct reply to Lord Mornington's earnest appeal by the announcement—under the circumstances, the insolent announcement—that he was about to start on a shooting expedition. The announcement ran thus: "Being frequently disposed to make excursions and hunt, I am accordingly proceeding on a shooting expedition; you will be pleased to despatch Major Doveton (about whose coming your friendly pen has repeatedly written), slightly attended (or unattended)."

But, before that letter reached its destination, Lord Mornington had been forced by Típu's long silence to make a new departure. The Governor-General had come to Madras that he might be near at hand to confer with Típu. His letter earnestly requesting an immediate reply had been despatched on January 9th, from Madras. The distance thence to Seringapatam is but three hundred miles, a distance which might be traversed by the means at the Governor-General's disposal in six days. Yet January had passed, and no reply had been received to that letter, or to that despatched a week later, covering the missive from the Ottoman Porte. It was evident to Lord Mornington that he was being played with. Believing that Típu's object was to cause delay till the rainy season should set in, and learning that the Maisur sovereign had despatched another envoy to the French, he determined to be fooled no longer. Accordingly, on February 3rd, he issued instructions to the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras army, General Harris, to enter

the Maisur territory with the army assembled at Vellur ; and to General Stuart, commanding in Bombay, to operate from Malabar. General Harris had actually begun his forward movement (February 11th), when, on the 13th, Lord Mornington received from Típu the reply which I have quoted. With his natural shrewdness he detected at once the motive which had prompted it.

“The design,” he wrote, “is evidently to gain time until a change of circumstance and of season shall enable him to avail himself of the assistance of France. I shall endeavour to frustrate this design ; and although I shall not decline even this tardy and insidious acceptance of my repeated propositions for opening a negotiation, I shall accompany the negotiation by the movement of the army, for the purpose of enforcing such terms of peace as shall give effectual security to the Company’s possessions against any hostile consequences of the Sultán’s alliance with the French.”

Acting upon this principle, Lord Mornington, in his reply to Típu, dated February 22nd, expressed his sincere regret that his urgent representation of the danger of delay had produced no effect, and that the Sultán had postponed all notice of his admonitions until the lateness of the season rendered the advance of the army necessary for the safety of the allies ; that the mission of Major Doveton was therefore no longer expedient ; but that General Harris would receive any embassy the Sultán might despatch. He was further informed that General Harris had been directed to despatch this letter to him on the day that the British army should cross the Maisur border ; and to issue on the same day the Governor-General’s proclamation, a copy of which was sent to Típu by the same opportunity.

The proclamation of Lord Mornington, dated February 22nd, bears the impress of the strong, decisive, and vigorous intellect which conceived it. Beginning by

enumerating the various proofs he had given of his earnest desire to cultivate friendly relations with Típu Sultán, of the decisions in his favour on the question of boundary disputes, and of the absence of all complaints on the part of the Maisur ruler, Lord Mornington proceeded to express "the astonishment and indignation" which he and his allies had experienced, when, at the very moment the British Government had confirmed his claim to the lands in the Wainád, they had learned of the engagements he had contracted with the French nation, "in direct violation of the Treaty of Seringapatam, as well as of his own most solemn and recent protestations of friendship towards the allies."

Enumerating, then, in full detail all the efforts the Government of British India had made to induce the Sultán to enter into the paths of loyal friendship, Lord Mornington came to the famous reply to his earnest warnings and remonstrances of January 9th and 14th, the reply in which the Sultán announced his intention of proceeding on a shooting expedition:—

"The allies," continued the proclamation, "will not dwell on the peculiar phrases of this letter: but it must be evident to all the States of India that the answer of the Sultán has been deferred to this late period of the season with no other view than to preclude the allies, by insidious delays, from the benefit of those advantages which their combined military operations would enable them to secure." Announcing, then, that "the allies cannot suffer Típu Sultán to profit by his own studied and systematic delay;" recounting how, during three months, he had "obstinately rejected every pacific overture in the hourly expectation of receiving the succour which he has eagerly solicited for the prosecution of his favourite purposes of ambition and revenge;" Lord Mornington concluded by declaring that the allies, equally prepared to repel the violence and to counteract the artifices and delays of the Sultán, "are therefore resolved to place their army in such a position as shall afford adequate protection against any artifice or insincerity, and shall preclude the return of that danger which has lately so menaced their possessions."

He added, however, that as they were animated by an anxious desire to effect an adjustment with Típu Sultán, the Commander of the British Army, General Harris, "is authorised to receive any embassy which Típu Sultán may despatch to the head-quarters of the British army, and to concert a treaty on such conditions as may appear to the allies to be indispensably necessary for the establishment of a secure and durable peace."

Típu was thus afforded the time and the opportunity to save himself. Had he obeyed the first promptings of his heart when he received Lord Mornington's letter of January 9th, and, confessing his misdeeds, had promised reform, he would still undoubtedly have had to consent to being shorn of that part of his dominions which secured to him a seaport on the Malabar coast, but he would have been allowed to retain the still considerable remainder. As it was, he completely outwitted himself. When he despatched the insolent reply to Lord Mornington, intimating that he was about to proceed on a shooting expedition, he actually started to see how best he could surprise the English troops commanded by General Stuart before they should be ready. He did actually attack a portion of that general's army on March 6th, the very day after General Harris had crossed the frontier at another point. War thus became inevitable.

Into the details of that war it is no part of this book to enter. Begun, in the manner related, on March 6th, admirably conducted by General Harris, who personally directed all the details of the movements of the army he commanded, it was brought to a close on May 4th, by the storming of Seringapatam and the death of Típu Sultán. Then it was that it devolved upon the Governor-General to determine in what manner the territories which Haidar Álí had robbed from the Hindu dynasty, of

which he had been originally the servant, should be treated.

The task was one which called forth the display of the qualities of a statesman. Lord Mornington had not only to satisfy the just claims which his own Government might prefer—claims which, even before the war had begun, pointed to the scission of the Maisur principality from the sea—but he had to think of those who, under the name of allies, had contributed more or less to the success of the campaign. Those allies were the Nizam and the Peshwá. The former, become, by Lord Mornington's own bold policy, a protected ally; the latter still as independent as were the English. But, whereas the Maráthás had borne no part whatever in the war, whilst the Nizam had contributed to it all the resources of his territories, it seemed to the Governor-General to be highly unfair that they should benefit equally from the success which had been achieved. And yet it was necessary to take care so to act as to avoid giving just umbrage to a power which was preponderant in Western and predominant in Central and North-Western India. How Lord Mornington felt on this delicate point was expressed by him in his despatch on the subject to the Court of Directors :—

“To have divided the whole territory,” he wrote, “between the Company and the Nizam, to the exclusion of any other State, would have afforded strong ground of jealousy to the Maráthás, and aggrandized the Nizam's power beyond all bounds of discretion. Under whatever form such a partition could have been made, it must have placed in the hands of the Nizam many strong fortresses in the northern frontier of Maisur, and exposed our frontier in that quarter to every predatory incursion. Such a partition would have laid the foundation of perpetual differences, not only between the Maráthás and the Nizam, but between the Company and both those Powers.

“To have divided the country into three equal portions, allowing the Maráthás (who had borne no part in the expense or hazard of the war) an equal share with the other two branches of the triple alliance,

in the advantages of the peace, would have been unjust towards the Nizam and the Company; impolitic as furnishing an evil example to other allies in India, and dangerous as effecting a considerable aggrandizement of the Maráthá Empire at the expense of the Company and the Nizam. This mode of partition, also, must have placed Chitaldrug and some of the most important northern fortresses in the hands of the Maráthás, while the remainder of the fortresses in the same line would have been occupied by the Nizam, and our unfortified and open frontier in Maisur would have been exposed to the excesses of the undisciplined troops of both Powers."

Proceeding, then, to state that the Maráthás had no claim to any portion of the conquered territory, Lord Mornington added:—

"It was, however, desirable to conciliate their goodwill, and to offer them such a portion of territory as might give them an interest in the new settlement without offence or injury to the Nizam, and without danger to the frontier of the Company's possessions. On the other hand, it was prudent to limit the territory retained in the hands of the Company and of the Nizam within such bounds of moderation as should bear a due proportion to their respective expenses in the contest, and to the necessary means of securing the public safety of their respective dominions."

Lord Mornington then proceeded to declare how, acting on the lines thus laid down, he would deal with the territories which lay, without a recognised sovereign, prostrate at the feet of General Harris. To the representative of the ancient Hindu dynasty, then a boy five years old, he would reserve a portion of the country, including the capital, the plateau of Bangalor, and other districts towards the sea coast, but the nearest severed from the sea by a distance of fifteen miles, the whole yielding then (though it has since more than doubled) an annual revenue of about £500,000. During the minority of the Rájah the resources of the country should be controlled and husbanded by a British Resident, and, on attaining his majority, the Rájah should be under the

suzerainty of the British. To the British and the Nizam, portions of territory of equal value, yielding revenues to the amount of about £250,000 annually, would be assigned; whilst the Maráthás were to obtain a tract somewhat more than half the value of that assigned to the Nizam. But it was not the amount of revenue which constituted the main value of the territories obtained by the British. In coming into possession of the districts of Kanará, Koimbatúr, Darapúram, and Mujnad, with all the territory lying below the gháts, between their possessions in the Karnátik and those in Malabar, they acquired valuable districts assuring uninterrupted communication between the eastern and western coasts of the Peninsula, the entire sea-coast of the kingdom of Maisur, and territories constituting the base of all the eastern, western, and southern gháts. To these were added the forts and posts forming the heads of all the passes above the gháts on the table land, with the fortress, city, and island of Seringapatam. The occupation for a term of about twelve years—the period of the minority of the young Rájah—would, moreover, assure to the English the time, which more than any other nation they have known how to employ, of procuring to the inhabitants, by the development of industrial enterprises, alleviation from the miseries they had suffered from years of misrule.

So far as related to the British and the Nizam, there was a complete understanding regarding the terms of the Treaty. But the condition on which the Peshwá should be invited to become a party to it differed, as I have already shown, in almost every particular from that which concerned the Nizam. Lord Mornington thought, then, that high policy forbade him to offer to the Maráthá Prince, without something in the shape of an equivalent, territory as a reward for merely nominal

service. The Peshwá had not put a man in the field, nor had he spent a rupee in preparations. He had been absolutely passive. In return for this, the action of the British and the Nizam had secured for him a peaceful neighbour on his south-western frontier in exchange for a neighbour who had been one of the great enemies of his race. If the Peshwá, then, were to obtain anything in the shape of territory, in addition to that sense of security, Lord Mornington thought that he should be asked to give something in exchange. That something might be shadowy, but it must possess the appearance at least of value, sufficient to constitute the basis of a contract. Carrying out this view, Lord Mornington proposed that in return for the territory which he was prepared to cede from the conquered kingdom of Maisur the Peshwá should guarantee the inviolability of the new kingdom; that he should constitute the East India Company arbiter of his disputes with the Nizam; that he should not admit Europeans into his service; and that he should enter into a defensive treaty against the French in case they should invade India. It seemed to Lord Mornington that as he was offering a solid substantiality in the shape of territory producing an annual revenue of about 12,00,000 Rs., in return for which he demanded only a few words, which, his Indian experience of little more than a year must have proved to him would only be binding so long as no strong temptation to break them should arise, the Peshwá would hasten to agree; that at the most he would only require a modification on the subject of the admission of Europeans into his service. But he was deceived. The Peshwá peremptorily demanded equal partition of the conquered territory with the Company and the Nizam, and declined to render any counter-gift of promises. As for the smaller portion with the conditions annexed to

it, he indignantly refused it. That portion was, therefore, divided between the Nizam and the British.*

One word must be said as to the reasons which prompted Lord Mornington's policy to restore the Hindu dynasty of Maisur, instead of permitting the succession of a son of the deceased Sultán. It might have been argued that as the Governor-General had recognised Tipu, had even been prepared to treat with him regarding the rearrangement of his frontier, and would most certainly have recognised a member of his family as his successor had Tipu died before hostilities had broken out, it was reasonable that he should now pursue a similar course. But in Lord Mornington's opinion the schemes perpetrated by the deceased Sultán—schemes aiming at the expulsion by any means of the British from India—were so ingrained in his family that it would be in the highest degree impolitic to recognise a successor, born and brought up in those ideas, who sooner or later would

* The fate of the portion of the Maisur territory assigned to the Nizam is curious. In the first division he received districts yielding annually about 24,00,000 Rs. To these were subsequently added two-thirds of the territory offered to but rejected by the Peshwá, amounting to about 8,00,000 Rs. more. But all the territories thus acquired, as well as those acquired by the Treaty of 1792, and yielding altogether an annual revenue of about 100,00,000 Rs., were, in 1800, ceded to the British in perpetuity to defray the expenses of the subsidiary force, then augmented to 8,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, and a proportion of artillery. It was stipulated in this Treaty that, in the event of war, 6,000 infantry of this force with the cavalry and artillery, joined by 6,000 foot and 9,000 horse of the Nizam's own troops, should be under orders to march against the common enemy. (*Vide Aitchison's Treaties*, Vol. V.) The practical result, then, of the covenant made by Lord Mornington with the Nizam was that the spoils obtained by the latter from Tipu Sultán in the wars of 1789-92, and of 1799, purchased a British guarantee for the Nizam's dominions, as they had been in 1789; and placed him absolutely in the position of a protected prince, bound to follow the fortunes of the British.

develope similar idiosyncracies. It was true that the parcelling out of a considerable portion of the dominions of the Sultán would deprive his successor of much of the power for mischief which Típu had enjoyed. But if that successor were a son of Típu there would be a perpetual brooding over past losses; a continuous searching for an opportunity to retrieve the disasters of 1799; the necessity would consequently be imposed upon the British Government to remain in a perpetual state of watchfulness, perhaps even, should war occur with the Maráthás, of alarm. To place upon the vacant throne, on the other hand, the representative of the dynasty which Haidar had removed, would be to secure a ruler who would be bound to the British by ties of gratitude; who would be acceptable to the Hindu races who constituted the vast majority of the population of Maisur; and who represented the ancient Royal line, endeared to them the more from the miseries they had suffered at the hands of the tyrants who had expelled it. Influenced by these considerations, which he set forth at great length in a despatch to the Court of Directors, dated August 3rd, 1799, Lord Mornington appointed Commissioners to instal the young Rájah on the *masnad*.* This ceremony was performed with great pomp on June the 30th of the same year.

The reader will not fail to notice the wisdom of the policy which dictated this action. Not only was an inveterate enemy of the British race removed for ever from the control of territories which had been used before, and might be used again, to the detriment of the Company; not only was that hostile family replaced by another family bound to be as hostile to it as it must be dependent on the British; but to guard against possibilities that new family was not intrusted with the power of peace or war.

* *Masnad*, a throne, a royal cushion.

It was forbidden to maintain an army. For an annual subsidy of £280,000, the British Government undertook to secure the defence and protection of the restored territories. The British likewise expressly reserved to themselves the right, which was exercised in 1831-2, of interfering in the management of the internal affairs of the country whenever high policy should demand such interference; and, further, of increasing when it might be necessary, the amount of the subsidy to be paid by the Rájah. Meanwhile, until that prince should obtain his majority, one of the ablest political officers of the day, Sir Barry Close, was appointed to reside in his capital as Resident, whilst the troops necessary to keep in the country for the maintenance of order were placed under the command of Colonel Arthur Wellesley.

Thus, within thirteen months of his arrival in India, the successor of a *doctrinaire*, Lord Mornington had settled two important, I might say indeed with truth, two vital questions, which he had found awaiting him, and which the policy of "masterly inactivity" of his predecessor had caused to assume enormous proportions. He had found Southern India smouldering; its independent princes ready to pour forth their hordes upon the English; the English unprepared even for a slight attack; Anglo-Indian statesmen unwilling to make preparations lest thereby they should provoke a contest. The danger was vast, imminent, pressing, the more so as the greatest military power of Europe, in alliance with a native prince whose hostility to the English was inveterate, was occupying at the moment the country which was the halfway house to India. By a policy patient yet farseeing, manly, direct, and statesmanlike, Lord Mornington averted both those dangers. He had scarcely landed in India when he recognised that his hands were tied. The danger was

in Southern India, and the army in Southern India was not in a condition to fight. He had to meet two dangers, the danger from the contingent of the Nizam, commanded by Frenchmen; the danger from Típu Sultán. Till he was strong enough to meet the lesser of these he temporised and made preparations. In five months he had made himself strong enough to meet the Nizam's case. Acting then with that directness of purpose which was his great characteristic, he disposed for ever of that danger. He treated the Nizam as in 1871 Prussia treated the German princes; he deprived him, whilst guaranteeing his dominions, of all power of treating with foreign nations. He was not then quite ready for the inveterate enemy of England. He had ample proofs of his treachery and hostile intentions; and he knew that any sudden action on the part of the French, then always possible—for France had still a navy—might add enormously to the difficulties of the situation. Still he waited again patiently, exercising a forbearance which, under the knowledge he possessed, must have chafed him sorely. He did more. He strove with all his might to effect a peaceful solution of the question. When his preparations were sufficiently advanced to enable him to speak without any fear of the consequences of speaking plainly, he acquainted the doomed prince with his knowledge of his plots and his intrigues, set before him his danger, and offered still to treat on terms which would have left him by far the greater part of his territories. It was not till his offers, first received with silence, had been finally responded to with insult, that he showed his whole hand to his enemy. Showing it, he still offered terms. But the enemy was bent on war. Típu precipitated by twenty-four hours the hostilities which were about to break out, and, rushing upon his fate, lost alike his throne

and his life. Lord Mornington had, by his statesmanlike action, not only averted the second danger, but made a second settlement, which, like the first, has lasted till our own day—a settlement which secured the permanent predominance of the British in South-Eastern and in South-Western India. In the hands of such a man, from whatever quarter danger or difficulty might arise, British interests, it was clear, were safe.

CHAPTER V.

TANJÚR, SÚRAT, HAIDARÁBÁD, THE KARNÁTIK, OUDH,
PERSIA, KÁBUL, EGYPT.

1799-1801.

Lord Wellesley's rewards and his disappointment—State of affairs in Tangúr—Removal of Amír Singh, and conclusion of a treaty with the Rájah—Settlement of the Súrat difficulty—Rejection of Lord Wellesley's proposals by the Nawáb of the Karnátik—Discovery of his intrigues with Tipu—Death of the Nawáb and conditions of the treaty with his successor—Regulation of our relations with the Nizam—Disordered condition of Oudh—Missions of Colonel Scott and Mr. Henry Wellesley—Surrender of the Nawáb-Wazir—The Governor-General at Káhnepúr—Persia and Afghanistan—The French excluded from Persia—Danger from the Isle of France and Bourbon—Difficulties in the way of their capture—Summary of Lord Wellesley's foreign policy.

HENCEFORTH we must think and write of the famous Governor-General as the Marquess Wellesley. For the services he had rendered in Southern India the Houses of Parliament unanimously passed a vote of thanks to him, as well as to Lord Clive, Mr. Duncan (Governor of Bombay), and the army engaged in the war. The East India Company passed resolutions expressive of their admiration of the important services rendered to them by their servants in the East. King George III. testified his sense of the Governor-General's conduct by raising him to the dignity of Marquess in the peerage of Ireland. Pitt wrote to him:—"At this moment, my dear Lord, you are the

admiration of all Europe. May you long enjoy the glorious laurels you have gained, in health, happiness, and every domestic blessing. . . . I hear Lord Cornwallis talks with rapture and surprise of your noble administration in India, and he is a good judge." He received letters of similar import from all his friends.

Still, it cannot be concealed that Lord Wellesley was disappointed at the nature of the reward bestowed upon him by his Sovereign. Knowing, better than any one in Europe, the greatness of his success, he felt that the recompense fell far short of his deserving. In a letter, dated April 28th, 1800, to the address of Mr. Pitt, he wrote that he could not describe his anguish of mind in feeling himself bound by every sense of duty and honour to declare his bitter disappointment at the reception which the King had given to his services, and at the ostensible mark of favour which he had conferred upon him. In England, as in India, he went on to say, the disproportion between the service and the reward would be imputed to some opinion existing in the King's mind of his being disqualified by some personal incapacity to receive the reward of his conduct. He left him (Mr. Pitt) to judge what the effect of such an impression was likely to be on the minds of those whom he was appointed to govern—and more to the purport. To a private friend he wrote that he would never have health or happiness till this outrage was repaired. There can be no doubt that he did regard this Irish Marquisate as an outrage, and he felt it so to the end of his life. Writing, many years later, to Lord Harris, when the Government tardily recognised the services of that excellent officer by bestowing upon him a peerage (1816), Lord Wellesley said that none of the subsequent triumphs of his life could drive from his memory the recollection of the scurvy manner in which

he had been treated in 1800. He had, I think, ample reason for his dissatisfaction. His services had been immense; his reward was, to use his own expression, "pinchbeck."

It deserves to be recorded that in the distribution of the plunder of Seringapatam, Marquess Wellesley had displayed the greatest self-abnegation. The army, sensible that to his foresight, his preparations, his energy, the triumph that had been achieved was mainly due, had expressed a desire to present to him a star and badge of the order of St. Patrick, composed of Tipu's jewels, but Lord Wellesley from motives of delicacy had declined the present; nor was it till the Court of Directors begged him to accept the star and badge, "as a testimony of the very high sense which they entertain of the distinguished services to the Company of the Most Noble the Marquess Wellesley, by the superior wisdom and energy of whose counsels the late war in Maisur was brought to so speedy and glorious a termination," that he was prevailed upon to take them. He declined, however, the donation of £100,000, offered by the Court, "from the spoils taken at Seringapatam." "I am satisfied," he wrote to the President of the Board of Control, "upon reflection, you will perceive that the accepting such a grant would place me in a very humiliating situation with respect to the army; and, independent of any question of character, or of the dignity or vigour of government, I should be miserable if I could ever feel that I had been enriched at the expense of those who must ever be the objects of my affection, admiration, and gratitude, and who are justly entitled to the exclusive possession of all that a munificent King and an admiring country can bestow." Subsequently, the Court of Directors voted him a pension of £5,000 a year for twenty years. With that, and the

“double-gilt potato,” as he styled it in a letter to Pitt, the Irish Marquisate, he had to be content. ’

But, deeply though in this respect the iron had entered into his soul, the mortification in no degree affected the zeal and energy which the Marquess brought to bear on the administration of Indian affairs. Prominent amongst those which demanded his attention had been the State of Tanjúr. The affairs of that State had for some years past caused anxiety to the Madras Government. • In 1786, the ruling Rájah, Tuljají, had died, leaving an adopted son, Sarbojí, then in tender years, to succeed him. • The succession of Sarbojí was, however, disputed by the half-brother of the deceased prince, Amír Singh, and the question was referred to the Madras Government for decision. The conduct of that Government was characterised by a childish unwisdom which did not augur favourably of the ability of its members to deal generally with affairs. They appointed Amír Singh to act as regent during the minority of his rival. Meanwhile they nominated a council of pandits to decide the question of succession according to Hindu law. The natural consequences followed. Although, according to the law which had been invoked, the claims of Sarbojí were beyond question, the pandits, influenced by the man who held in his hands the power of the State, decided in favour of Amír Singh.

Amír Singh was, in the worst sense of the word, a tyrant. No sooner had his claim been recognised than he began a career of oppression, which very soon compelled the Madras Government to interfere. The party of Sarbojí was still strong in the State. Sarbojí, the widows of the late Rájah, and their prominent partisans, had therefore been especially made to feel the jealous dislike of the tyrant. The first step of the Madras Government,

after its attention had been repeatedly called to their complaints, was to remove the boy and the ladies to the Presidency. There the question of the boy's right to the throne was again brought forward, and, after some delay, was referred by the Madras Government to the then Governor-General, Sir John Shore. Sir John, in his turn, consulted the pandits in different parts of India; finally, those of the holy city of Banáras. These gave an unreserved opinion in favour of the rights of Sarbojí. The papers on the question were then transmitted to England, and the Court of Directors ordered that Sarbojí should be placed on the throne of Tanjúr, though they left the time and mode of carrying their decision into effect to be determined by the Governor-General.

Such was the position of the Tanjúr question when Marquess Wellesley had arrived in India. He had well considered it on the voyage out, and he had decided not to deal with it until the more pressing affairs of the Nizam and of Típu Sultán should be settled. In the autumn of 1799 that conjuncture had arrived, and Lord Wellesley at once took up the dropped thread of Tanjúr. That country had been reduced by the misgovernment of Amír Singh to the worst throes of misery. The wretchedness of its distressed and despoiled people, ground down by the minions of the ruling prince, can scarcely be exaggerated. To transfer these unfortunates, like so many cattle, from a prince, who had reduced them to their miserable condition, to a young man, who, however amiable he might appear, possessed neither talents nor experience of governing, and who was almost certain, therefore, to drift into the worst ways of his predecessor, was a course against which the generous mind of Lord Wellesley revolted. Indian governors have very often been placed in the cruel position of having to perpetrate acts, ap-

parently demanded by strict legality, but really fraught with misery to thousands of human beings, lest by refusal they should bring upon their heads the vials of wrath of inexperienced sentimentalists. In such circumstances a weak man will succumb; a strong man will act according to his conviction of right. Lord Wellesley was a strong man, and he acted accordingly. He removed Amír Singh; but unable to find it in his heart to place the people of Tanjūr under the irresponsible sway of a zenana-bred boy, absolutely without experience of the world, he made with him a Treaty, whereby the civil and military administration of the country should be vested in the British Government; an allowance of the equivalent of £10,000 per annum reserved for Amír Singh, and one of £40,000 for the Rájah, who likewise was to receive all the honours attaching to his position. This arrangement, Mr. Thornton justly remarks, was undoubtedly beneficial to the interests of Great Britain. No one who knows aught of India can fail to agree with that historian when he adds:—"but it is no exaggeration to say that it was far more beneficial to the people of Tanjūr. It delivered them from the effects of native oppression and European cupidity. It gave them what they had never before possessed—the security derived from the administration of justice." The Treaty, embodying the provisions stated, was concluded October the 25th, 1799, and ratified by the Governor-General in Council November the 29th following.

Another case of deadlock, the case of Súrat, had likewise been awaiting the settlement of claims more pressing. The town of Súrat on the Taptí had been one of the first which had attracted the commerce of Great Britain. Her merchants had built a factory there in 1612. Subsequently, the factors and writers of the Company had aided the native inhabitants to defend the town against the

great Maráthá, the renowned Sívájí—a service which procured for them the thanks of the Mughul Governor. A century later, upon the invitation of the most powerful party in the country, they took possession of the castle and of the native fleet, as the *de facto* administrators of the town and its immediate surroundings, and this act was shortly afterwards confirmed by the Imperial Court of Dehlí. I should add that, to this transfer of authority, the ruling Nawáb, whose power was thereby curtailed, had been a consenting party.

Had the Mughul authority at Delhí continued to exist in all its pristine vigour, it is probable that the Nawáb would have continued to acquiesce in an arrangement which not only relieved him from great responsibilities, but secured the safety and prosperity of the town. But the fall of the Mughul Empire seemed to open out a new career to every petty princelet throughout India, and the Nawáb of Súrat was unable to resist the impetus which had carried away so many others. Step by step he began to assert his independence of his western coadjutors. At length he proceeded to decline to furnish the funds absolutely necessary for maintaining, in a state of efficiency, the military and naval forces required for the protection of the place. Entreaty and remonstrance met alike with refusal. As the Company was dependent on the Nawáb for the requisite funds, his refusal to contribute naturally produced a deadlock. Matters were in this unsatisfactory condition when, in 1799, the Nawáb died. Death is a great leveller of difficulties, especially when the material force is in the hands of a disputant who survives. The continuance of the *status quo* had become impossible, because, of the two parties whose co-operation was necessary to propel the State vehicle, one had refused his assistance. Lord Wellesley had long seen that “a dual

control," to be exercised by two parties, whose interests pulled them in opposite directions, must terminate in failure. He determined, then, to put an end to it. Fortune singularly favoured him. A very short time after the death of the Nawáb his only son followed him to the grave. The next heir was the uncle of the deceased, and the uncle could not inherit without the permission of the British. Lord Wellesley had, then, the game in his own hands. He used the opportunity wisely and well. The lines upon which he acted were the lines of Tanjúr. He made a Treaty with the incoming Nawáb, by which "the management and collection of the revenues of the city of Súrát, and of the territories, places, and other dependencies thereof, the administration of civil and military justice, and generally the whole civil and military government of the said city and its dependencies should be vested for ever, entirely and exclusively, in the Honourable East India Company." A lakh of rupees was set aside annually for the maintenance of the Nawáb, who was to retain his honours and dignities. These arrangements were embodied in a Treaty which was signed by the consenting parties on May the 13th, 1800.

There remained still the Nawáb of the Karnátik. For many years the relations between the Madras Government and the ruler of the territories so denominated had been of a very unsatisfactory character. The Nawáb, utterly careless of the engagements entered into by his father and himself for the maintenance of a subsidiary force, was becoming every year more and more involved in debts, which he took not the smallest pains to discharge. Europeans, unprincipled but shrewd, carried on the vilest intrigues at his Court and with his connivance. The revenue was badly managed, the people were oppressed, and ruin was fast overtaking the country

which he professed to administer. Unfortunately, the last Treaty made by the British with the Nawáb, the Treaty of 1792, had contained a clause which secured to the Nawáb absolute control over the territories thereby secured to him. Not only, then, did he meet the proposals made to him by Lord Wellesley after the conclusion of the war with Típu, and which had for their object the cession of a portion of his territories as a set-off against his debts, by a reference to the Treaty of 1792 and a question as to whether the terms of that Treaty were still binding; but he added thereto a demand to participate in the distribution of the territories just then severed from Maisur. Though Lord Wellesley was able to treat this demand with the indifference it merited, he was puzzled how to deal with the "*non possumus*" with which the Nawáb replied to every request to give valid security for reform. That he recognised the course which ought to be pursued and yet felt most strongly the difficulty in the way of pursuing it, is proved by his correspondence at this period with the Court of Directors. In a despatch to that august body, dated March the 5th, 1800, he wrote:—"The double government of the Karnátik is a difficulty which continues to present the most serious and alarming obstacles to every attempt at reform. . . . I am thoroughly convinced that no effectual remedy can ever be applied to the evils which afflict that country, without obtaining from the Nawáb powers at least as extensive as those vested in the Company by the late Treaty of Tanjúr." But from the ruling Nawáb, who had succeeded his father, the notorious Muhammad Áli, in 1795, there was no hope that he would ever obtain the smallest concession. He was, however, comparatively old, given to debauchery, and his life was precarious. Lord Wellesley could only hope, then, that on his death he might be able

to make conditions with his successor which would enable the paramount power to remedy the crying evils which characterised the administration of territories so closely adjacent to the possessions of the Company.

The Nawáb having repulsed, in the manner already described, the attempts made by Lord Wellesley to reform his administration, that lord, precluded by the Treaty of 1792 from attempting forcible entry, had almost abandoned the task in despair, when there arrived, at Madras, boxes containing the correspondence found in the archives of Típu Sultán, at Seringapatam. The perusal of this correspondence, which was officially examined by two officers of the highest honour, Colonel Barry Close and Mr. Webbe, made it abundantly clear that for many years past the Nawáb and his father had been carrying on a treasonable correspondence with the Sultán of Maisur; that they had communicated to Típu such secrets regarding the British preparations and the British objects as had been entrusted to them; that they had, in fact, acted as secret friends and true allies of the prince, who, they knew (as the correspondence revealed), was endeavouring to form a league with the princes of India and the French for the expulsion of the English from India.

The revelation of this correspondence cleared the way for the action which Lord Wellesley had already hoped to put in force when a just opportunity should offer. But, in such a matter, it was above all necessary to show no indecent haste. Lord Wellesley waited, then, until due investigations had been made regarding the correspondence; he then considered it in council; then referred it, with his own comments, to the Board of Control. The Board of Control and the Court of Directors coincided in the views he had set forth. Then, and then only, did

Lord Wellesley act on those views. In a despatch to the Madras Government, dated May 28, 1801, he recounted the perfidy alike of the Nawáb and of his father; showed from the correspondence that the actual Nawáb had been confederate with his father in the machinations secretly carried on against the British; that as a party, likewise, to the Treaty of 1792, with the British, which he had negotiated, he was subject to the same conditions which his father had accepted. He concluded by directing the Governor of Madras, Lord Clive, to propose a new Treaty to the Nawáb, requiring him to cede the civil and military government of the Karnátik to the East India Company. Lord Wellesley wrote at the same time to the Nawáb himself, informing him of the discoveries which had been made, and referring him to the Governor of Madras for information as to the footing upon which his position would be placed in the future. That letter was never read by the Nawáb. When it reached his palace at Arkát, that prince was dying, nor, had he been physically sound, would the state of his mind have permitted him to understand its contents. Those contents were, therefore, mercifully withheld. But when, on July 15th following, he died, and his reputed son declined to accept the succession on the new terms offered by the Governor of Madras, Lord Clive made the arrangement, directed by Lord Wellesley, with another relative of the deceased, Azímu'd daulah. With him a Treaty was concluded, whereby the territories known as the Karnátik should be administered by the Company; whilst the title of Nawáb, with a suitable income for the maintenance of its dignity, should be secured to the holder of that title, and to his successors. Order thus replaced disorder, good government, bad government; justice, oppression. Yet, naturally enough, this transaction, which redounds to the honour of the Marquess Wellesley, has been

used by doctrinaires and sentimentalists to hold him up to reprobation. One of the ablest of this impractical body has gone so far as to insinuate that he caused the incriminating letters to be forged. The charge has only to be made to be repelled with indignation and disgust. If, it has been well observed, the documents were forged, not only must the Governor-General have been the grand mover of the forgery, but General Harris, General Baird, Colonel Arthur Wellesley, Colonel Close, the Hon. Henry Wellesley, Captain Macaulay, Mr. Edmonstone the interpreter, and Mr. Webbe the secretary to the Government, must have been "the vile instruments" of this "unmanly fraud." *

In the third chapter, I have related how, by the prompt method of dealing with the Nizam's French contingent in October, 1798, Lord Wellesley had converted that prince from the position of a possible enemy to that of a dependent ally. I have also told how the Nizam had been rewarded for the aid he had rendered to the British in the war of 1799, against Típu Sultán, by receiving, first, districts yielding an annual revenue of 6,07,332 pagodas; subsequently, two-thirds of the territories which had been offered to, and refused by, the Peshwá. The Maráthá chiefs had noticed with the greatest dissatisfaction the conduct of the British on the morrow of the short and glorious campaign they had made against a prince whose father had forced the haughty islanders to sue for peace. The feeling displayed at Purná formed one reason why, in the opinion of the Marquess Wellesley, the bonds which united the Nizam to the British should be drawn still closer. He accordingly, with the concurrence of the Nizam, resolved to increase the British contingent in the service of that prince by

* The expressions used by Mr. Mill.

adding to it two battalions of infantry and one regiment of cavalry. Then came up for consideration the mode in which the subsidiary force should be paid. Experience had proved that engagements with the native princes, for the payment of a fixed annual sum to defray expenses incurred on their behalf, generally terminated by the default of the native prince, and, eventually by the cession to the debtor of the whole of his dominions. Two cases of this kind, the case of Súrat and the case of the Karnátik, have been recorded in this very chapter. It was then in the interest of the Nizam that Lord Wellesley proposed that there should be no open account between the contracting parties; that, in lieu thereof, the Nizam should cede to the British the territories he had acquired by their aid in the two last wars with Típu, whilst opportunity should at the same time be taken to make some exchanges of territory to secure a well-defined boundary. These proposals were accepted by the Nizam, and embodied in a Treaty, dated October 12th, 1800. This treaty regulated, likewise, the duties on which the subsidiary force was to be employed; secured the Nizam in the sovereignty of his dominions; prohibited his entering into political negotiations with other states; and made the British Government the arbiter of his disputes with other powers. In a word, it made more binding still the obligations on the contracting parties which had been shadowed forth in the Treaty of September 1st, 1798.

Having thus, by the union of an intellectual power, wide enough to grasp all the points of a difficult and complicated situation, with a strength of will sufficient to execute his conclusions, restored peace, order, and prosperity to Southern India; having, by the exercise of the same qualities, satisfactorily settled the Súrat difficulty; Lord Wellesley had leisure to take in hand the affairs of

a province, the treatment of which had constituted the one great problem which had exercised his predecessor, and which threatened again to give trouble. In the second chapter, I have related how Sir John Shore had settled for the moment the difficulties which had occurred regarding the succession to the vacant "*masnad*" of Oudh, by recognising the claims of Saadat Álí. I added, that this recognition, though based upon legality, had left in the province a strong party which viewed with great disfavour the interference of the British.

It is possible that, notwithstanding this feeling, Saadat Álí, had he been a man of capacity and character, would have succeeded in obtaining the affection of his subjects and the respect of the paramount power. But, like all the representatives of the family, which the break-up of the Mughul empire left in possession of one of the fairest provinces of India, Saadat Álí lived merely for the gratification of his own passions. With him the ruling passion was avarice; his mental failings were cowardice and irresolution. He trusted no one—neither his ministers, nor his troops, nor his courtiers. A veritable miser, a hoarder of wealth, he may be said to have hated those to whom it was absolutely necessary upon occasions to pay money. Such a man can never possess friends; and Saadat Álí had not one.

The disordered state of the country, the consequence of the government of such a man, had attracted the notice of the Governor-General when his mind was occupied by the more pressing dangers threatening Southern India, and he had addressed to the Nawáb-Wazír of Oudh more than one serious remonstrance. Lord Wellesley had to bear in mind that an invasion on the part of Zamán Sháh was always possible. Sometimes even it appeared imminent, and, although the Maráthás might be expected to bear

the first brunt of it, their state of unpreparedness seemed to indicate that their resistance would be comparatively feeble, and that the reported richness of Lakhnao might invite the conquerors of Dehli. Saadat Ali had so neglected his army that against the hardy warriors of Kábul he could put in the field only an ill-armed and disorderly rabble, whose drilling had been utterly neglected, and whom the withholding of their pay had rendered disaffected. So much had Lord Wellesley been impressed by the danger of having such a body of men on the flank of his northernmost position, that, in 1799, he addressed a letter to the Nawáb-Wazir, recommending him to disband his rabble, and to allow it to be replaced by a British subsidiary force. To enforce his views in this respect, and to point out the extreme danger of his position to the Wazir, Lord Wellesley despatched the Adjutant-General, Colonel Scott, an officer in whom he had great confidence, to Lakhnao.

Saadat Ali did not like the proposition. It is true that the cost of the subsidiary force would not have exceeded in nominal value the cost of his own rabble, had he paid them. But he did not pay his rabble, and he knew he would have to pay the British contingent. Hence he hesitated long; he gave no decided answer; he always replied that he was preparing a counter-proposition. When, after many delays, he at length presented this proposition, it was found to be merely the expression "of an earnest desire to relinquish a government which he could not manage with satisfaction to himself or advantage to his subjects." Colonel Scott, believing that this renunciation would be agreeable to the Governor-General, transmitted it to him with all haste. But Lord Wellesley had a clearer grasp of the true bearings of the situation than was displayed at a later period by his

successors. He had no desire to annex Oudh. He preferred that that province, stripped of the additions made to it in the north-west, should be well administered, under the nominal rule of a native sovereign. He proposed, then, an arrangement similar to that which he had inaugurated at Tanjūr, viz., a native ruler with a fixed income and all the paraphernalia of sovereignty; the administration to be in the hands of British officers. This proposal the Nawáb-Wazír at once rejected. It would seem, too, that in a conversation with Colonel Scott he endeavoured to explain away his former offer. He did not intend, nor had he intended, to abdicate in favour of the British, but merely to shift the burden of sovereignty on to another member of his family, so that he might enjoy, in a private situation, the wealth he had amassed. Rightly did Lord Wellesley regard such an explanation as the veriest trifling, "as intended to defeat, by artificial delays, the proposed reform of his Excellency's military establishments." With characteristic resolution, he pressed with all the more vehemence the necessity of arriving at a conclusion which should ensure the end he had in view—the formation of a disciplined force for the defence of a province, the safety of which against an invader was necessary for the security of the British dominions. If he could not obtain that result by introducing the Tanjūr system, he was ready to accept that which had been inaugurated in the territories of the Nizam. Still, Saadat Álí refused. He hoped by pleading the eternal *non possumus* to ward off for ever an interference which seemed to threaten his ability to indulge in his favourite passion. Little did he know the character of the man with whom he was dealing. When the Marquess had exhausted every other mode, when his patience was tired out by continued pleas for delay, then, and then only, did he take a decided step to bring the

negotiations to a conclusion. He despatched his brother, Mr. Henry Wellesley,* to Lakhnao, with instructions which should leave no doubt on the mind of the Nawáb-Wazír as to his determination. Mr. Henry Wellesley was equal to the occasion. Saadat Álí recognised that the day of delay was passed. He accepted then an arrangement analogous to that concluded with the Nizam. On November 10th, 1801, he signed a Treaty by which he ceded to the British Government lands in the Duáb,† yielding an annual revenue of one crore and thirty-five lakhs of rupees (£1,350,000), including expenses of collections. In consideration of this cession, the British Government agreed to commute the subsidy till then paid, to pay the pensions accruing to Banáras and Farrukhábád, and to maintain a force for the defence against external enemies of the territories of the Nawáb-Wazír. The Treaty provided likewise that the Nawáb-Wazír should reduce his troops to four battalions of infantry and one of Najibs (police), 2,000 cavalry, and 300 gunners; further, that he should introduce a system of good government into his remaining territories.

This Treaty having been concluded, the Governor-General proceeded to Káuhpúr. There he was met, on January 10th, 1802, by Saadat Álí, who accompanied him to Lakhnao. In that city, after some discussion, various matters arising out of the Treaty were arranged. Amongst these was an agreement by which the Nawáb of Farrukhábád transferred to the British the civil and military administration of his territories, receiving in return an ample provision for the maintenance of his honorary

* Afterwards Lord Cowley.

† The "Mahalls" (districts) included in this cession were those of Koráh, Karrah, Itáwah, Kehr, Farrukhábád, Khairagarh, Ázamgarh, Goráklipur, the Subah of Alláhábád, Bareílí, Nawábganj, Mohul, and others of less importance.

dignities. The Nawáb submitted with an ill grace to this arrangement, but he did submit.

The rumours which had prevailed regarding a possible invasion of Indiá, by the ruler of Kábul, had not yet died away. Indeed they assumed, from time to time, a consistency which lent force to the belief that at any moment such an invasion might occur. It was, I repeat, in view of such a possibility that the Marquess Wellesley had endeavoured, by his action in Oudh and at Farrukhábád, to put his frontier house in order. But such a preparation, however well designed it might be, to meet an invasion, would have no effect in averting one. Dehlí, Ágra, Álighar, were held by the troops of Sindhiá, and, judging the present by the past, Lord Wellesley might well believe that these would be quite insufficient to stem an invasion made in the fashion of that conducted by the father of Zamán Sháh. To avert such a calamity he must have recourse to other means. Turning over the matter in his prolific brain, the Governor-General arrived at the conclusion that the best mode of preventing an Afghan invasion was to provide occupation for the ruler of the Afghans at home. With this view, early in 1800, he despatched Captain Malcolm,* of whose sterling worth he had had experience at Haidarábád, to Persia, to negotiate a treaty with the Sháh. Malcolm acquitted himself of his task with an ability and a success which left nothing to be desired. Persia had always coveted that portion of Khorásán which had formed, alternately her boundary in the north-east, or, as it does in the present day, the frontier of Afghanistan to the north-west. Malcolm experienced but little difficulty in persuading the Sháh to renew his attack upon that debatable land. To enfeeble still further the ruler of Kábul, the Sháh stirred up his

* Afterwards Sir John Malcolm.

brother, Mahmud, to make war against him. These tactics succeeded almost beyond expectation. Mahmud defeated, made prisoner of, and deposed his brother. But he had laid up a store of domestic trouble for himself. Thenceforth, there was no occasion to dread an invasion from Kábul.

But there was yet another danger recognised by the far-reaching mind of the Governor-General. The Czar of Russia, Paul Petrovitch, had made no secret of his desire to invade India from the north. His plans were ready; and he was but awaiting the opportunity to put them in execution. At this conjuncture the young conqueror of Italy, just become virtual master of France, had known how to captivate the soul of Paul. How dangerous to the tranquillity of India would be an alliance of these ambitious and powerful potentates, Lord Wellesley at once recognised. He endeavoured to provide as far as he could against the danger by enlisting the Sháh of Persia on his side. Malcolm, under his instructions, succeeded then in adding a clause to the treaty he made with that prince, by which the French were forbidden to establish themselves in any portion of the Persian territories.

Those who know only the British India of the present day naturally experience some difficulty in imagining a British India held under conditions varying in almost every respect from the India of their experience. Not only, I repeat, was the India of Lord Wellesley's day not the predominant power; but the traditions immediately preceding told of war waged, not always successfully, with native princes, and of native princes largely assisted by troops sent from France. Only fifteen years before the arrival in India of the Marquess Wellesley, that is, in 1783, a French fleet under the famous Suffren had captured Trinkamali, and a French force, three thousand

strong, led by the once renowned Bussy, had joined Haidar Ali. The animosities between the two nations, England and France, were pale at that period compared with what they became during the war of the Revolution. Between 1793 and 1800 there always existed the possibility of an invasion on a scale larger than any which had been previously attempted. The reason for this, as a reason which considerably exercised the minds of the Marquess, deserves a paragraph to itself.

During the time the Marquess Wellesley ruled in India the route to India was the sea-route by way of the Cape of Good Hope. Capetown had been a Dutch Colony. The English had captured it in 1795, and they held it at the period of which I am writing. But there was a general impression that if a general peace should shortly ensue the colony would be restored to its original owners. That indeed happened when the peace of Amiens was signed. In 1800, then, the English held the Cape, recently conquered, by a precarious tenure. But, not very far from the east coast of Africa, in fact on the direct course between that coast and India, were two islands, held for many years by the French, the isles of France and Bourbon, which had ever constituted the base of the French operations against India. Those islands constituted likewise places of arms, whence French ships could rally to prey upon British commerce. The fleets and light squadrons of England, numerous and well appointed as they were, were still not numerous enough to command at the same moment every sea. They were wanted in the Mediterranean, in the West Indies, in the Channel; they had to blockade the coasts of France; often the coasts of Spain; to protect our enormous commerce; to ward off threatened invasion from our shores. Large, then, as was the British navy, especially large in proportion to the navies of other

European nations, it was not large enough to dominate at the same moment all the waters of the world. In the Indian seas France possessed the enormous advantage over England, in that she possessed a base for naval operations in the mid ocean, far nearer to India than the temporary and precarious base which England had secured at the Cape, and which did not offer a safe anchorage in all seasons. The result of this difference is shown in the tables below,* compiled from the official record of the five years prior to the arrival in India of the great Marquess. With such figures before him; with the knowledge of the negotiations of Tipu with the Governor of the islands; and with a tolerably correct insight regarding the actual ruler of France; Lord Wellesley might well be alarmed, in 1800-1, at the fact that at a period when France had humbled all Europe, England alone excepted, she should possess a base of operations, so valuable to her, so dangerous to the commerce of England, so dangerous even to the position of England in India, as that which the occupation of the isles of France and Bourbon afforded her. With characteristic decision; with a directness of purpose which always struck at the end to be obtained; Lord Wellesley resolved to despatch an expedition to secure that base for

	Merchant ships taken by the French from the English.	Merchant ships taken by the English from the French.
In 1793	261	63
In 1794	527	88
In 1795	502	47
In 1796	414	63
In 1797	562	114
	<hr/> 2266	<hr/> 375

being a proportion in five years of more than six to one. Capetown was taken by the English September 25, 1795.

England. Early, in 1801, then, he directed the concentration of an English force at Trinkamali, composed of three regiments of the line, and detachments from two other corps, a corps of Bengal native volunteers, and two companies of European and native artillery with lascars attached. The command of this force he gave to Major-General Baird,* commanding the Dánápúr division. He instructed that very distinguished officer to proceed first to Java and capture that island; to remain there as Lieutenant-Governor; whilst his second in command, Colonel Arthur Wellesley, should proceed with the bulk of the force to drive the French from the islands of France and Bourbon.

All at once a difficulty arose. To ensure the success of the expedition, Lord Wellesley had requested the co-operation of the British admiral commanding in the eastern seas. He had not the smallest doubt but that such co-operation would be freely rendered. But it is not given to all British admirals to possess that disregard for punctiliousness which distinguished a Nelson. The Admiralty, not possessing the gift of prescience, had not specially instructed the admiral on the eastern station, Admiral Rainier, that he was to take part in an expedition against Java and the two French islands. Not possessing a specific order to aid in such an operation, Admiral Rainier then refused his co-operation. But already, while Lord Wellesley was digesting this refusal as best he might, plans had been formed for an even more important expedition against the French. General Baird had not left the Ságar Roads on his way to Trinkamali when the Governor-General received a despatch from Mr. Dundas, informing him that a British force had been directed to proceed to Alexandria for

* Afterwards Sir David Baird.

the purpose of landing there and co-operating with the Turkish army assembling in Syria for the expulsion of the French from Egypt; and that it had been thought expedient "that a force should also be sent from India to act in such a manner as might appear conducive to that essential object," from the side of the Red Sea. The force which had been warned, then, to act against the islands, was now, with some changes in its composition, diverted to Egypt. Consisting of about a thousand European and four thousand native troops, it was escorted to the shores of the Red Sea by a squadron of the Company's ships, commanded by Admiral Blankett. With the order for the despatch of the expedition the responsibility of the Governor-General in its action ceased, but the Marquess Wellesley did not fail to take the deepest interest in the progress of an expedition till then unique in the history of the world.

Hitherto I have dealt only with the foreign policy of the Marquess Wellesley. I have endeavoured to set out in detail, as they occurred, the measures which, during a period of four years, he had prescribed and carried out to secure the safety of the territories entrusted to his care. It is not too much to say that in those four years he had effected a complete change in the situation he had found existing. He had found Southern India trembling before the native sovereign of Maisúr—dreading, unprepared, an attack, and yet fearing to arm lest it should provoke one. He had found the Nizam halting between two opinions, hesitating whether to cast his lot with the French or with the British; he had found Tanjúr, Súrát, the Karnáuk, and Oudh in desperate need of a reminder that for them, at all events, the British power must be paramount; and, lastly, he had found India threatened by an invasion from Afghanistan. In four years not only

had he dispelled all those dangers, but he had derived from every one of them advantages of a decisive and permanent character for England. He had made of the Nizam's dominions a protected State, with no voice in the direction of its external policy, for he had allied its fate with the fate of the British. He had smitten Tipu to the earth, annexed a large portion of his territories, and so dealt with the remainder that danger from Maisúr was eliminated for ever. He had placed in British hands the administration of Tanjúr, of Súrat, of the Kárnátik. He had added to the British dominions two-thirds of the territory till then ruled by the Nawáb-Wazír of Oudh; and he had located in the remaining third a contingent officered by British officers. Finally, he had rendered invasion from the north impossible; and, changing his defensive attitude into an attitude of offence, had despatched a force to aid in driving the French from Egypt. In every instance the policy pursued was marked by clearness of vision, by directness of aim, by thoroughness in action. Scrutinise as strictly as one may all his measures, it is impossible to detect a single error. The general plan, the modes of execution, the management of the details stand out faultless. Every one of the acts mentioned has stood the test of time. Haidarábád, Maisúr, Tanjúr, the Kárnátik, Súrat still remain, with the differences only which ~~this~~ system was certain to evolve, just as Lord Wellesley made them. Oudh remained so, likewise, till 1856, when she, too, was brought, in a manner which Lord Wellesley would never have sanctioned, within the British family. His plan of securing the two islands in the Indian Ocean was carried out a few years after he had quitted India. Finally, the despatch of Indian troops to Egypt, unique, as I have said, in the history of the world, constituted a precedent of which the genius of Lord Beaconsfield

eagerly availed itself in 1878, and to which Lord Beaconsfield's successor, after denouncing it as unconstitutional, had recourse three years later.

Lord Wellesley might well be proud of his foreign administration. He had done much for the security of British India. Much, however, remained still to be accomplished. Hitherto the Maráthá Powers had been deterred, by mutual jealousies and internal strife, from making any effort to stop his progress. But it was certain that Sindhiá, at least, would not notice unmoved the absorption of Farrukhábád and Rohilkhand within the British border, and Sindhiá was far more formidable than had been the ruler of Maisúr. But before I notice the course of Maráthá action, which gradually led to new complications and to a final settlement, I shall ask the reader to glance at those domestic measures which illustrated the administration of the accomplished statesman whose splendid administration I am recording.

CHAPTER VI.

DOMESTIC LEGISLATION.

1797-1803.

Evil plight of the civil administration—Lord Wellesley's reforms—Mr. Tucker's finance—The establishment of Christian observances—Censorship of the native press—Lord Wellesley made Commander-in-Chief—His educational scheme—Differences with the India House—Lord Wellesley's resignation—The Treaty of Amiens—Lord Wellesley refrains from carrying out its conditions—Opening of new Government House—Renewed difficulties with the Directors—Lord Wellesley again offers to resign.

SIR JOHN SHORE had left the civil administration of the affairs of the East India Company in a plight almost, if not quite, as heartbreaking as the condition of their military forces. During his rule, notwithstanding his peace-at-any-price policy, there had been a steady annual declension of the revenue until, in 1797-8 it had fallen to £8,059,880, whilst the charges, lightened by cheese-parings in the military expenditure, reached £8,178,626. The debt, meanwhile, had gone on increasing till "the Company's credit was at its lowest ebb, and money could not be borrowed in Bengal under twelve per cent."*

Nor were the civil and military services in the condition which a young, active, and resolute Governor-General could regard with satisfaction. The former seemed sunk

* Memorandum by Sir Arthur Wellesley in 1806, on his brother government of India.

in a torpor from which it would require very strong measures to rouse them; the latter, neglected and left in idleness, were in a state of semi-mutiny. The allowances for service at frontier stations not only differed from those sanctioned for inland stations, but they were ill-defined. The new system of officering native regiments, based on the system prevailing in the Royal Army, had but recently been introduced, and it had caused much intrigue and much heart-burning. Regimental committees, the existence of which was utterly subversive of discipline, had been formed in every battalion, to watch the rights of officers. The officers complained, and probably their complaints were founded on justice, that their services were unnoticed, and that even recommendations on their behalf forwarded to Leadenhall Street were disregarded.

Lord Wellesley was the last man in the world to permit the continuance of such a state of things. One of his first acts, after he had mastered the situation, was to insist on the dissolution of the regimental committees. Possessing, as the reader will have seen, a true soldierly instinct, and foreseeing how much the India of the British would have to depend upon its officers, he, whilst firmly recalling them to the strict line of discipline and duty, allowed them to see that he sympathised to a great extent with their position, and that their future would be safe in his hands. In the army, then, the order to abolish the committees, far from exciting discontent, was hailed as the beginning of a new line of policy in which the claims of the soldier should meet with due attention.

The other defects he had noticed in the actual condition of both services, Lord Wellesley met in a similar manner. In all that he did he could not help being "thorough." With that "thoroughness" there did not mingle a particle of meanness or parsimony. He recognised at the outset

that services rendered should be well paid. But then he would see that the service was rendered. He grudged no recompense provided this condition were fulfilled. He wished to stimulate zeal amongst a body of men in whose minds a long period of unenterprising and unmethodical government had introduced a profound lethargy. Yet his position was one of extreme difficulty. He had, on the one hand, to reform the army; to prepare it to meet the wars which he saw looming in a very near future; to rouse from the torpor in which they were sunk the bulk of the members of the civil service; on the other, to bring expenditure within the limits of the income, to restore credit, and to procure the money which would be necessary for the conduct of military operations on a large scale. He proposed, with a view to attain these aims, to apply himself in the first instance to a general revision of all public establishments in the three Presidencies. With the army he would deal in a different manner. There, no great reduction of numbers was to be thought of. One regiment of cavalry, taken over from the Chevalier de Boigne, would be transferred to the Nawáb-Wazír of Oudh. Further economy would be consulted by the abolition of the extra allowances granted to the garrison of Alláhábád. Finally, he would refer to specially appointed committees, under his own inspection, the revision of the several branches of the revenue and its collection.

Lord Wellesley was planning and partially carrying out these reforms when the discovery of the correspondence of Típu Sultán with the Isle of France forced him to provide funds for the military preparations which had become absolutely necessary. If he had had money, he would have solved the question without further delay; but in the south, in the west, in the east, the treasuries were alike empty.

For the moment money was found, and the success of the war which followed augmented alike the credit of the Company and its means of permanent supply. But the improvement did not come all at once. In 1800, the Treasury notes, bearing 12^o per cent., were selling in the bazaar at a discount of 3 or 4 per cent. Silver was scarce, and in the hands of the native capitalist; and he would only sell it at a discount sometimes of as much as 7 per cent.

One of the special qualities of Lord Wellesley was his power to detect worth in others. He had picked out young Malcolm from the crowd before even he had seen him, judging merely from some letters of the young soldier which had come under his eyes. To aid him in his financial difficulties, to restore order and credit, he now selected a Bengal civilian, Mr. Tucker, to fill the office of Accountant-General. He had known Mr. Tucker when that gentleman was on sick leave at Madras, prior to, and during, the Maisûr war, and he had formed a high opinion of his capacity as a financial administrator. There could not have been a better selection. Recognising that the financial embarrassment and its consequences were due to the lowness of the Company's credit, Mr. Tucker, as soon as he could spare time from the exigencies of the ~~hour~~, pressing upon him, from the three Presidencies, inaugurated a bold and soundly based system, which, in a short time brought about the desired result. Thenceforward the finances of India worked with a magical regularity.

Amongst other subjects which had greatly exercised the mind of the Governor-General, was that regarding the observance of the Sunday in India. Up to his time there had been no intermission of trading or work on the seventh day. To the Hindu population and to the

Muhammadan shopkeeper the day had no religious significance, and the European settler had fallen in with the ways of the people of the country. But few things had more struck the keen mind of Lord Wellesley than the observance of the ceremonies which formed part of their religions by the Hindus and the Muhammadans. He had noticed how such observances entitled those who strictly kept them to the respect of their fellow men; how, also, neglect in that particular on the part of the English had led to a very general impression that they had no religion—none, certainly, that regulated their conduct—and that they were regarded therefore by the native community as little better than pariahs or outcasts. In Bengal and Bibár the English had from the time of Clive been the paramount power. By the action of Lord Wellesley they had become so in Southern India. It was not fitting then, he thought, that they should continue to subject themselves to the reproach which till then had been freely cast on them in the matter of religion. Accordingly, shortly after his return from Madras, Lord Wellesley inaugurated the germ of his future policy by directing that the Government of India should make a public profession of its faith. He ordered that a day should be set apart for a public and general thanksgiving for the various successes which had attended the British arms. The day fixed was February 6th, 1800. On that date the Governor-General proceeded on foot from Government House to the Church of St. John, accompanied by the leading members of the Government and of the community. He followed up this action by directing, in an order in the *Gazette*, the observance of Sunday as a day of rest, and by prohibiting Sunday newspapers. But, whilst he thus publicly announced that the English had a religion, and that he, as the Head of

the State in India, desired to set an example in the observance of the authorised ceremonies of that religion, he did not depart a single hair's breadth from the practice of toleration. The Hindu and the Muhammadan were allowed the most complete liberty of action in the exercise of their religious observances. The one point upon which Lord Wellesley insisted was that the paramount power should not show itself ashamed of the faith which it professed.

His dealings with the native press were characterised by the same combination of firmness and prudence which had marked his transactions with native princes. Naturally, he was in favour of unrestricted freedom of the press. But he felt that, although the influence of Great Britain might be paramount in Bengal, in Madras, and in Bombay, there was a large portion of India, comprehending the imperial cities of Dehli and Ágra, and the important centres of Puná, Nágpúr, Indúr, Gwáliár, and Barodah, subject to the unsubdued Maráthás, who, more openly than the English, laid claim to the succession to the Mughul. The native press within the British territories was, even in those days, very licentious. It was represented, then, to Lord Wellesley that in the independent native states the comments, the unrestricted comments, of newspapers published under the shadow of the English Government were liable to be mistaken for the comments of the Government itself. That such an impression should prevail at a time when Europe was in arms, when India was always liable to attack from without, when a jealous and susceptible rival was watching from Puná the tendency of the action of Calcutta, was dangerous to the maintenance of peace. Acted upon by these considerations—considerations which even in our own time have not been without their weight—Lord Wellesley established a mild

censorship, which, without interfering with legitimate comment, prevented the ill consequences which absolute freedom of utterance might have caused.

In February, 1801, the complete satisfaction of the Crown with the mode in which the Marquess was administering England's great dependency was manifested by the bestowal upon him of the rank of Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief of all the Forces in the East Indies. A year later, the Ottoman Porte, to testify its high appreciation of the manner in which the Marquess had co-operated for the expulsion of the French from Egypt, bestowed upon him the Order of the Crescent of the first rank. The first of these appointments caused the most unbounded satisfaction throughout British India. There was not an officer in the army who did not feel that the success which had been obtained in Southern India had been due in the first instance to the splendid initiative of the Marquess Wellesley; that it had been he, who, against advice and remonstrance from the highest quarters, had insisted, amid great financial difficulties, in putting the army on a war footing; that he, too, had planned the campaign which—a contrast to the previous campaigns against the same enemy and his father—had been brought to a successful issue within three months; that he then had declined to diminish the spoil due to the army by refusing to accept the proffered donation of £100,000. He was their paladin, their hero. His nomination to that high, and till then unbestowed, office was hailed by all classes as an honour fitly conferred upon the most deserving.

In consideration of this supreme command over the armies of India, the Marquess Wellesley took possession of the house in Barrackpúr Park, which had always been occupied by the Commander-in-Chief. Here he found

the rest which was denied him in the crowded quarters of Fort William—quarters at no time befitting the master of nearly one-third of India. That the Marquess had long felt the unfitness of the residence assigned to the Governor-General of India had been evidenced not very long after his return from Madras, by the designing and laying the foundations of a building which should be more worthy of England's representative. He had noticed, as a matter of no little significance, the importance which the natives attached to display, and it was a part of his policy to indulge them in it to their hearts' content. With them he was the "great lord," the living embodiment of the Company's power, "the perfect representative of the might of England." The outer manifestations of his grandeur, in the building of a new and magnificent palace, of a splendid barge, of a richly-attired *entourage*, seemed to them to be the fitting demonstration of the greatness which characterised all his acts of government, and they rejoiced at them accordingly. Never was pageantry employed to a more useful end.

But, amidst the pomp and glittering circumstances of war and its concomitants, the Marquess neither forgot nor neglected the subject of education, of the education especially for the English public servants, to whose hands would be intrusted the working of the measures of the Government. His views on this point are contained in an elaborate minute bearing the title, "Notes by the Governor-General in Council." In this State paper he pointed out that the civil servants of the Company could no longer be considered as the agents of a commercial concern; that they were, in fact, the ministers and officers of a powerful sovereign; and that they must be viewed in that capacity with reference to their real occupations. Proceeding to show that they were thus required to discharge the functions of magis-

trates, judges, ambassadors, and governors of provinces, in all their complicated and extensive relations of those sacred trusts and exalted stations, sometimes under circumstances of great difficulty, he laid down the kind of education they were bound to acquire before starting on the race for distinction.

"Their education," he wrote, "should be founded in a general knowledge of those branches of literature and science which form the basis of the education of persons destined to similar occupations in Europe. To this foundation should be added an intimate acquaintance with the history, languages, customs, and manners of the people of India, with the Muhammadan and Hindu codes of law and religion, and with the political and commercial interests and relations of Great Britain in Asia. They should be regularly instructed in the principles and system which constitute the foundation of that wise code of regulations and laws enacted by the Governor-General in Council, for the purpose of securing to the people of this Empire the benefit of the ancient and accustomed laws of the country, administered in the spirit of the British constitution. They should be well informed of the true and sound principles of the British constitution, and sufficiently grounded in the general principles of ethics, civil jurisprudence, the law of nations and general history, in order that they may be able to discriminate the characteristic differences of the several codes of law administered within the British empire in India, and practically to combine the spirit of each in the dispensation of justice, and in the maintenance of order and good government. Finally, their early habits should be so formed as to establish in their minds such solid foundations of industry, prudence, integrity and religion, as should effectually guard them against those temptations and corruptions with which the nature of this climate and the peculiar depravity of the people of India will surround and assail them in every station, especially upon their first arrival in India."

To carry into action these views, the Marquess issued orders (July 10th, 1800) for the foundation of a college, which should be called the College of Fort William. The regulations of this college required that the provost, that is, the immediate governor of the college, should receive the junior civil servants on their first arrival at Fort William; should superintend and regulate their general

morals and conduct; should see that they duly attended the several courses of instruction, of which a list was given; that the civil servants, arriving after the date of its formation, as well as those who had not already served three years in India, should be attached to the college for three years; that the junior military servants of the Company should be admissible to the college under such terms and regulations as might be deemed advisable. There were also further regulations for public examinations, bestowal of degrees, and the arrangement of other matters affecting its well-being.

Well intended and loudly called for by the existing defects in the public service as was this scheme, it was not to be. Lord Wellesley had been gifted by nature with an order of mind far more capacious, a genius for administration far more brilliant, than were to be found amongst his masters in Leadenhall Street. Although these, not too openly to discredit him, professed to applaud the design of the college, and to sanction the principle upon which the Governor-General had acted in constituting it, they declared it to be too vast, too expensive, for the purpose. The vexation of the great Proconsul on receiving this unlooked-for disapproval is not to be described. He did not recognise at the moment the fact that the opposition of the India House was dictated mainly by a desire to check his autocratic tendencies; to signify, without saying it, that they constituted a body which had the right to be consulted before action was taken, and not a Directorate merely to register his decrees; but, believing that in his original proposal he must have omitted some argument necessary to convey conviction, he sat down and penned a despatch containing a hundred and forty-two paragraphs, in which, in classic sentences, he unfolded the unanswerable reasons why his

original plan should be sanctioned. To support his arguments with the Court, he solicited the assistance of the Board of Control and of several members of the Ministry. In reply to Lord Wellesley's arguments, the India House continued to plead poverty. Finally, on the intervention of Lord Castlereagh, a compromise was arrived at, really acceptable to neither party, and for the moment the college was saved. It did not, however, in its original form, survive the departure of Lord Wellesley from India.*

The disagreement about the college was not the only disagreement which the far-seeing but high-handed Proconsul had at this period with his uncongenial masters. The world's history gives examples without number of the difficulty with which genius works under mediocrity. Cromwell was forced to dissolve his Parliament; Napoleon to upset the factious Directory; Wellesley, unable to follow in their footsteps, experienced a repugnance amounting to disgust at finding his actions controlled and then annulled by men whose intellectual requirements were of the smallest, and for whose political knowledge and parsimony he had learned to feel only contempt.

* "It is but justice to the Honourable East India Company," writes Mr. Pearce, "to say that, after the heat of these discussions had passed away, in a magnanimous spirit they took up the plan of Lord Wellesley, and put it into execution with so much success that many have doubted, and still doubt, whether the maintenance of Fort William College as originally designed would have been more useful to the servants of the Company than the College of Haileybury." The scheme was strongly supported by some of the best men in England, amongst others by Wilberforce, who condemned the parsimony of the Company in withholding its sanction. The bitterness of Lord Wellesley's feelings may be gathered from a letter which he addressed to Lord Castlereagh on the subject in 1804, in which he speaks of his "unqualified contempt and abhorrence of the proceedings and propensities of the Court of Directors."

Before the year 1802 had dawned, he had received instructions from them, some of which, if he had literally carried them out, would have placed English interests in India in the greatest peril. For instance, whilst four of the Maráthá Powers were still indignant at having been debarred from their share of the plunder of Maisúr, and the astutest among them were deliberating how best to deliver a counterblow to the foreigner whom they now recognised as their only possible rival for empire, the Court peremptorily instructed the Governor-General to reduce his military strength. Again, the same controlling authority rudely interfered with the staff salaries he had authorised for the new political appointments which it had been necessary to create on the close of the Maisúr campaign. Among these was the salary of the Governor-General's brother, Arthur Wellesley. Further, Lord Wellesley had nominated Colonel Kirkpatrick, the same with whom he had journeyed from the Cape on his voyage to India and who had rendered him then and subsequently the most valuable services, to be Secretary to the Government in the political department. The Court brusquely ordered him to rescind that appointment. He had nominated Colonel Scott, whose services in negotiating with the Nawáb-Wazír of Oudh had been eminently useful, to be Resident at Lakhnao. The Court ordered him to revise the appointment "with a view to rescind it." The Court had further interfered with his patronage by directing him to bestow upon one of its *protégés* an appointment for which, in the judgment of the Governor-General, he was not qualified. This last order, following upon the implied disapproval of the nomination to high political office in Maisúr of his brother, Arthur, was regarded as peculiarly offensive. By the confession even of his enemies, the principle upon which the Marquess Wellesley

had acted in his selection for staff employment was one which ought to prove a standing rule for all governors. Solicited by many, he selected only those whom he believed deserving, and to them he gave all his confidence. It is worthy to be noted that all his selections stood the test of time and trial.*

These several annoyances, crowned by the cavalier rejection of his scheme for the college, so irritated Lord Wellesley, that on January 1st, 1802, he intimated to the Court of Directors his desire that they would select some one to replace him the following October. The moment he had selected for making this request was singularly opportune. Tranquillity reigned throughout India. The revenues of the British provinces were showing signs of great improvement. Communications between their component parts had been opened out, and were being vigorously pushed forward. Information had reached India leading to the belief that the negotiations for peace in Europe, then pending, would prove successful. There was not, then, a cloud on the horizon.

About ten weeks later, when at Banáras, he received from Lord Hobart a letter, dated Downing Street, October 12th, 1801, informing him that Articles of Peace had been exchanged at Amiens between Lord Hawkesbury and M. Otto, and that hostilities had ceased. Lord Wellesley, conceiving that this announcement added force to his previous request, wrote at once to the Court

* Mill, who has done his best to disparage the great Proconsul, thus wrote regarding his selections for offices: "The Governor-General, amid the talents for command which he possessed in a very unusual degree, displayed two qualities of primary importance. He has seldom been surpassed in the skill with which he made choice of his instruments; and, having made choice of his instruments, he communicated to them, with full and unsparing hands, the powers which were necessary for the end they were employed to accomplish."

(March 13th, 1802), to reiterate it, merely deferring his time of leaving from October to December, or the month following. The reply of the Court was a request to the Marquess to defer his departure for a year, that is, to the beginning of 1804. How Lord Wellesley would have acted had no complications arisen in India it may not be difficult to surmise. But, long before he received the reply, the struggle for Empire between the two rival powers in India, the British and the Maráthás, had commenced.

The definitive Treaty of Peace with France was not signed till March 27th, 1802. In compliance with one of its clauses instructions were transmitted to the Marquess Wellesley "to restore to the French and Batavian Republics respectively all the countries, territories, and factories, with the exception of the Dutch possessions in the island of Ceylon, which belonged to them, respectively, in India, and which had been occupied or conquered by His Majesty's forces, and," added Lord Hobart, "you will take the necessary measures for placing the subjects of the French and Batavian Republics in India upon the same footing on which they stood at the commencement of the war." These directions involved the retrocession of Chandranagar, Pondichery, Chinsurah, Mahé, and Goa.

In the November following, circumstances having arisen in Europe which tended to show that the peace would not last, Lord Hobart enclosed to Lord Wellesley a cypher letter, from the Admiralty to himself, informing him that Commodore Linois, having on board one of the ships of his squadron the new French Captain-General for India, was about to sail from Brest, to be joined *en route* by another squadron, and instructing him to defer the reduction of the force in India till he should receive further

orders. Two days later, Lord Hobart wrote directing him still to execute the instructions he had received regarding the immediate restitution of the French possessions to the commander of the troops of that nation.

Well may Mr. Pearce write that "a man of less firmness than the Marquess Wellesley would perhaps have obeyed these commands." So precise were they that it required a very strong man indeed to disobey them. But, reading between the lines, Lord Wellesley clearly discerned that the Peace of Amiens was but an armed truce; that it had recognised the French Republic as the virtual mistress of continental Europe, and would afford that Republic facilities for extending her power in Asia and in Africa. He took upon himself, then, the responsibility of declining for the moment to direct the restitution of the French possessions. When, then, in due course, the squadron of Commodore Linois appeared before Pondichery, Lord Clive, acting upon orders from the Marquess Wellesley, informed the French commander that he had not received instructions to surrender the place, and referred him to the Governor-General of India.

Pondichery, then, was not restored to the French. A few months later, a despatch from Lord Hobart (March 19th) completely justified the prevision of the great Marquess. That despatch contained enclosures which made it abundantly clear that the armed truce was virtually at an end. On May 17th following, Lord Hobart announced the recall of the British ambassador from Paris, and the renewal of hostilities. The despatch containing this announcement urged upon Lord Wellesley the duty of recapturing "any forts or possessions which the French may have in India." Happily, the firmness and prescience of Lord Wellesley had rendered it unnecessary to fire a shot

to effect that object, for, thanks to him, the French had no forts and no possessions in the country.

Before the war with France had been renewed, and whilst the British possessions in India were enjoying peace and the consequences of peace, Lord Wellesley publicly inaugurated the opening of the new Government House. Occasion was taken to make the *fête*, which was then celebrated, a *fête* of rejoicing for the cessation of hostilities in Europe. It took place January 26th, 1803, and, like everything to which the Marquess Wellesley put his hand, was in all respects magnificent. It should be borne in mind that at that period the knowledge that peace had been signed in Europe was comparatively fresh news for the residents of Calcutta, the peace having been signed only at the very end of March. Other rejoicings followed, and these rejoicings gave place in turn to the consideration of remedial measures affecting the country. Amongst these was a measure by which might be prevented the practice prevalent among the Hindus of allowing the wife of a deceased nobleman to be burnt alive on the funeral pile of the husband. The din of war came, however, to interrupt the Governor-General in the midst of this work.

I have already stated that twice in the year 1802 had the Governor-General, annoyed beyond measure at the parsimony and short-sighted policy of his masters in Leadenhall Street, tendered the resignation of his high office. In reply to both these offers he had been requested to remain another year. But, meanwhile, the relations between himself and the Court of Directors did not improve. They seemed to take a special delight in the display of suspicion and distrust. In his dealings with the Nawáb-Wazír of Oudh, Lord Wellesley had derived the most important assistance from his brother, Henry, afterwards Lord Cowley, placed by him in a high position

at the Court of that prince. The Court of Directors had objected to the appointment of a gentleman not in their covenanted service, as one outside the power of the Governor-General to bestow. This annoyed him greatly. There, however, the Court were, strictly speaking, within their rights. But, about the same time, there came from them a despatch, which, whilst revealing their petty suspicion of their representative in India, placed them completely in the wrong.

When, at a critical period of the war just concluded, Lord Wellesley had despatched Indian troops to Egypt, he had sanctioned the chartering of three private ships, that is, ships not the property of the Company, to convey stores to the Red Sea. The Court of Directors, who jealously guarded as their most precious possession the monopoly of trade with India, seized the occasion to accuse him of abusing his discretionary power for the purpose of enriching private shipowners at the expense of the Company to the extent of 30,000 tons. It was not difficult for Lord Wellesley to prove that he had employed only three ships, the united tonnage of which did not exceed one-tenth of the amount stated by the Company. And he proceeded further to justify his action. That action, he stated, had been adopted "under an irresistible exigency of the public service at the most critical period of the war." In the letter to Lord Castlereagh, in which that expression is used, Lord Wellesley expatiated on the difficulty of defining the precise boundaries of the discretionary authority vested in the Governor-General. "On the due and firm exercise of that discretion, however," he added, "the stability of the Empire must principally depend." In such a matter much must depend on the degree of sympathy between the employer and the employed. Between the genius of Lord Wellesley and

the halting and suspicious mediocrity of the Court of Directors there could be none. Lord Wellesley's letters abound with expressions of the loathing, the contempt, with which he regarded the inmates of Leadenhall Street.*

Stung by the vexatious opposition to his best thought-out schemes, the Marquess Wellesley once again, in 1803, expressed to the Court his desire to be relieved of his office, so as to enable him to return to Europe some time in the following year. But when this despatch reached England there were signs that the discontent long seething in the minds of the Maráthá princes was about to burst into action; and the Court, in reply, requested the Marquess to remain at his post until the nascent excitement should be appeased. Lord Wellesley, bitterly as he felt and keenly as he resented the indignities which had been heaped upon him, could not bring himself to abandon the state vessel in the hour of danger, and he agreed to remain until that danger should be averted.

That danger was upon him before his thoughts had expressed themselves in words.

* For instance, to Lord Castlereagh, 1st March, 1804: "It is unnecessary to repeat to your Lordship my utter contempt of any opinions which may be entertained by Mr. — and the Court of Directors, or to apprise you, that I expect every practicable degree of injustice and baseness from that faction." Again, on June 19, the same year, "I am induced to hope that I shall be enabled to relinquish the service of my honourable employers in the month of January or February next. Your Lordship, however, may be assured, that no symptoms of tardy remorse, displayed by the honourable Court in consequence of my recent successes in India, will vary my present estimation of the faith and honour of my very worthy and approved good masters, or ~~prolong~~ my continuance in India for one hour beyond the limits prescribed by the public interests, so no additional outrage, injury, or insult; which can issue from the most loathsome den of the India House, will accelerate my departure, while the public safety shall appear to require my aid in this arduous station."

CHAPTER VII.

THE MARÁTHÁ WARS.

1802-1805.

The Maráthá Empire—Its consolidation by Mádhabái Sindhiá—His death and its consequences—The treaty of Bassein—Discontent of Dáolat Ráo Sindhiá—Lord Wellesley's military preparations—Restoration of the Peshwá by General Wellesley—Evasions of Sindhiá and the Bhonslá—Lord Wellesley's plan of campaign—Assaye, Argaum, and Láswári—The Maráthás sue for peace—Inaction of Holkar—He now resolves on war—Monson's retreat—It is avenged by General Lake—Holkar's surrender.

THE Maráthá Empire, if I may so term the five States ruled by Maráthá chiefs, with the Peshwá as their nominal head, which, at the period of which I am writing, dominated Western, Central, and North-Western India, founded in the middle of the seventeenth century by Sívájí; tending to decay under his son, Sambají; restored by the efforts of Mulhárjī Holkar and Ránojī Sindhiá; had been humbled to the dust by the complete defeat its armies sustained on the fatal field of Pánípat, at the hands of the ruler of Kábul, Ahmad Sháh Abdálí, January the 6th, 1761. There fled, however, from that field, sorely wounded, a member of the house of Sindhiá, Mádhabái by name, who, recognised shortly afterwards as the 'heavē of that house, devoted all his intellectual power, which was extraordinary, and his energies, which were untiring, to restore to his race the influence and the position which it

had lost. He succeeded. In 1771, he entered Dehli—the titular Emperor, Sháh Álam, in his train—as a conqueror. In 1778, he had his first contest with the English, a contest in which not only had the Maráthás all the advantage in the field; but they forced upon their enemy the shameful and humiliating Treaty of Wárgaum (January 14th, 1779). Warren Hastings, however, who then guided the fortunes of British India, was not the man to allow such a disgrace to pass unavenged. Disavowing the Treaty of Wárgaum, he sent Goddard and afterwards Camac to Central and Western India, and these commanders soon retrieved the reputation which had been lost in the disastrous campaign. *

Mádhájí, indeed, fought not unequally with Goddard, and baffled two successive attempts to force him to a general action (April 3rd and 19th, 1780). But, meanwhile, Captain Popham had surprised and captured the strong fortress of Gwáliár. The following year, however, Mádhájí came up with a small force under Colonel Camac at Sironj, and drove it for seventeen days before him. But on the eighteenth day Camac, suddenly turning, surprised the Maráthá chieftain in his camp. His great superiority in cavalry saved Mádhájí, however, from much damage, and during the rest of the year he compelled the English to remain inactive. Finally, perceiving he had everything to lose from carrying on a contest within his own territories, he concluded (October 13th, 1780) a treaty with Colonel Muir, who had joined Camac, by which he bound himself to neutrality, agreed to exercise his good offices to bring about a peace with the other Maráthá Powers, recovered all his territories except the fortress of Gwáliár, and obtained from the English a promise that they would recross the Jamnah.

Warren Hastings was conducting at this time the last

and desperate war with Haidar Álí, and he wished by all the means in his power to make peace on fair terms with the Maráthás. He succeeded, by the aid of Mádhájí, in May, 1782, in inducing the Peshwá to agree, at Salbai, to a treaty by which the contending parties were, with respect to their territories, restored to the positions they respectively occupied before the war. This treaty was ratified June the 6th, and the ratifications were exchanged with the Peshwá on February the 24th following. The Maráthás were thus left free to consolidate their fortunes in Western, Central, and North-Western India. •

In the attempts which they made to this end, Mádhájí Sindhiá took a very decided lead. First, by an arrangement with the native chief to whom the English had made over Gwáliár, he recovered that fortress. Then, having ascertained that the English would not interfere with any plans he might put in action for obtaining possession of the imperial cities of Ágra and Dehlí, he joined the Imperial Court, then a prey to contending factions, near the former city; speedily obtained a complete ascendancy in the councils of the Mughul, and accompanied it to Dehlí. There he accepted for the Peshwá the title of "Vicegerent of the Empire;" for himself that of Deputy to the Peshwá. From this period to the occurrence of the events immediately preceding the action forced upon Lord Wellesley, and which I am about to describe, the Maráthá power, as exercised by the house of Sindhiá, was supreme in the two imperial cities, and in the districts immediately dependent upon them.

To establish and maintain his power in North-Western India, and to prepare for the decisive struggle with the English, which he not only saw looming in the future, but which he was resolved to provoke at an opportune moment, Mádhájí organised bodies of troops on the

European model, under the immediate command of adventurers from all parts of Europe, but mostly from France. His policy was to destroy the power of the smaller princes who should prove irreconcilable, to conciliate those who would be conciliated; then, when his power in North-West and Central India should be firmly consolidated, to proceed to Purná; obtain the ascendancy he required in the councils of the Peshwá; to induce, ^{there,} the independent native chiefs of India to join the confederacy which he was forming against the foreigner; and finally to enter upon a decisive struggle for empire with the English. Had he lived two years longer he would have had a great chance. He would have had to do with a Governor-General who would have moved neither hand nor foot until he were attacked, and it is impossible to say that he might not have succeeded. When the year 1794 dawned he had accomplished most of his objects. He had consolidated his power in North-Western and Central India; he had obtained the ascendancy he required in the councils of the Peshwá; he was engaged in arranging for a general combination against the English. But, just as success seemed within his grasp, he was attacked by fever and died (February 12th, 1794).

He was succeeded by his grandnephew, a boy of fifteen. This boy, Dáolat Ráo by name, was suddenly called upon, with a character unformed, to deal with problems which called for the wisdom of an experienced statesman.

The first problem was caused by the death of the Peshwá. On October the 25th of the year following, Madhu Ráo Peshwá, a young man of considerable promise, deliberately threw himself, in a fit of melancholy, from the lofty terrace of his palace to the ground. Two

days later he died, from the effects of the injuries he then received. The misfortune was not so much that a Peshwá had died, but that the nearest heir to the Peshwá was a young man so unscrupulous, so depraved, so intriguing, and so cowardly, that his succession could not fail to prove a misfortune to his family and race.

After much manœuvring, this young man, whose name was Báji Ráo, did succeed to the vacated seat. His first aim was to rid himself of the powerful vassals who rounded him. The first whose influence he neutralised, was his predecessor's minister, Náná Farnáwís, the partisan of alliance with the English. Then he turned his attention to Dáolat Ráo Sindhiá, the successor of Mádháji, and who still remained at Puná. He began by doing all in his power to lessen his popularity, to weaken his influence, to exhaust his treasury. Then he encouraged Jeswant Ráo Holkar to attack the dominions of Sindhiá in Central India. Hostilities in consequence broke out between the two Maráthá princes. After some preliminary successes Holkar was totally defeated by Dáolat Ráo, in a battle fought near Indúr, October 14th, 1801. Had Dáolat Ráo followed up this victory the career of Jeswant Ráo had been finished for ever. But Dáolat Ráo delayed to amuse himself, whilst Jeswant Ráo, hurrying off with fresh troops to Khandesh, turned suddenly upon the army which, led by one of Sindhiá's generals, was leisurely following him, and inflicted on it a crushing and decisive defeat near Puná, October 25th, 1802. From this defeat arose the conjuncture which brought the Peshwá in close contact with the British, and gave the Marquess Wellesley the opportunity, of which he availed himself with rare ability, to carry out the policy which he had fixed in his own mind as the only policy which could ensure absolutely the security of the British in India.

Impatient of the yoke which Sindhiá had long imposed upon him, the Peshwá, Bájí Ráo, had for some time past been listening, not without indifference, to a proposal made to him by the British Resident at his Court, Colonel Barry Close, for the location, near to, but not within his territories, of a British force which he might call to his aid in case of need. No arrangements had been actually arrived at when the rival Maráthá armies came into each other's presence, near Puná, on that morning of October 25th. The Peshwá, confident that Sindhiá's troops would gain the day, had actually set out from the city with his own following for the purpose of taking part in the action. But the battle had joined before he reached the ground, and, naturally a coward, he became frightened by the noise of the firing, and turned off to the south, there, at the distance of three or four miles, to await the result. As soon as he had ascertained that Holkar had gained the day, dreading that chieftain far more than he had dreaded Sindhiá, he fled with about seven thousand followers to the fort of Singarh, eleven miles from Puná, and despatched thence to Colonel Close a preliminary engagement, binding himself to subsidize six battalions of sipáhis, and to cede twenty-five lakhs of rupees of annual revenue for their support. He stayed three days at Singarh; proceeded thence twenty-one miles further, to Raigarh; thence to Mahar. From this place he despatched letters to the Bombay Government, requesting that ships might be sent to convey himself and his followers to Bassein. Hearing, before he could receive a reply, that Holkar's troops were approaching, he repaired to Severndrugga, stayed there till a fresh alarm arose; then crossed over to Rewadanda, and, embarking thence in an English ship, provided for his reception, proceeded to Bassein, where he arrived on December 6th. He was met there

by Colonel Barry Close, armed with full instructions from the Marquess Wellesley; and there, on December 31st, he signed the important Treaty, known as the Treaty of Bassein. By this treaty the Peshwá entered the list of protected princes. He bartered his independence for security. The titular chief of the Maráthá confederacy became virtually the vassal of the nation, which he had regarded till then as his rival for empire.*

In May of the following year, the Peshwá accompanied a British force, which, under the provisions of the treaty, was assembled, in a manner presently to be described, to reseat him in Puná. Holkar, who till that time had occupied that capital, fled on its approach, acquiescing for the moment in an arrangement which he did not feel himself strong enough to prevent. Dáolat Ráo Sindhiá was not so easily reconciled to the position. He had now attained the age of twenty-three. During the seven or eight years which had followed the death of Mádhájí, he had had some rough schooling. Some glimmering of the wisdom of the policy entertained by his prescient great uncle, had forced itself on his intelligence. He recollected that twice had the opportunity been offered him of preventing the catastrophe: once, when he had beaten Holkar at Indúr; again, when after the defeat of his general, he might have marched with an

* By the Treaty of Bassein, the Peshwá was to receive a subsidiary force of six battalions with guns, and was to cede for their payment territory of the value of 26,000,000 rupees. He was to refer to the British Government all his disputes with the Nizam, and his claims against the Gaikwár, and was to be re-established by the British Government in his full rights as the head of the Maráthá confederacy. A portion of the territory thus ceded was afterwards exchanged for part of the Peshwá's possessions in Bundelkhand. These arrangements were embodied in supplementary Articles to the Treaty, on December 16, 1803. *Vide Aitchison's Treaties*, vol. iii.

overpowering force to the aid of the Peshwá. The Treaty of Bassein took him completely by surprise. He was not ready for the contest which he now foresaw would be waged under conditions far less advantageous for the Maráthás than would have been possible before the signature of that treaty. Invited to acquiesce in its conditions, he at first hesitatingly agreed, then as abruptly refused, and sent messengers to two other Maráthá chiefs, Holkar and the Bhonslá,* to endeavour to persuade them to enter into a confederacy against the foreigner. Jeswant Ráo, influenced probably by jealousy; believing that, in the event of victory, which he did not doubt, the main advantages would accrue to Sindhiá; received the messengers coldly. The Bhonslá, on the other hand, professed himself willing to discuss the matter at a personal interview.

The action of the Peshwá in throwing himself on the generosity of the British Government, and in invoking its protection, corresponded entirely to the hopes which Lord Wellesley had long entertained as constituting the best solution of the Maráthá question. "The most effectual arrangements for securing the British Government against any danger from the Maráthá States," he had written, "appear to be an intimate alliance with the acknowledged sovereign power of the Maráthá empire, founded upon principles which should render the British influence and military force the main support of that Power. Such an arrangement appeared to afford the best security for preserving a due balance between the several states constituting the confederacy of the Maráthá empire, as well as for preventing any dangerous union or diversion of the resources of that empire." And now, without any prompt-

* The Maráthá prince who ruled at Nágpur: otherwise called the Rájah of Barár.

ing on his part, "the acknowledged sovereign power of the Maráthá empire" had solicited, with an earnestness which would not take refusal, permission to place himself and his territories in the very position which Lord Wellesley had declared to be "the most effectual arrangement for securing the British Government against any danger from the Maráthá states." The arrangement, it is true, was one which, through his agent at the court of the Peshwá, he had been constantly suggesting, and which, by that means, had become familiar to the mind of Bájí Ráo, oppressed by the superiority affected by Sindhiá and Holkar. When the hour of trial came that prince had clutched at it, as his one hope of protection against men of his own race and kin, little caring that by his action he was signing the death-warrant of the Maráthá empire.

For the Marquess Wellesley, thorough in all his actions, had resolved, when he accepted the propositions of the Peshwá, and directed Colonel Close to sign the treaty of Bassein, to leave nothing in the carrying out of its provisions to chance. Jeswant Ráo Holkar, flushed with victory, was still occupying Puná with his army. It was always possible that Sindhiá, placing the interests of the Maráthá race above personal feeling, might, at a conjuncture the like of which had never before occurred to blight his plans of empire, join his forces to those of Holkar, and that the fate of the two rival powers might be decided at Puná. The Marquess, then, had to take care that the army which should reconquer Puná for Bájí Ráo, should be an army strong enough to meet any possible opposition. Whilst, then, he communicated to the other Maráthá princes the conditions of the Treaty of Bassein, and suggested their adherence to those of its provisions which secured the Peshwá against external

attack, he directed that his brother, Major-General Arthur Wellesley, should march upon Puná with 15,000 troops from the south. At the same time he urged upon the Nizam to send his contingent in the same direction, to be joined at a fixed place by his brother; and he intimated to the Commander-in-Chief in India, General Lake, that it was necessary he should be ready at any moment to commence hostilities.

General Wellesley responded with alacrity to the orders he received. With a force consisting of one regiment of European and three regiments of native cavalry; two regiments of European and six of native infantry; a proportion of artillery; and 2,500 Maisur horse, he set out from Harihar, on the frontier Maisur, on the 9th of March, and, pushing on with all possible haste, effected a junction with the Nizam's contingent on April 15th. As he advanced the detached troops of Holkar's army fell back, without engaging, before him. When he was still some seventy odd miles from Puná, Holkar quitted that city, and, leaving there a garrison of 1,500 men, retired to Chandaur, a town distant from it about a hundred and thirty miles. Information of this movement having been promptly brought to Wellesley, he detached General Stevenson, with about a third of his own force and the Nizam's contingent, with instructions to post the latter at Gardur, within the Nizam's territories; to join then his own troops to those of the Haiderábad subsidiary force; and to await further instructions on the Bhima river, near its junction with the Mota Mola. Warned, at the same time, by the Peshwá, that the small garrison left in Puná would probably plunder the Peshwá's palace and then fire the city, Wellesley pushed on at the head of his cavalry, marched sixty miles in thirty-two hours, and appeared

before Puná on April 20th. The garrison evacuated the place as he approached it, and he took possession of the Peshwá's capital without firing a shot. That prince, meanwhile, had remained at Bassein. But, on hearing of Wellesley's movements, he quitted that place, escorted by British troops, and accompanied by the British Resident (April 27th). On the 13th May following, he re-entered his palace, under a salute fired by British guns.

So far, the success of Lord Wellesley's policy had been complete. There was, at the moment, no reason to despair of the acquiescence, sullen though it might be, of Sindhiá. Holkar, it was clear, was not prepared to enter upon hostilities. The Bhonslá was believed to be indifferent and apathetic, and was far less formidable than either of the others. Lord Wellesley, then, had reason to hope that Dáolat Ráo Sindhiá, feeling that he was isolated, would hesitate to imperil his own vast possessions by warring with the British, for an idea which their recent action had rendered impossible of realisation. But Dáolat Ráo was yet young. He had an army partially modelled on the European system, and officered to a certain extent by European officers. By degrees he had been realising how possible it had been for him, had he employed the preceding nine years more wisely, to realise the dream of his great-uncle. Acquiescence in the Treaty of Bassein would render that dream for ever impossible of realisation. It was worth fighting for. He was ready for war, and he would fight. He declined, therefore, as I have told in a previous page, with some asperity, to become a party to the Treaty of Bassein. To the remonstrances of the British Resident, Colonel Collins, he replied:—"After my interview with the Bhonslá you will know whether it is to be peace or war."

On June 4th, Sindhiá met that prince at Mulkapúr, on

the confines of the Nizam's dominions. On the 8th, he had with him a prolonged interview. At the close of the conference Colonel Collins again pressed him to declare his intentions, but received only the reply that it was necessary that he should have another interview with the Bhonslá before he could give a definite answer. It would seem as though the two chieftains had agreed to try once again to induce Holkar to embrace the common cause, ~~and the~~ evasive answers each in turn gave were intended to gain time. For some weeks Collins displayed the most exemplary patience. When, however, he could elicit no satisfactory reply, the Governor-General, anxious to know for certain whether the two chieftains were really determined on war, directed his brother, about the middle of July, to address a letter to Sindhiá, requesting him to separate his army from that of the Bhonslá, and to retire across the Narbadá; in which case, he was informed, the British troops would return to their cantonments. To this request again an evasive answer was returned. Practically it was refused, for the armies of two chiefs remained united. It became, then, clear that the two chiefs were bent on war, though neither would declare it. In the actual state of affairs in India, the Marquess Wellesley could not afford to allow the continuance of a situation so fraught with danger. There must either be peace, or there must be war—a middle course was impossible. With a patience which seemed to hope everything, the Governor-General had allowed the two Maráthá chieftains more than two months' time to make up their minds as to which it should be. They had met on June 4th, Sindhiá having previously declared that after the conference he would give a definite answer. Up to August 1st he had evaded a clear reply. His last had been so unsatisfactory, alike in its spirit and expression, that

Colonel Collins informed him that, finding it useless to continue negotiations, he should leave his camp. He quitted it accordingly on August 3rd. His departure, which Sindhiá took no means to prevent, was the signal for the commencement of hostilities.

The Marquess Wellesley, meanwhile, as Captain-General of India, had made arrangements to meet the issue which had now practically occurred. On June the 28th, he had instructed General Lake, who was at the frontier station of Kánbpúr, to put the army under his command in a position to take the field at the shortest notice. To his brother, Arthur Wellesley, he transmitted at the same time instructions to advance on the territories of Sindhiá to the south of the Godávarí as soon as negotiations should be broken off. He would do all that was possible to maintain peace, but, should the conduct of the Maráthá chiefs force war upon him, he was determined to prosecute it until such a settlement were effected "as would afford a reasonable prospect of continued peace and security to the British Government and its allies." With characteristic boldness and grasp of view, he thus expressed the objects which he was determined to accomplish in the two spheres in which he was about to operate, in the north-west and in the south-west. "The first of the military objects was to conquer the whole of that portion of Sindhiá's dominions which lay between the Ganges and the Jamnah; destroying completely the French force by which that frontier was protected; extending the Company's frontier to the Jamnah, and including the cities of Dehlí and Ágra, with a chain of posts, sufficient for protecting the navigation of the river, on the right bank of the river." His second object was to acquire Bundelkhand, or, at least, that portion of it which was necessary to secure his hold upon Ágra. The political

objects he aimed at securing by a successful war were not less important. By the conquest and permanent occupation of Dehli he would obtain possession of the representative of the Mughul, the unfortunate Sháh Álam, kept virtually as a State prisoner by Sindhiá, and, with his person, of the authority attaching to his name. It would be easy, he conceived, to make such an arrangement with that prince as would secure his personal comfort without awakening his ambition. Then, in the south, he would trust to his brother to secure the position of the protected allies of the British, the Nizam, the Peshwá, and the Gaikwár, by defeating the combined armies of Sindhiá and the Bhonslá. When they had been sufficiently humbled, he would then take measures to secure the British position, by compelling the former to surrender the port of Baroch, with the adjoining district on the coast of Gujrát; the latter to cede the province which connected Bengal with the south-eastern districts known as the Northern Sirkars, the province called Katak.

Such were his aims, bold, practical, statesmanlike, necessary for the consolidation of the British power in India, the complement to the measures by which he had secured permanent predominance in the south, and reduced the unwieldy proportions of Oudh. And—a most important consideration in the matter—he had not provoked the contest which promised to produce the magnificent results I have enumerated. He had, on the contrary, displayed a patience quite exemplary, a desire to avoid war so great as to have tried to the utmost a man who knew that war meant triumph, the increase, the consolidation, the permanent predominance and security of the British all over India, in the north as well as in the south. Promised on June the 4th a definite reply in four

days to his very moderate proposals, he had waited more than eight weeks to receive it. Then only, when the demands of the allied princes rose with every day of delay, did he authorise his agent to declare to them, in the manner best appreciated by Orientals, that the day of grace was past; that, thenceforth, they must try the arbitrament of the court to which they had appealed. Nor, to refer for a moment to the antecedent incident, the incident which converted the titular head of the Maráthá confederation into a protected prince, can the impartial historian find words too strong to express his admiration. It had been in the power of Sindhiá to prevent an event so galling to his pride by occupying the same position himself. The opportunity for the English had become possible because of his supineness. Here, too, the part played by Lord Wellesley was a part forced upon him. It was his merit that he had recognised the danger planned by Mádhájí; that in quiet and calmness he had prepared the remedy; and that when the occasion arose he applied it with a skill and a courage indicative of a real statesman.

It is not necessary that I should describe the details of the campaign which followed the departure of Colonel Collins from the camp of Sindhiá. It will suffice to say that Arthur Wellesley, advancing with a force of about 9,000 men from Puná on June the 4th, took up a position on the frontier of Sindhiá's territories, which would permit of his acting whenever war should be declared. On August the 7th, the Governor-General issued a proclamation declaring that on the day previous he had directed the levying of war against the two Maráthá chieftains. On the 8th, his brother, who had been previously instructed, advanced against Sindhiá's fortress of Ahmadnagar, forced it to surrender the 12th, crossed the

Godávarí the 24th, and reached Aurangábád the 29th. There he was but forty miles distant from the Maráthá army, for their allied forces had the same day ascended the Ajanta Pass, and the day following were at Jalnah. Wellesley, then, despatching Stevenson against Jalnah, marched himself down the Godávarí, and caught the Maráthás on the banks of the river Kaitna, their cavalry resting on Bokardan, their infantry on Assaye, on the morning of September the 23rd. Without waiting for Stevenson, he crossed the Kaitna by a ford, attacked, and after a very hotly-contested battle, completely defeated the enemy. Pushing on after this, his first victory, Wellesley, having meanwhile, by his lieutenants, forced the surrender of the important places of Asígarh and Burhánpúr, caught the enemy once again (November 29th) on the plains of Argaum. That same afternoon he attacked them, and inflicted upon them a second defeat, more decisive even than that of Assaye. That victory decided the war in Southern India.

Nor had Lake been less successful in North-Western and Central India. Marching from Kánpúr with an army about 8,000 strong on August 5th, he had crossed the British frontier the 28th, defeated the enemy's cavalry before Áligarh, the 29th; stormed the fortress of that name September 4th; beat the Maráthá on the Jehna nullah, six miles from Dehlí, on the 11th; entered that city, and released from confinement the blind Emperor, Sháh Álam, the 14th; defeated the enemy in front of Ágra, October 10th; compelled the surrender of that fortress on the 18th; and on the 27th started for Central India in pursuit of the best army of Sindhiá—that which had been entirely drilled by foreign officers. He caught it with his cavalry at the village of Lásvárí, after a series of forced marches, the morning of November 1st, and at

once attacked it. The enemy's position was, however, too strong, and was too well defended to be forced by cavalry alone, and Lake drew off to wait for his infantry. On these coming up, he gave them their dinner, and then renewed the attack, this time with complete success, though at a heavy expenditure of life. Láswári was one of the most decisive battles ever fought. It finished the war in Northern and Central India.

But it was the battle of Argaum, fought November, 29th, and the events which immediately followed it which brought the two Maráthá princes to ask for peace. Sixteen days after that battle Wellesley stormed the strong fortress of Guálgarh, believed by the enemy to be impregnable. It was the last blow. Two days later, the Bhonslá signed a treaty with the British by which he yielded the province of Katak and the port of Báleshwar; renounced all his claims on the Nizam, including those to the territory in Barár to the west of the Wardah river; and agreed to refer all disputes with that prince to British arbitration. Further, he promised to take no foreigners into his service without the consent of the British.

Thirteen days later, Dáolat Ráo signed with the British the treaty which is known as the Treaty of Surji Arjangaon. By this treaty he ceded to the British all his rights of sovereignty over the country between the Jamnah and the Ganges, and as well as over the territories belonging to the Rájahs of Jaipúr, Jodhpúr, and Gohad, with each of whom separate treaties were concluded. He ceded Baroch and Ahmadnagar, with the territories pertaining to both: and the territory between the Ajanta Hills and the Gôdavarí. Finally, he renounced all claims on the Emperor, Sháh Álam; upon the Nizam; upon the Peshwá; upon the Gaikwár; and upon the British Government. On the other hand, certain

lands which belonged to the family of Sindhiá, in the districts he was ceding, were to remain in the occupancy of their actual tenants; and in the same spirit, pensions assigned from similar lands, to the amount of seventeen lakhs a year, were to be paid as before.

Of the territories thus gained from the two princes, Lord Wellesley apportioned to the Nizam the territory to the westward of the Wurdah, and that between the Ajanta Hills and the Godávarí; to the Peshwá, the town and territory of Ahmadnagar; the rest he retained. With the further view to place Sindhiá, thus weakened by the war, in a position in which he could defend himself against Holkar, Lord Wellesley entered, two months later, into a supplemental agreement with Dáolat Ráo, to furnish him, in case of need, with a force of 6,000 infantry and the usual proportion of artillery. The expense of this force was to be borne by the ceded districts, but the force itself was not to be stationed within the actual dominions of Sindhiá. This treaty was signed at Burhánpúr on February 27th, 1804, but events moved too fast to allow of its conditions being acted upon.

It has always been something of a mystery why Jeswant Ráo Holkar had not joined Sindhiá in his struggle with the British. Their interests were identical. Jeswant Ráo had been, moreover, in a position peculiarly favourable for the commencement of a war in alliance with Sindhiá. He had held Puná. He had also troops trained by foreigners. He was daring even to rashness, and he resented, as much as did his fellow-chieftain, the intrusion of the English into Maráthá quarrels. When, from their encampment at Mulkápúr, Sindhiá and the Bhonslá despatched messengers to Holkar to endeavour to persuade that prince to become a party to the alliance, they had resolved to amuse the British agent until they could

receive a reply. The reply came, and it was favourable. Holkar sympathised with the views of the two allies, and agreed to join them. But the rapid movements of Wellesley and Lake probably disconcerted his plans. The English were too successful from the very outset; and his preparations had been made when it was too late to interfere with advantage. Added to this, there may have been a jealousy of Sindhiá, a desire to see him humiliated, a superlative confidence in his own ability to repair any damage. One fact is certain, viz., that although he took no part in the war, yet, no sooner was it concluded, than he showed himself resolved to provoke hostilities with the victor.

In December, 1803, Holkar had been quite ready. But by that time Láswári and Argaum had been fought, and Sindhiá and the Bhonslá were suing for peace. Holkar then took up a position with his army on the frontier of Sindhiá's dominions, with the intention of taking advantage of the weakness to which he had been reduced by the British to turn and plunder him. It was the view of such probable action on his part that induced Sindhiá to conclude with the British that supplementary treaty of February 27th, 1804, of which I have spoken. Holkar, hearing of this treaty, changed his tactics. He endeavoured to persuade Sindhiá to join him against the British, whilst he solicited from the latter permission to attack Sindhiá. In both these attempts he overreached himself. Sindhiá, smarting at having been left in the lurch in the late war, communicated to the British the overtures Holkar had made to him. The perusal of Holkar's letters, and the haughty, almost insolent tone assumed by that prince in his communications with the British officials, convinced Lord Wellesley that he was bent on war. He sent, then, to General Lake instructions

to oppose with force any attempt Holkar might make on the dominions of Sindhiá, and on those of the protected allies of the British.

General Lake, struck by the hostile attitude assumed by Holkar, had not, on the conclusion of the war with Sindhiá, moved back at once, as he would have done under ordinary circumstances, into cantonments, but had remained encamped at Bána, fifty miles south-west from Ágra. He was there when information reached him that Holkar had not only announced in his own camp his intention of making war on the British, but had barbarously murdered three English adventurers attached to his army, who had largely contributed to his success in his last war with Sindhiá, because they had declared that whilst ready to fight against any other people, they would not bear arms against their own countrymen. Lake, believing that a strong demonstration would suffice, detached a force of sipáhis, under command of Colonel Monson, to protect the city of Jaipúr, which, he was informed, Holkar was threatening. He then marched back slowly to Kánhpúr.

Monson reached Jaipúr just in time to prevent the city from being plundered by Holkar. That prince fell back in the direction of Kotá, as if in dread of an attack. Monson followed him, first to Kotá, thence through the Mokandará Pass to Souará. Learning there that Holkar was encamped on the Chambal, some twenty-five miles distant, Monson, though he had but three days provisions with him, started to drive him thence. On his way, however, he was persuaded by a traitor in his camp, one Bápuji Sindhiá, to stay his hand, and to retreat. That retreat, known to this day as Monson's retreat, was one of the most disastrous, till then, experienced by any army. Begun on July 7th, some seven miles from Rampúra on

the Chambal, it terminated on August 30th and 31st, by the arrival at Ágra "of wretched, footsore, half-starved, and dispirited fugitives," whose appearance "conveyed to the garrison some idea of the humiliation ever in store for the general who retreats before a barbarian enemy." *

General Lake, however, speedily avenged this misfortune. Marching from Kánhpúr, on September 3rd, he reached Mathurá on October 1st. There he had hoped to find Holkar. But that wily chief, having succeeded in drawing Lake to Mathurá, had himself made a dash on Dehlí. Dehlí, feebly garrisoned, but animated by the lofty spirit of David Ochterlony, held out till Lake, following close upon his enemy, compelled Holkar to raise the siege. Lake, then, finding that Holkar had made a dash into the Duáb, followed him thither, leaving General Fraser to deal with the smaller force that remained. Whilst Fraser—and Monson, who succeeded to the command on his being mortally wounded—beat that force at Díg, Lake, pursuing his enemy by forced marches, caught him up, completely surprised and defeated him at Farrukhábád, and compelled him to flee with but a small retinue in the direction of Díg. Lake carried that place on Christmas Day; then set down to besiege Bhartpúr.

Here, after a long siege of fifty-three days, he was baffled. But he had not forgotten Holkar. Springing after him from the very walls of Bhartpúr, he drove him before him through the north-west provinces, through the Cis-Satlaj States, across the river Satlaj, till he compelled him to surrender "his whole kingdom on his saddle's bow," † on December 24th, 1805.

* *The Decisive Battles of India* (W. H. Allen & Co., London), contains in full detail an account of this famous retreat, in which a force of from four to five thousand sipáhis, led by English officers, baffled a pursuing army of 75,000 men, of whom 60,000 were horsemen.

† Holkar's very expression.

CHAPTER VIII.

LAST DAYS IN INDIA.

1803-1805.

Panic of the Board of Directors—Lord Castlereagh's opinion—Lord Wellesley is ordered to cancel the treaty of Bassein—Further rebuffs—Progress of the Maráthá war—Lord Wellesley's letter to Lake—Resolutions of thanks to him—Lord Wellesley's letter to the Directors—Appointment of Lord Cornwallis—The manner of its communication—Mr. Thornton's testimony to Lord Wellesley's memory.

BEFORE the campaign recorded in the last chapter had been finished, the great Marquess had quitted India. Whilst he had been engaged in employing all his energies to defeat the formidable Maráthá confederacy which threatened the very existence of British authority in India, the Court of Directors, true to their petty traditions, had been worrying him in a manner which would have induced any one less conscientious to resign his high office in disgust. The war with the Maráthás, a war which we have seen was forced upon the Marquess by Sindhiá, had touched to the quick the money-grubbing instincts of the members of that honourable Court. When the news reached England that the war had broken out, India stocks, which had been at 215, fell to 160. This fall was naturally attributed to the policy of Lord Wellesley. It was impossible for a Governor-General to commit a greater crime. There arose, then, against the man

who was securing permanent security for British interests in India an exceeding great and bitter cry. The proprietors of India stock urged on the directors, and these, nothing loth, used every endeavour to heap insult after insult on their energetic servant in India. He was rebuked for legislating when away from his Council. Cases, describing individual instances of the exercise of his patronage when so absent, and therefore unaided by the concurrent advice, and unsupported by the sanction, of all its members, were sent for the opinion of lawyers in Lincoln's Inn, and the opinion so obtained, always, from the manner in which the case was drawn, friendly to the Court, was at once converted into a condemnatory resolution, and sent out to the Governor-General.* The clamour became so violent that even the Board of Control seemed to yield to it, and the action of Lord Wellesley in complying with the urgent request of the Peshwá to extend to him British protection—an act which conduced as much, at least, as any act of his reign to the ensuring

* It would be amusing, if it were not so provocative of contempt for the petty and puerile policy of the Court of Directors, to read the reasons upon which they and the lawyers they consulted based their condemnation of the conduct of the Marquess Wellesley. When, in 1803, war with the Maráthás seemed imminent, the Governor-General had delegated to Lieutenant-General Stuart, and Major-General Wellesley, the powers necessary for dealing with the enemy, without the necessity of making further reference to him; that is, he authorised them to act as circumstances on the spot might require. The reader will recollect that the Governor-General was in Bengal, kept there by orders repeatedly insisted upon: the Generals were in Western India; that there were no telegraphs; no horse-posts; and that communications took at least a fortnight. Yet, the Directors and their sapient legal advisers recorded that, in so delegating his powers, the Governor-General had exceeded his authority, that to enable him to delegate his powers in the way he had done, even to act himself when absent from his council, the confirming authority of an Act of Parliament was required.

of the stability of British interests in India—was gently but decidedly condemned.

“The eagerness,” wrote Lord Castlereagh, President of the Board, dealing with this question, “with which we appeared to press our connection upon all leading States in succession, might naturally lead them to apprehend, that we meant more than we avowed, that our object was ultimately to be masters rather than allies, and that, having obtained either possession of or absolute influence over every State, except the Maráthás, with whom we had been in connection, our object was to obtain a similar influence over their councils. Under whatever estimate of our views it may have been formed, the fact is indisputable that a general repugnance to the British connection on the terms proposed, universally prevailed amongst the great Maráthá powers. It was avoided by all as long as they had any choice. It was only embraced by the Peshwá when an exile from his dominions; and the jealousy of it was such as to have since led Holkar and Sindhiá to forget their animosities, and to league with the Rájah of Barár against the Company and the Peshwá. How long the Peshwá will continue faithful to engagements which were contracted from necessity and not from choice, in opposition to the other Maráthá States, is yet to be seen. The practical question to be considered is, whether an alliance formed under such circumstances can rest upon any other foundation than mere force; and if not, whether the means by which it was to be upheld are not destructive of its professed advantages. The Maráthás have never in any instance commenced hostilities against us: so far then as past experience goes, there seems to be no special ground to apprehend future danger from them. The French officers in Sindhiá’s army are just objects of jealousy, and their mixing themselves in the affairs of native powers must be watched, and be matter of alarm in proportion to the degree in which it takes place, and as those States are near to, or remote from, our possessions; but this alone cannot render the alliance prudent, nor is this danger at present of a magnitude to call for the adoption of a system otherwise of dubious policy. As far as the Maráthá interests are concerned, what motive can they have in acquiescing in the ostensible head of their empire being placed in our hands? Whatever we may hold out to reconcile the Peshwá to the alliance, and however we may profess to respect his independence in the management of his own affairs, we cannot deny that in fact as well as in appearance, whilst a British army is at Puná, he can be considered in no other light than as politically dependent on us. The same motives which before opposed Sindhiá and Holkar to each other now oppose them both to us, and the Rájah of Barár joins the con-

federacy. Nor is it to be expected that independent States, predatory and warlike, can wish to make us the arbiter of their destiny. To aim at a permanent connection with the Maráthá powers, must be, to say the least of it, extremely hazardous. It must be difficult and expensive to establish, not less difficult and expensive to retain. Such a result we disavow as our object, as in principle and policy against the laws of the land; and we should avoid therefore a course of measures, the tendency of which leads naturally to that result. "It may be said, if the treaty had not been pushed with the Peshwá while at Bassein, he might have refused it afterwards; but it is doubtful whether a treaty so obtained is a benefit, or whether it might not have been better to let Holkar and Sindhiá fight it out before proposing any permanent connection. The advantages of such a connection, had always been overrated. By keeping an army of observation on the frontier, and not mixing with Maráthá politics, except upon sure grounds, if we gained no more than securing our own territory, as well as that of our ally, the Nizam, from insult, we escaped war, whilst the Maráthá princes wasted their strength."

The historical student of the present day who shall read these platitudes, based upon half-truths and imperfect knowledge, will rejoice that it was to the Marquess Wellesley, and not to Lord Castlereagh, that the destinies of the British empire in India were entrusted. Whilst the former reasoned as a *doctrinaire*, the latter acted as a wise and far-seeing statesman. Yet, the Home Government, uncertain of the issue, far from assuring him of their support, began to take into consideration whether, by his treaty with the Peshwá, the treaty thereafter proudly referred to as the Treaty of Bassein, the Governor-General had not exceeded his powers, and what instructions should be sent to him to curb his future action. The result of these considerations was that instructions were sent to Lord Wellesley to cancel the Treaty of Bassein, and forbidding him to make war with Sindhiá or with Holkar. Fortunately, these instructions reached Lord Wellesley at a time when it had become impossible to execute them. They reached him after he had waged

war with Sindhiá and the Bhonslá, and had forced both to sue for peace; at the very moment, in fact, when he had actually signed that treaty with Sindhiá which brought him very nearly within the category of protected princes. The electric telegraph did not, happily, exist in those days, or the folly of the Home Government would have placed British interests in India in a situation of very great peril.

The Governor-General was not the less subjected, however, to annoyances which chafed his proud spirit. In the fourth chapter, reference has been made to the Secretary to the Madras Government, Mr. Webbe, as a gentleman who had at the outset opposed Lord Mornington's policy. But Mr. Webbe was a very able man, and, not wedded to his own opinions because they were his opinions, he had gradually recognised the wisdom of the policy which he had formerly opposed. When Lord Clive came to Madras as Governor he had found in the experience, the knowledge, and the ready resource of Mr. Webbe, a support upon which he could count in any emergency. The ability and rectitude of that gentleman had also won for him the esteem and good opinion of Lord Wellesley. Yet, notwithstanding that Mr. Webbe possessed the confidence of the Governor under whom he was immediately serving, and of the Governor-General of India, the Court of Directors, in the exercise of their power, directed that he should be removed from his office. In vain did Lord Clive remonstrate. Vainly did Lord Wellesley inform the Prime Minister that the removal of Mr. Webbe would be a severe blow to the Government. The Court of Directors wanted the appointment for one of their *protégés*, and persisted in their order. Rather than carry it out, Lord Clive resigned his office in disgust. Lord Wellesley could not repress his indignation at the

nefarious transaction. He informed Mr. Pitt, in the letter just referred to, that the direct appointment from home to the most confidential office under the Governor "comprised every degree of personal indignity that could be offered to Lord Clive and himself, and the result had been to drive that honest, diligent, prudent, and able public servant from India."

Amongst other rebuffs that were administered to him was one connected with the proposed erection of a house or palace for the Governor-General in the park of Barrackpúr. Lord Wellesley had taken over, on his appointment as Captain-General, the residence theretofore allotted to the Commander-in-Chief. That residence was neither large enough nor commodious enough for the lodgment of the Governor-General of India and his suite. Yet it was desirable that one engaged in the arduous duty of governing India should possess a place in the country to which he could occasionally retire for rest and recreation. No locality appeared to the Marquess to be so well suited for such a purpose as the park at Barrackpúr. It is the only piece of enclosed ground in India that bears any resemblance to an English park. No sound from the outer world reaches the palatial residence. The majestic Huglí flows calmly on one side, its surface gay with craft of varied shapes. On the other were magnificent trees, undulating grounds, and a fine garden. Successive Governors-General have found there a place of real solace after the cares of Calcutta. The wife of one of the noblest of them, the courageous and high-minded Lady Canning, loved it so much that, when she died in India, her remains were transferred to the spot in the garden of the park on which, when living, she delighted to sit and gaze at the river flowing beneath her. In this park Lord Wellesley designed to build a

residence worthy of the representative of England's power in the east. He had the plans made and the estimates prepared. The builders were about to commence their work, when the Court of Directors, delighted to thwart him, forbade him to proceed. The work, in the style in which it was intended, was therefore abandoned.

The reader can well imagine how the great Marquess had been cheered and delighted by the success of his generals in the war against Sindhiá; how he had followed their course of victory without a check with swelling heart and beaming eye. He was essentially a soldier, and the campaigns, both in the north-west and south-west, had been conducted on plans, the general ideas of which are to be found in his letters. In the victories which followed he saw not only the justification of his policy, but the impossibility of disturbing it; and, in that impossibility, the consolidation of the British power in India. Before his time the great danger to that power had lain in an union between the Maráthá powers. How real that danger had been any one who studies the life of Mádhájí Sindhiá will at once recognise. There was no guarantee that a second Mádhájí—a man with foresight as keen, with a will as resolute—might not again come to the front. It was the iron will of the Marquess Wellesley which, as was proved after his departure from India, prevented the re-introduction into the Government policy of the principles of Sir John Shore. A Maráthá empire united, pitted against a British India governed on those principles, would at least have had a great chance. But the Marquess Wellesley had rendered such a combination impossible. He had neutralised the Peshwá, smitten to the ground Sindhiá and the Bhonslá, despite the factious orders of the Court of Directors, then fortunately on the bosom of the ocean, to leave them alone; and he rejoiced, as only

a king of men can rejoice, that action so necessary to the safety of the great trust committed to him had been accomplished before it had been possible for mediocrity to prevent it. He felt that he had, in very deed, deserved well of his country.

Nor, whilst rejoicing at the success of plans which were his very own, did he complain when misfortune followed the attempted execution of a project which failed mainly because his recommendations with respect to the carrying out of it had been neglected, although he knew that he alone would have to pay the penalty of such misfortune. When it became necessary for Lake to defend the allies of England against the assault of Holkar, and that general intimated his intention of detaching a force, under Colonel Monson, to Jaipur, Lord Wellesley urgently pressed upon him the advisability of sending with it a due proportion of European troops. But the hot weather had set in, Lake did not care to expose his Europeans, and he would not. Monson, I have always held, owed his misfortune to not continuing his advance on Holkar's position at Rámpurá (on the Chambal). He changed his advance into a retreat because he, a man who had had no experience of native troops, did not care to run the risk of a further advance with native troops only. The misfortune that followed was due, then, to the neglect by General Lake of Lord Wellesley's advice. But, instead of whining at the disaster, of casting the blame on others, Lord Wellesley met it in the way natural to his noble nature :—

"I received this morning," he wrote to Lake (Sept. 11th, 1801), "your letter of Sept. 2nd. Grievous and disastrous as the events are, the extent of the calamity does not exceed my expectation; from the first hour of Colonel Monson's retreat, I have always augured the ruin of that detachment, and if any part of it be saved I count it so much gain. I trust that the greater part of it has arrived at Ágra, but I

fear that my poor friend Monson is gone. Whatever may have been his fate, or whatever the result of his misfortunes to my own fame, I will endeavour to shield his character from obloquy, nor will I attempt the mean purpose of sacrificing his reputation to save mine. His former services and his zeal entitle him to indulgence; and, however I may lament and suffer for his errors, I will not reproach his memory if he be lost, or his character if he survive. Your letter manifests your usual judgment and spirit. We must endeavour rather to retrieve than to blame what is past, and under your auspices I entertain no doubt of success. Time, however, is the main consideration. Every hour that shall be left to this plunderer will be marked by some calamity; we must expect a great defection of the allies, and even confusion in our own territories, unless we can attack Holkar's main force immediately with decisive success. I trust that you will be enabled to assemble your army in sufficient time to prevent further mischief; I highly applaud your determination to leave nothing to fortune, and rather to risk the internal tranquillity of the provinces for a season, than to hazard any contest on unequal grounds with the enemy. Holkar defeated, all alarm and danger will instantly vanish. When I look at the date of this letter I cannot entertain a shadow of apprehension for the result of this war. This is the anniversary of the battle of Dehli,—a victory gained under circumstances infinitely more unfavourable than the present. Your triumphs of last year proceeded chiefly from your vigorous system of attack. In every war the native States will always gain courage in proportion as we shall allow them to attack us; and I know that you will always bear this in mind, especially against such a power as Holkar. If we cannot reduce him, we have lost our ascendancy in India. You will perceive that the only effect produced on my mind by this misfortune is an anxious solicitude to afford you every aid in remedying its consequences with every degree of despatch."

The men of the present generation who shall read this noble letter will at once understand how proud the good men and true of his day were to serve under such a chief. Recollect that Lord Wellesley knew that Monson's disaster would be his death-warrant with the Court of Directors. That disaster had happened mainly because his advice had been neglected. How truly royal, under such circumstances, is his demeanour. For Monson only consideration and sympathy; for himself a determination

to assume the entire responsibility, whilst urging Lake to lose no time in retrieving the disaster. Then, how delicate his advice to Lake. The earnest wish of his heart is that Lake shall advance with all the dash of the war against Holkar, and annihilate his enemy. He thinks, in his heart, that Lake has not done well to leave Monson so far without support. But he is careful not to say so. He does not utter a word which can grate on the feelings of that gallant soldier. On the contrary, he invokes the glories he had gained in the last war by prompt action; indicates the danger of allowing the enemy to gather head and to attack; and thus insinuates rather than directs the course to be pursued. How Lake responded to this call, how he sprang upon Holkar and annihilated him, I have already told. He, at least, appreciated the generous nature of his large-minded Captain-General.

Six weeks later a solace to the wound caused by Monson's disaster was vouchsafed to the Governor-General by the receipt of the manner in which his victorious campaign against the two Maráthá chiefs had been received in Parliament. He had the satisfaction of reading that in the House of Lords the brilliant success which had been achieved was attributed to the vigorous and comprehensive system of measures pursued by the Marquess Wellesley for bringing the various armies with promptitude and effect into the field. In the Commons, Lord Castlereagh, without committing himself to the policy of the war, passed a glowing eulogium on the splendid conduct of all concerned in it, and the vote of thanks was unanimous. Even the Court of Directors, though they declined to pronounce an opinion on the political questions involved in the campaign, passed a resolution that :—

“Taking into consideration the despatches relative to the late

brilliant successes in the war with the Maráthá chiefs, their thanks be given to the Marquess Wellesley for the zeal, vigour, activity, and ability displayed in preparing the armies of the several Presidencies to take the field, to which might be attributed, in a great measure, the rapid and brilliant successes which had crowned the British arms in the East Indies."

The Court of Proprietors, hitherto so bitter against him, recorded their approval in identical terms.

It can easily be understood, especially by those who have had experience of India, why votes of thanks, unaccompanied by expressions of approval of policy, gave no satisfaction to Lord Wellesley. The actual expression of thanks was, he knew well, his due, and could not be withheld without a public scandal. But there was one sentence in the preamble to the resolution which seemed to him to compromise his position in India. In that preamble the Court had declined to express an opinion as to the origin and justice of the war. Lord Wellesley felt that he could not publish in the *Calcutta Gazette* the vote of thanks without at the same time publishing the preamble. "The determination," he wrote to the Court, some months later, when explaining why, when he published in the *Gazette* the resolution conveying the thanks of the Court to other officers therein named, he had withheld all mention of himself:—

"expressed to withhold all judgment upon the original justice, necessity, and policy of the war, could not have been published in India by a formal act of the Government without conveying a universal impression of doubt and ambiguity respecting the stability of every arrangement connected with the progress and success of our arms. The permanency of all treaties of peace, partition, subsidy and alliance must have been exposed to hazard by such a public declaration, proceeding from the high authority of your Honourable Court and the Court of Proprietors; and announced by your Government in India to all your subjects, dependents, and allies. It could not be supposed that either your Honourable Court or the Court of Pro-

prietors would try the justice of our cause by the success of our arms; the prosperous result of the war, therefore, could not have removed the doubts of its justice arising from the reservations expressed in your resolutions; and the irresistible inference in the minds of all Native States, would have been that your Honourable Court and the Court of Proprietors might ultimately censure the whole transaction; while the general fame of your equity and magnanimity would have precluded any supposition that in condemning the justice of our cause, you would retain the fruits of your success, or enjoy the benefits of the peace, while you repudiated the necessity and policy of the war. If the origin and policy of the war shall ultimately be condemned, and the treaties of peace, subsidy, and alliance, shall finally be abrogated by the commands of your Honourable Court, those commands will be issued in such terms, and accompanied by such arrangements, as shall render the execution of your orders an additional bulwark to the public safety, and a fresh security to the public faith. During whatever interval of time your Honourable Court may be pleased to suspend your determination, it would neither be consistent with the welfare of the Honourable Company in India, nor with the respect due to your high authority, that one of your servants, for the gratification of personal ambition, by the ostentatious display of the honours which you had been pleased to confer upon him, should pursue a course which might embarrass the free and deliberate exercise of your wisdom and justice in a matter of the utmost importance to the national interests and honour; or that, by a premature and unseasonable publication of your favourable acceptance of his services, the same servant should risk the main object of those services, and endanger the immediate security of a great political system of arrangement which it might possibly be your future pleasure to confirm."

As a specimen of finished irony this letter is not to be surpassed. The writing of it relieved the mind of the injured and offended Proconsul. He showed plainly to the honourable masters who had been unable alike to appreciate him, or the real interests of the country they had invited him to administer, how little he was affected by their praise or their dispraise. His mind was wholly absorbed by a desire that the India which he had received from them weak, threatened, so terrified that it dared not make preparations for war lest it should

provoke war, only one amongst three rivals for empire, should be transferred from his hands to those of his successor strong, compact, predominant, ready for any action and for any emergency. He was proudly conscious that, despite the innumerable obstacles cast in his way by masters incapable of appreciating him or the condition of affairs in India, he had accomplished that end; and he was, therefore, utterly indifferent as to whether such masters should dole out to him praise or blame. He, at least, had faith in the verdict of posterity.

How Lake had avenged the retreat of Monson I have told in the previous chapter. But his repulse at Bhartpūr had again roused hopes in the breast of Sindhiā, who, asked by Mr. Jenkins, the British Resident at his Court, to explain his preparations, proceeded to the length of seizing the person of that minister and plundering his property. Although he apologised for this insult by casting the blame on others, he still continued his preparations, and, but for an opportune meeting with Holkar, and the disclosure at that meeting of the divergent views entertained by the two chieftains, would probably have proceeded to hostilities. Convinced at that meeting that Holkar was impossible as an ally, he made his submission, dismissed his warlike minister, and adopted a peaceful programme. But in the meanwhile, events were occurring in England which were to relieve him and the native princes of India of the watchful glance which had noted and had baffled all their intrigues. The news of Monson's retreat, which reached England early in 1805, gave the Court of Directors the opportunity for which they had been longing. Up to that time, although they had hated Lord Wellesley they had bowed the knee to his success. Defeat, exaggerated as to its possible consequences, as all defeats are exaggerated, gave them the chance of in-

dulging in their personal feelings. The second Ministry of Mr. Pitt was weak at home, and was too burdened with the responsibilities of the war with Napoleon, to be able to pay much attention to India. The opportunity, then, was not to be foregone. Lord Cornwallis, who had already held the high office of Governor-General, and who, it was known, condemned the policy of the Maráthá wars, was asked if he would go out to succeed Lord Wellesley. The old man, not so accustomed to victory as Wellesley, at first declined. Much entreaty, however, procured in the end a reluctant consent, and he set out. He landed in Calcutta July 30th, 1805.

The manner in which Lord Wellesley heard of the appointment of a successor was worthy of the Court he had served so well. They did not, in the first instance, communicate personally with him.

"In May, 1805," writes Mr. Torrens, in his interesting biography of the Marquess Wellesley,* "two letters were received in Calcutta by the overland route, announcing the re-appointment of Lord Cornwallis to the Governor-Generalship of India. One of these letters was received by Mr. J. Alexander, the other by Mr. Tucker. Both gentlemen determined to keep their information to themselves; but a rumour was soon in circulation to the effect that overland letters had been received in Calcutta, and Lord Wellesley sent for Mr. Tucker. After some conversation, the Governor-General exclaimed: 'I hear you have received letters from England.' Mr. Tucker assented, and Lord Wellesley asked, 'Do they contain any news of importance?' 'The appointment of Lord Cornwallis,' was the reply. The accomplished actor was too much master of himself to indicate by look or gesture any opinion of the choice which had been made. But he had abundant information from confidential sources of the reasons which had led to it, and he well knew that it implied the reversal, in many essential particulars, if not the general renunciation, of his comprehensive policy."

Monson's retreat had injured British prestige in India

* *The Marquess Wellesley, Architect of Empire: an Historic Portrait.* Chatto & Windus. 1880.

only to an extent which the victories of Lord Lake, the following year, were able to repair. The effect of the same retreat in England was to cause the reversal of a policy which had been successful in all its bearings : which had ensured predominance to England and security to protected princes : which had, therefore, been merciful in its action, ensuring to the weak protection against the strong. All this was now to be reversed. The protected princes of Rájputáná were to be delivered to the tender mercies of freebooters like Amír Khán, and robbers like the Pindáris. The rule of murder and plunder was to succeed the era of peace and prosperity ; and another war, waged by a Governor-General approaching more nearly to the Wellesley type, was required to restore Central India, after an interregnum of twelve years, to the state in which he had left it.

The great Marquess has been avenged. Even the India Office has paid a tribute to his memory, full of appreciative justice. The historian of that august body, Mr. Thornton, concludes the record of the events of the brilliant rule of the Marquess Wellesley, with the following eloquent summary, to which the posterity who have witnessed in India the effects of his administration, will, I am confident, enthusiastically subscribe.

“The unrivalled brilliancy of the Marquess Wellesley’s administration has perhaps tended to obscure the rare qualities which led to its success. The first of those qualities was his extraordinary sagacity. He saw the true position of the British Government in India—a vision withheld not only from his predecessors, but from his contemporaries. It is common to say of the great minds whose genius stands out in bold relief amid universal tameness, that they are beyond their age ; and if ever this were true of living man, it is of the Marquess Wellesley. His mind was not led captive by words—it was not to be trammelled by conventional opinions. He neither gave credence to the prevailing cant of his time on the subject of India, nor affected to give credence to it ; and this leads to the notice of another striking point in his

character—the manly boldness with which he avowed and maintained opinions not lightly formed, and which he therefore felt were not lightly to be abandoned. The vigour with which he carried into action the great plans which his genius suggested is scarcely less remarkable than his sagacity. When resolved to strike a blow at Maisur, he was met by difficulties which ordinary minds would have deemed insuperable. He determined that they should be overcome, and they were overcome. The same determination of purpose—the same unshrinking energy—are manifested in his transactions with Arkat, with Oudh, with the Peshwa, and indeed in all the principal acts of his government. Like all truly great men, he was not the slave of circumstances—he made circumstances promote his purposes.

“Eminent talents are a blessing or a curse alike to their possessor and to the world, according to the use made of them. Those of the Marquess Wellesley were invariably directed to the highest and best ends—the promotion of peace, of the interests of the two countries with which he was connected, with one by birth, and with the other by office—and to the happiness of mankind. He laid in India the foundations of peace and of increasing prosperity, and if the superstructure was not completed in accordance with the original design, the crime rests on the head of others.

“In describing the characters of great men, the speck of human infirmity, which is to be found in all, should not be passed over. The Marquess Wellesley was ambitious; but his ambition sought gratification not in mere personal aggrandisement, but in connecting his own fame with that of the land to which he belonged, and of the Government which he administered—in the diffusion of sound and liberal knowledge, and the extension of the means of happiness among millions of men who knew not his person, and some of them scarcely his name. That name is, however, stamped for ever on their history. The British Government in India may pass away; its duration, as far as human means are concerned, will depend on the degree in which the policy of the Marquess Wellesley is maintained or abandoned—but whatever its fate, or the length of its existence, the name and memory of the greatest statesman by whom it was ever administered are imperishable.”

I make no apology for the length of this extract. It conveys, in terms as true as they are precise, the verdict of history regarding the Indian administration of the Marquess Wellesley. He who recorded that verdict was not a personal follower of the great Proconsul. He was, on the

contrary, an official in the service of that India Office, which had been the bitterest opponent of the Marquess Wellesley during the last four years of his administration, commissioned by that office to write such a history of the British administration of India as they could place in the hands of their covenanted civil servants when they started for that country. To each civil servant a copy of Thornton's History was invariably given on his appointment. The book may therefore be regarded as stamped with the approval of the India Office. It is for this reason that I have preferred that the estimate of Lord Wellesley's administration, an estimate in which I entirely concur, should be drawn from a source not unduly prejudiced in his favour, for it is the source whence proceeded the most persistent hostility to him during his tenure of the chief authority in India.

CHAPTER IX.

YEARS OF DISAPPOINTMENT.

1806-1809.

Lord Wellesley's return—Meeting with his family—Death of Mr. Pitt—Paul's attack—Other Parliamentary enquiries—The dinner at Almack's—Prospects of office—Speech in the House of Lords—The mission to Seville—Sir Arthur Wellesley's position—Lord Wellesley is appointed to the Foreign Office.

THE MARQUESS WELLESLEY, who returned to England the beginning of 1806, was a different man to the Lord Mornington who had quitted England to govern India in 1797. His seven years' Proconsulship had given a force to his will and a strength to his character, which tended to make him intolerant of the opinions of those who differed from him. He had fed on the obedience which had been freely rendered to every utterance, until he had come to stand in need of such condiment. The voyage home in the stately *Indiaman* had not broken him in to the new life that he felt awaiting him. He could not realise to himself how it would be in the world which he had in a great measure forgotten. His highly nervous nature became excited beyond measure as the hour for disembarkation arrived. Then the disillusion was complete. The master of millions found himself but one of the herd. The exact facts are so graphically told by Mr. Torrens that I willingly extract the passage:—

“Lady Wellesley and her children awaited him on landing, and several private friends pressed round him with kind welcomes. The

Port Admiral was also there, and certain military officials eager to see the little man of whom they had heard so much, and of being able to say that he had shaken them by the hand, a familiarity the thought of which had never occurred to him. There was, in short, no lack of fuss and even of affection; enough to content any ordinary general or envoy returning home. But he was neither. He had been playing king until the ruffled atmosphere of kingship had become so habitual that the mark of commonplace in the best room of the best inn in a half-lighted seaport town almost stifled him. Had the successor of Aurangzib come to this? There he was, with wife and children, and two or three friends from town, after all his impersonation of paramount power and impersonation of Oriental magnificence, made much of by vulgar waiters just like any other Irish Marquess on his travels. He did his best to look pleased and be gracious, but his mortification was unspeakable; and ere dinner time was half over he broke out in expletives of impatience that made the circle stare. Hyacinthe (his wife) forgetting all that had changed their lot in life since the time when as a youthful and hardly known official he had sat at her feet adoringly, said, with an unlucky laugh, 'Ah! you must not think you are in India still, where everybody ran to obey you. They mind nobody here.' The disenchantment was complete. He rose early from table and withdrew, saying he was ill, and must be left alone; nor could any subsequent explanation or expostulation mend the matter. It was the foretaste of a long course of disappointment and vexation, wholly unanticipated, that was in store for him."

I have the more readily made this extract from Mr. Torrens's book, because it furnishes the keynote to the subsequent career of the Marquess; to the reason of his practical disappearance in 1812 from the Parliamentary arena. Autocratic sway had made it impossible for his nature to bend. He must be first or nothing. The same, it is true, might be said of Mr. Pitt. But Mr. Pitt had established himself by abilities displayed in Parliament, that not only was he admittedly first, but there was not a second. There was no other under whom he could serve. The Marquess Wellesley had yet to make a name on the field of English politics; and although his old friends and associates were willing to give him an equal chance with themselves, not one of them was prepared to admit as

incontestable the predominance of ability which, in his heart, he claimed for himself.

Wellesley returned to find his old friend and master, William Pitt, dying. The great minister was at Bath, trying to shake off the gout and stomach-ailments which tormented him. On his return thence to Putney, he wrote an affectionate letter to Wellesley begging him to come and see him. Wellesley saw him there, and pressed his emaciated hand a few days before he died. In him he felt he had lost his best and truest friend.

No long time elapsed before another revelation filled to the brim the cup of bitterness of which the ex-Pro-consul was forced to drink. He knew that he deserved well of his country. Knowing this, he found it difficult to realise that, instead of being greeted as a conqueror, he was to be accused as a criminal. The persecuting mania which had helped to drive Clive to a premature grave, which had embittered the middle life of Warren Hastings, would not spare their brilliant successor. His first accuser was one Paull, originally a linendraper, who, having made a fortune in India, had obtained, in June, 1805, a seat in Parliament. It was the object of this man to obtain notoriety by the denunciation of some eminent personage, and, having been in Oudh whilst the Marquess Wellesley was Governor-General, he pitched upon him as his victim. To ensure support in his denunciations, he wrote to Lord Folkestone, addressing him "as the only man untainted by corruption," to inform him that he had taken measures to obtain a seat in Parliament "in order to make the conduct of the late Viceroy the subject of legal investigation." Folkestone, a feather-brained extremist, fell into the trap, and agreed to support Paull. Meanwhile, Grenville and Fox had formed the Ministry known as the Ministry of "All the Talents."

It has been said that on this occasion* office was offered to Lord Wellesley, but that he declined to accept it until Paull's threatened charges should have been disposed of. It would seem, however, that though his name was mentioned, no office was actually offered him. The fact that Paull was a follower of Fox, and had been encouraged by that statesman and by Sheridan to persevere in his charges, whilst yet Fox was in opposition, rendered it impossible that any such offer should be made. Fox, however, expressed to Paull his hope before Parliament met that, as Sheridan and Francis had dropped their intended interpellations regarding Lord Wellesley's conduct towards the Nawáb of the Karnátik and the Maráthás, Paull would do the same regarding Oudh. Paull refused.

On January 27th, 1806, Paull moved for the papers which were necessary to substantiate his charges against Lord Wellesley. Those charges were printed on May the 28th following. The gist of them was that, whilst the Nawáb-Wazír of Oudh had fulfilled all his obligations to the British Government, Lord Wellesley, as the agent of that Government, had excited his subjects to rebel against him; had then occupied Oudh; and, by threats made by his brother, Henry, compelled the Nawáb to yield a large portion of his dominions. Before these charges could be debated, Fox had died (September 13th), Parliament had been dissolved, and the Duke of Portland had become Prime Minister. In the new Parliament no place was found for Mr. Paull. Lord Folkestone then took up the fallen mantle, and formulated his charges. In the debate upon them he had, however, but scant support, and on a division (March 8th, 1808), only thirty-one votes were recorded in his favour, whilst a hundred and eighty-two concurred in negating the motion. A subsequent resolution,

approving of the Marquess Wellesley's conduct in the matters referred to, was moved by Sir John Anstruther, and carried triumphantly. Undeterred by this expression of opinion, another youthful grievance-monger, Sir Thomas Turton, brought forward, in May following, a motion for the impeachment of the Marquess on the ground of his conduct towards the Nawáb of the Karnátik. But his speech, in the course of which he charged Lord Clive and the Marquess with having connived at the murder of the heir to the *masnad*, was listened to with indignation, and his motion was negatived without a division. Thereupon, Mr. Wallace moved a vote expressive of the approval of the House of Lord Wellesley's conduct in the circumstances referred to. This motion was carried with but nineteen dissentients. This was the last occasion on which the charges against Lord Wellesley were brought under the notice of Parliament.

To dispose of the charges against Lord Wellesley in Parliament, I have outstripped the regular course of his life. It deserves to be stated that the persecution, of which he was the object, only confirmed his friends in their attachment. On March 22nd, 1806, a public dinner was given to him at Almack's. His old friend General Harris (of Seringapatam renown) was in the chair, supported by some of the most illustrious men in England. The Prime Minister, Lord Grenville, was unable, through illness, to attend, but he wrote to say that it would have given him no ordinary pleasure to bear his testimony, not only of affectionate regard for the guest of the evening, but of respect for the splendid services he had rendered to his country.

When, in 1807, George III. dismissed Lord Grenville's Ministry for refusing to give a pledge, in writing, never again to reopen the question of the removal of the disa-

bilities on Roman Catholics, there was again question of offering a seat in the Cabinet to Lord Wellesley. Mr. Pearce, in the *Memoirs* already referred to, plainly states that the King actually made the offer. I do not find that it went quite so far as that. The views of Lord Wellesley regarding the emancipation of the Catholics were those of the fallen Administration. It is highly improbable, therefore, that the King should have desired to have his services. There was much talk, undoubtedly, about his admission, and a desire was expressed in many quarters that he should be included in the new arrangements. It is clear that if, as Mr. Torrens states, "Canning was offered the Foreign Department, but told the Duke that he would give way if Wellesley or Malmesbury would accept it," he might have had office had he chosen. The Foreign Office, moreover, was the office which, of all, he would have preferred. As he did not take office, I am constrained to believe that the fact that Paull's and Folkestone's charges were still hanging over him proved the stumbling block on both sides, and that there was a mutual understanding that no serious offer should be made until those charges should have been disposed of.

On February 8th, 1808, the Marquess spoke for the first time in the House of Lords. The occasion was historic. The Government, moved to energetic action by the disclosure of the secret arrangements made between Napoleon and Alexander at Tilsit, had despatched a fleet to Copenhagen, to prevent, by a prompt seizure of the Danish fleet, the transfer of that fleet to the French Emperor. On the date above mentioned, the Duke of Norfolk moved, in a hostile sense, for the production of papers bearing on the subject. The Ministers refused them, and the Marquess supported the Ministers. Again I quote from Mr. Torrens:—

"As soon as the mover of the amendment sat down, he (the Marquess Wellesley) rose, and though intensely nervous and anxious, with the imperturbable calm and consummate air of ease he knew so well how to assume, he entered at length upon the antecedent, and strategic circumstances of the situation. In the words of Lord Hawkesbury (afterwards Premier), the cause, not so much of ministers as of the country, was successfully maintained by his eloquent and argumentative speech. . . . Next to the great oratorical success of Canning, whose matchless eloquence Erskine said had far exceeded anything he had heard in Parliament, the honours of the debate were accorded to Wellesley."

The Ministry obtained a large majority.

Soon after the charges brought in the House of Commons by Paull and his confederates had been triumphantly disposed of, the Ministry had an opportunity of offering to Lord Wellesley employment, which, not uncongenial in itself, might prove the stepping-stone to the Cabinet. Sir John Moore, sent to command the British army in Portugal, which was to lend its aid to the inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula in their struggle against Napoleon, had been repeatedly urged by the British minister to the Supreme Junta, Mr. Hookham Frere, to march on Madrid, and thus finish the war. The representations of Mr. Frere were so strongly worded, and professed to be based upon such accurate knowledge, that Moore, against his better judgment, quitted Lisbon in October, and crossed the frontiers of Spain. There he discovered that all the Spanish armies had been beaten by Napoleon, and that he himself was in danger of being cut off. He had to choose between a retreat into Portugal, and a march of great danger, but which would enable him to unite all his troops, on Corunna. With characteristic chivalry, he chose the latter course, and, conducting an arduous retreat "with sagacity, firmness, and fortitude," saved the honour of the British army, and his own—at the cost of his valuable life. The Ministry, rightly appreciating the

circumstances, resolved to send the Marquess Wellesley as Ambassador Extraordinary to Seville, to arrange a common mode of action with the Spanish Junta, and to entrust the command of the army in Portugal to his brother, Arthur. The combination had worked well in India. It was anticipated it would produce equally satisfactory results in the Peninsula. The appointment of the Marquess, gazetted April 30th, 1809, was well received by the nation.*

The student of the history of the period will recollect that at the time when this appointment was made, Austria was just engaging in that war of 1809, which she had planned with so much ability, and which, at its outset seemed to promise so much success. Her early victories suggested to a section of the Cabinet, and, as it proved, a too powerful section, to attempt a diversion in Holland whilst Napoleon should be entangled on the Danube. They planned, therefore, the fatal expedition to Walcheren. The keen mind of the Marquess Wellesley recognised at once that an expedition to the coasts of Holland, whilst it would almost certainly prove abortive, could be attempted only at the expense of the efficiency of the army which his brother was to command in Portugal, and the efforts of which he was to facilitate by his diplomacy. He represented his views on this subject with great force to the Ministry, and, when he found that his arguments availed nothing, feeling that any words he might speak to

* The *Times* wrote of it: "We consider the appointment as an unequivocal pledge given to the nation by Ministers that they are resolved to adopt no half measures, to pursue no system of cold or timid precaution, to leave no outlets for irresolution or vacillation. Lord Wellesley cannot be an instrument for such purposes; he possesses one of the cardinal virtues, fortitude, which we would at the present moment place above the others, because it is that which the necessities of the hour render indispensable."

the Junta would be thrown away unless he had an army to support them, he resigned his office. His intimate friend, Canning, who was then Foreign Secretary, induced him, towards the end of June, to recall his resignation, on the condition that his brother, notwithstanding Walcheren, should have an adequate number of troops under his command. He went, then, and arrived at Cadiz just as the bells of the cathedral were ringing a joyful peal for the victory of Talavera. He was received there with every demonstration of honour. A flag, one of the many captured by the Spaniards when Dupont's army surrendered, was placed on the ground, so that on landing he might tread upon one of the emblems of Napoleon's power; and representatives of every class thronged to bid him welcome. A similar reception awaited him a few days later at Seville.

The Marquess had not, however, been many days at his post before he discovered the striking contrast between the promises of the Spanish Government and their performances. His brother had, it is true, won the battle of Talavera, but he could not disguise from himself that he was in an eminently false position; that he was greatly indebted for his victory to the jealousies of each other of the French marshals; and that his army was in want of food, of clothing, of shelter. So deplorable was its condition that Arthur Wellesley dared not leave it to visit his brother:—

“A starving army,” he wrote (August 8th), “is worse than none. The soldiers lose their discipline and their spirit. They plunder even in the presence of their officers. The officers are discontented, and almost as bad as the men; and with the army which a fortnight ago beat double their numbers, I should now hesitate to meet a French corps of half their strength.”

Just at this time came news of the battle of Wagram, fought a month earlier, and which was the prelude to the

cessation of hostilities between Napoleon and Austria. The intelligence, unwelcome as it was, only incited the Marquess to renewed efforts to strengthen his brother before Napoleon should be able to pour his legions into Spain. But he found the work heartbreaking. He could have borne far better a positive refusal to send the supplies of which the army stood in need. But when, in the most cordial manner, the Spanish Minister assured him that the supplies had been sent, and gave him the dates of their despatch, and a list of their nature, and when, subsequently, he discovered that the statement was absolutely untrue, that no supplies had even been collected, then he realised the intrinsic weakness of his position. Between two contracting parties there must be an element of trust, or business becomes a farce. In dealing with the Spanish Government that basis was wanting. Wellesley speedily realised that their most solemn assurances were not to be believed.

The threat that the British army would retire into Portugal produced some amelioration in the position; not, however, until the retrograde movement had actually begun. Further observation convinced the Marquess that the task upon which he and his brother were engaged presented extraordinary difficulties of another character. Of the Spaniards he wrote thus to Canning:—"Many officers, even in the highest command, are notoriously disaffected to the cause." He persevered, however, not the less, in his efforts to rouse the patriot Spaniards to a sense of the gravity of the situation; to induce them to take a practical view, and, instead of running wild after theories of popular government, to concentrate all their energies to provide those necessities without which a British army could not move, and British assistance must prove useless.

He was still working in this direction when he received from England the information that the dissensions in the Cabinet had culminated in a duel between Canning and Castlereagh (September 21st), and in the resignation of both. Perceval, after a vain attempt to secure the co-operation of the Whigs, offered the seals of the Foreign Office to the Marquess Wellesley. The Marquess accepted, received a flying visit from his brother, quitted Cadiz on November 10th, and landed at Portsmouth on the 26th. On the 6th of the following month he kissed the King's hand as Secretary of State. On March 3rd following he received from his Sovereign, at a special chapel, the insignia of the Garter.

CHAPTER X.

FOREIGN SECRETARY.

DEC. 1809—JAN. 1812.

Gloominess of the situation—The Continental blockade and the right of search—Lord Wellesley's qualifications—Talavera—Lord Wellesley's reassuring despatch—Dissensions in the Ministry—Reconciliation with Canning—Attempts to strengthen the Ministry—Reply to Lord Lansdowne—Masséu's repulse and its consequences—Canning refuses to join the Ministry—Negotiations with the United States—The Regency Question and Lord Wellesley's silence—His partial withdrawal from the Cabinet—Success of foreign affairs—Lord Wellesley's resignation—He refuses to join the Liverpool Ministry—Attempts to form a fusion of parties—Restoration of the Liverpool Cabinet—Lord Wellesley's account of the transactions—Salamanca and its consequences.

RARELY had Great Britain been in a position of greater difficulty than she was at the period when the Marquess Wellesley assumed the seals of the Foreign Office. Europe, that is, continental Europe, lay, apparently, at the feet of Napoleon. Of the old allies of England, Holland had been absorbed; Prussia had been crushed and parcelled out; the minor princes of Germany had become the satellites of the conqueror; the Czar of Russia was his confidential ally; Austria, still bleeding at every pore, was negotiating for his marriage with a daughter of her Imperial House; Sweden was about to ask him for a sovereign; Spain and Portugal, though still resisting, were, apparently, at the mercy of the armies which the

peace with Austria had left disposable. From no quarter did it seem possible to invoke assistance. Great Britain was pitted against Europe, all the resources of which were, practically, at the disposal of her enemy. Never had the outlook appeared so dark. It seemed as though "the silver streak," and the command of the seas which rendered that streak impassable, alone preserved these islands from the fate which had befallen Germany.

Nor, at that period, was a glance at the kinsmen of England across the Atlantic calculated to afford encouragement. In his famous decree, issued at Berlin (November, 1806), followed up, a year later, by one yet more stringent, from Milan, Napoleon had endeavoured to "boycott" the British Islands. Haughtily replying to those decrees, Great Britain had blockaded the ports of France, and, to ensure the efficiency of that blockade, had carried to its extreme limit that law of nations which gave her the right to search the cruisers of neutral powers, and to confiscate all vessels engaged in carrying articles contraband of war. She did not stop there. The common origin of the two nations, the identity of language, had brought it about that the ships of the mercantile marine of the United States were largely manned with sailors, British by birth, who found, under the Stars and Stripes, immunity from the press-gang, and high wages. It was naturally galling to the statesmen of Great Britain that at a time when she was called upon to put forth her utmost strength, when she was fighting for very existence, a considerable number of efficient seamen should be able to withdraw themselves from her service. To prevent it as far as possible, she determined to stretch the maritime law of nations so as to make it apply to men as well as to cargo. She resolved, that is, to insist upon her right to search neutral ships for deserters from the British service,

and to impress English seamen engaged in navigating American merchant vessels. The United States had resented this action. To arrive at a satisfactory agreement between the two nations, a conference had taken place in 1806 at London. At this conference, conducted by Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinckney on the part of the States, and by Lords Auckland and Holland on the part of England, no agreement of a practical nature was arrived at. A milk-and-water resolution, settling nothing, was, indeed, presented by the English Commissioners and sent to Washington. There the States Government, displaying that resolution regarding foreign affairs which has given it so high a place in the councils of the world, refused to accept it; and their Courts of Justice having about the same time declared that deserters from British ships ought not to be surrendered, the feeling between the two countries became extremely bitter. That feeling was accentuated in 1808, when—Napoleon having by decrees issued from Hamburgh, endeavoured to enforce more rigidly his continental system—the British Government replied by an Order in Council, which gave to neutrals the power to trade with the enemy under certain restrictions, on condition that they should touch at a British port and pay the British Custom Duties. The United States replied by passing (December 23rd, 1808) an Act, called a “Non-Intercourse Act,” to prevent French and English ships from entering their ports to lay an embargo on vessels belonging to the States, and commanding all foreign ships in their harbours instantly to quit, with or without cargoes. To this Act Napoleon responded by a decree published at Paris, May the 14th, 1810, declaring that—

“All vessels under the flag of the United States, or owned, either in whole or in part, by an American subject, which, since the 20th of

May, 1808, had entered, & should thereafter enter, any of the ports, either of the Empire or Colonies of France, or of the countries occupied by French armies, should be confiscated, and the produce deposited in the *Caisse d'Amortissement*, or Sinking Fund."

Great Britain had taken no such high-handed step; but the relations between the two countries had been strained to the point of breaking. The fierce struggle for independence still lived in the memory of the Americans, and they were prepared to deal more gently with the France which had helped them than with the English with whom they had fought. One consequence of the ill-feeling had been the suspension, in 1809, of intercourse between the British Envoy in America and the Government of the States. Affairs were in that position when at the close of that year the seals of the Foreign Office were confided to the Marquess Wellesley.

Surely it was a task full of difficulty, this task of encountering Europe under the sway of a despot who hated, with a bitter hatred, the island which had defied him, and America irritated against England almost to the point of declaring war: he who had to encounter it, moreover, being a statesman comparatively young, holding Cabinet office for the first time, and whose great merit in consolidating the British empire in India had not, even then, been fully recognised. It was, nevertheless, a task which no other man was so fit to accomplish as the man who had found the British power in India so weak and had left it so strong. There was a certain similarity between the two situations. In India, Wellesley had found a large party among his countrymen unwilling to do anything which might precipitate a contest with the native prince who claimed to be the equal of the English. In 1810, he found large bodies of his countrymen bent on the recall of the British Army from the peninsula. "What chance,"

they exclaimed, "can the handful of men led by Lord Wellington have against the legions of Napoleon?" If the country had been polled at the beginning of 1810 from one end to the other, but very few would have been found who believed that Lord Wellington was effecting that thin-end-of-the-wedge entrance which would ultimately cause the overgrown imperial tree to split to pieces. One man, however, saw it; saw it with a distinctness of vision which the immediate prospect never for one moment clouded. The conviction of it breathes in every line of his writings in which the subject is referred to. It speaks in his every act. It inspired and directed his every thought. This man was the great Marquess, never greater than he was in 1810-11.

The details of the battle of Talavera, which came to be understood about this time, had made it tolerably clear that Sir Arthur Wellesley had been induced to advance to a position in which, but for the jealousy entertained by Victor lest Soult should monopolise the credit of beating him, he must have fared badly, for he was hemmed in by two armies. As it was, the victory had enabled him to escape by abandoning his wounded. These facts had made a deep impression on the public mind, and it is not too much to say that had the basis of Parliamentary election been as broad as it is at the present day, it would have become necessary to withdraw the army from the Peninsula.

But, under the old aristocratic constitution, education and matured ability exercised more influence than passion and self-seeking; and, despite the murmurs of the multitude, the Marquess Wellesley was enabled to impress his strong and sagacious will on the foreign policy of the country. His brother, still ignorant of the course which Ministers would adopt, had written a letter expressing

his opinion that they were as much frightened as the public, for Lord Liverpool had asked him whether or not it would be prudent to bring home his army. The action of the Marquess speedily reassured him. So early as January, 1810, the new Foreign Secretary thus wrote to the Minister in Portugal the views which he had laid before his sovereign, and which his sovereign had sanctioned.*

"The condition of Spain and Portugal has engaged His Majesty's most anxious attention, and I am to signify to you his determination to maintain the cause of his allies in the Peninsula by continuing to supply to them every assistance, compatible with the resources and security of his own dominions, as long as the contest shall appear to afford any reasonable prospect of advantage against the common enemy. It is intended to employ in Portugal a force of 30,000 men, and an annual sum of £980,000. This great and generous effort cannot fail to inspire confidence and additional regard in the Portuguese Government and nation. You will offer, and even urge, advice as to rendering available the resources of Portugal, obtaining monthly accounts of the expenditure and the state of the corps receiving British pay; and, generally, of the financial condition of the country. No jealousy or suspicion must be harboured under such a pressure of common danger. The great sacrifices which we have made for our ally must not be frustrated by any considerations inferior to the main purpose of our mutual security; nor can we now hesitate to take the lead in any measure evidently necessary to enable Portugal to contribute a just share of efforts and resources for the accomplishment of her own safety."

The despatch proceeded to urge upon the Minister the desirability of evoking a spirit amongst the Portuguese akin to that which the Spaniards had so lavishly displayed.

Nor was the steadiness of purpose indicated in this despatch belied by the Speech from the Throne. The

* The Marquess Wellesley to Mr. Villiers at Lisbon, January 6th, 1810. I have taken this letter from the excellent work of Mr. Torrens, who states that the MS. is in the Foreign Office.

sovereign was 'made to say that "he' relied on the aid of Parliament in his anxious endeavours to frustrate the attempts of France against the independence of Spain and Portugal, and against the happiness and freedom of those loyal and resolute nations."

Lord Wellesley's task, however, was the more difficult, because perfect unanimity of opinion did not exist in the Cabinet itself. The criticisms levelled at the campaign of Talavera produced an effect within as well as without the walls of Parliament. Lord Wellesley, however, never ceased to urge the continuance of the war; and it is probable that his insistence on this point laid the foundation of those differences with the Prime Minister which caused the severance of political connection between them in 1812.

A curious episode threatened early in its life to break up the Ministry, and to leave the forming of a new one in the hands of the Foreign Secretary. This episode was a motion brought forward in the Commons for a vote of censure on all those concerned in the ill-starred Walcheren expedition, and compelling their retirement from the Government. The only Ministers who would have been exempt from this proscription, had the motion been carried, were the Marquess Wellesley and Lord Harrowby. So general was the indignation on the subject of Walcheren, that the success of the mover, Lord Porchester, was deemed certain, and speculations were rife as to the colleagues whom Lord Wellesley, who was indicated as the future master of the situation, would select. He had to choose between Castlereagh and Canning as his henchman in the Commons. He made, however, the, for him, strange mistake of not positively deciding before the debate came on. There had been some estrangement between Canning and himself, in consequence of his

having accepted office in a Ministry in which the former had no place, and he therefore leaned somewhat, without openly declaring himself, towards Castlereagh. He regarded the success of the incriminating motion as certain. But matters took a turn which no one had anticipated. Canning and Castlereagh, each taking upon himself the responsibility naturally devolving upon him as a Minister of the Cabinet which had sanctioned the expedition, fought so eloquently and forcibly against the motion that it was defeated, and the crisis passed. Almost immediately after, a complete reconciliation was effected between the Marquess and Canning.

On March the 30th following, Wellesley triumphantly answered a motion brought forward by Lord Grenville for the reference to a secret committee of papers relative to the campaign in Spain and Portugal. The object of the motion was to rehabilitate the reputation of the Spanish Government and the Spanish generals at the expense of Lord Wellesley and his brother, Arthur. Lord Wellesley, after having replied, point by point, to the actual charges brought forward by Lord Grenville, urged the House to reject the motion

“which would deprive them of that full information respecting the affairs of Spain which alone could guide their future determination with regard to the interests of that country.” He added that the papers already on the table, as well as those to be produced would amply supply all information, “and would disclose the truth in full and open day. Your Lordships will then see that the weakness, the dissensions, and the corruptions of the Spanish officers and Government were the real sources and springs of many disasters and calamities which had befallen the Spanish nation.”

His arguments prevailed, and the motion was rejected without a division.

The weakness of the Ministry in debating power in the Commons rendered its tenure of office insecure. Men

who sympathised with its general policy, such as Castlereagh and Canning, were not prepared to suffer an exclusion which might be lasting. The former, especially, commanded a band of adherents so powerful that he was almost in a position to dictate the terms of his support. It is not my intention to enter into a history of the intrigues of that period, except so far as they affected the actual action of Lord Wellesley. He felt their influence, and the weakness of the Ministry in their presence, so strongly, that in June he and Lord Liverpool offered to resign their offices in favour of Canning and Castlereagh, in the event of their being willing to accept them. The Cabinet, however, would not accept the sacrifice, and the Prime Minister endeavoured to attract the two distinguished statesmen by other means; but the negotiations led to nothing.

It was at this period that Lord Lansdowne, the great supporter in later years of the Whig Cabinets of Russell and Palmerston, but who was then a young man, gave Lord Wellesley the opportunity of declaring, in terms which could not be mistaken, his policy with respect to the war in Spain. Lord Lansdowne inaugurated his entrance into the House of Lords by a speech condemning the carrying on of war without an object, and questioning the policy of continuing it unless we were certain of success. Lord Wellesley replied in the following glowing periods:—

“The struggle in which Spain is now engaged is not merely a Spanish struggle. No, my Lords, in that struggle are committed the best, the very vital interests of England. With the fate of Spain, the fate of England is now inseparably blended. Should we not, therefore, stand by her to the last? For my part, my Lords, as an adviser to the Crown, I shall not cease to recommend to my Sovereign to continue to assist Spain to the latest moment of her existence. It should not dishearten us that Spain appears to be in the very crisis

of her fate. We should, on the contrary, extend a more anxious care over her at a moment so critical. For in nations, and above all in Spain, how often have the apparent symptoms of dissolution been the presages of new life, and of renovated vigour? Therefore I would cling to Spain in her last struggle; therefore I would watch her in her last agonies, I would wash and heal her wounds, I would receive her parting breath, I would catch and cherish the last vital spark of her expiring patriotism. Nor let this be deemed a mere office of pious charity, nor an exaggerated representation of my feelings, nor an overcharged picture of the circumstances that call them forth. In the cause of Spain, the cause of honour and interest is equally involved and inseparably allied. It is a cause in favour of which the finest feelings of the heart unite with the soundest dictate of the understanding."

The motion was rejected by a large majority.

Whilst the Marquess Wellesley was thus supporting by all the means in his power the foreign policy which he believed to be absolutely necessary for the safety of the Empire, and for success in the life struggle with Napoleon, that mighty conqueror, resting himself in the Capua of his Austrian marriage, had poured his legions into Spain, and had committed to the ablest of his marshals,—the man who had destroyed the army of Souvaroff in 1799, and whose splendid leading had contributed much to save the French Army at Essling,—the man of whose unvarying success he had given testimony in bestowing upon him the *soubriquet* of "*l'enfant chéri de la victoire*"—the task of "driving the leopards into the sea." Towards the middle of May, Masséna had arrived at Valladolid, and had taken command of the army of Portugal, consisting of the second corps under Reynier, of the sixth under Ney, of the eighth under Junot, of a reserve of cavalry under Montbrun, constituting altogether an army of 70,000 men, of whom 60,000 were in the ranks. This is not the place to indicate the many obstacles which rendered the task of Masséna one of

extraordinary difficulty. His worst enemies were the superior officers of his own army. The greatest offender was Ney, who chafed at having to serve under an officer of a rank equal to his own. But in spite of these difficulties, Masséna did all that it was possible to do. Capturing Ciudad Rodrigo in July, Almeida in August, he marched then upon Coimbra by the valley of the Mondego. On September the 26th, he arrived in front of the hill of Busaco, which covered Coimbra, and which was occupied by the English Army. On the 27th, he attacked the English position, but was repulsed. The day following, however, he made a turning movement, which compelled Lord Wellington to fall back. He followed the English to the lines of Torres Vedras, there to find himself at the head of an army reduced to 50,000 men, in front of defences of a most formidable character, defended by an army of English, Portuguese, and Spaniards, numbering 60,000.*

The news of the repulse of Masséna at Busaco, exaggerated into a great victory, came, just at the proper time to strengthen the position of the Marquess Wellesley in England. His own friends became jubilant; his opponents, disconcerted by the failure of all their prophecies, ceased for a short time to croak, whilst that vast body, who judge only by results, and who may justly be styled "waiters upon Providence," rallied to his standard. For a brief moment it seemed as though there would be a reaction, especially in the first days of the retreat from Coimbra. But when it became known that Torres Vedras had baffled Masséna; that "the dear son of victory" was falling back pursued by the British army—an event which occurred in March, 1811,† the enthusiasm became

* The entire force within the lines numbered 130,000.

† Masséna began his retreat the 5th March.

unbounded. The perseverance and resolution of the two brothers, the one at the Foreign Office, the other at the head of the army, had, it was becoming every day more apparent, to the clearer-sighted, effected the marvel which had been pronounced impossible; they had succeeded in inserting into the Imperial tree the wedge which was to lay it low. In after-years, making a rapid retrospective glance at the causes which led to his overthrow, Napoleon himself exclaimed: "It was the great Spanish ulcer that ruined me." But for the Wellesleys the ulcer might have been healed.

Before the feeling in favour of the continuance of the war had become so pronounced as I have indicated above; that is, before the result of Masséna's march on Torres Vedras had been realised; the Marquess never ceased to make every effort to strengthen the Cabinet of which he was a member. The safety of Great Britain depended, in his view, on the continuance of the operations in Spain; the continuance of those operations depended on the maintenance in office of a Ministry pledged to a war policy; and the maintenance in office of such a Ministry depended on the support of the House of Commons, in which they were weak in debating power. Lord Wellesley was especially anxious to obtain the accession of his old friend, Canning, and he repeatedly declared that unless Canning were admitted he was unwilling to continue to hold office. For the moment, however, the old quarrel between Canning and Castlereagh stopped the way. Mr. Perceval was unwilling to admit the one without the other, but Castlereagh declared that the spectacle of the two men re-entering the Cabinet together who had quitted it but a year before to take one another's lives, was one which the public would not endure. When Ministers separated for the autumn, then, there was a

general agreement that no change would take place in the composition of the Cabinet.

That autumn was spent by the Foreign Secretary in doing all in his power to strengthen the position of his brother in the Peninsula, and to smooth over the difficulties with the United States. As long as Masséna was able to maintain himself before Torres Vedras, so long was it possible that a flank movement made by Soult would bring him triumph; and—the lines held by the British and their allies once forced—the whole structure of resistance would fall to the ground. It was upon this that Napoleon had counted, omitting only one calculation in his mighty scheme, viz., that the obedience which his marshals would have willingly rendered to himself, they would not give to each other.

With the States there had been no perceptible progress towards a pacific termination of the dispute. The American Minister at Paris had, indeed, persuaded the Foreign Minister, M. de Champagny, to offer a suspension of the imperial decrees to England and America, if the former would acknowledge herself in the wrong and revoke her orders in council; or to the latter alone, if she would withdraw from the embargo and break the blockade. The proposal was considered in England, but Lord Wellesley had no means of judging how far the French were sincere, and a doubt which he expressed on that subject served to add fuel to the fire, and rather facilitated a good understanding between France and the States. Further correspondence only tended to increase the bitterness already existing, and, on February 23rd, 1811, a letter from the Foreign Secretary, announcing that it was not the intention of the British Government to relinquish any of the principles on which Great Britain had acted,

caused a suspension of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Before this had happened there had occurred an event which, it seemed probable, would greatly affect the fortunes of the Ministry. Towards the close of 1810, the mental malady from which the King had suffered assumed a permanent character, and it became necessary to define the conditions on which the Prince of Wales should administer the regency. This was a subject, the reader will remember, which had occupied the attention of the Foreign Secretary when, as Lord Mornington, he had sat, in his early days, in the House of Commons. Then, as the supporter of the policy insisted upon by Mr. Pitt, he had won his first laurels. At the Cabinet Council, which preceded the debate on the question in the House of Lords, Wellesley had repeated his old arguments; had cited again and again the words of Mr. Pitt; and had made preparations for a great speech. Yet, when the debate came on, he sat, to the surprise and discomfiture of his friends, absolutely silent. The scene is thus graphically described by Mr. Torrens:—

“The day came, and a crowded House waited with unusual interest the renewal of the contention in which all the greatest men of their time had been formerly engaged. Grey was absent, and the amendment on the resolution was moved by Holland and supported by the Duke of Norfolk, Lord Erskine, the Duke of York, Lord Lausdowne, and Lord Grenville, who expressed his astonishment at the dead silence which some of the most responsible individuals in the Committee observed on the occasion. The Chancellor accepted the challenge, and in his ponderous way summed up the legal arguments for limitation; but for the rest the defence of the Government was left to secondary men; and although, on a division, they prevailed by 100 to 74, one who watched the scene with searching eye thought ‘he never saw a set of men look so crestfallen and beaten to the ground.’* For the signal opportunity had come and gone, and Wellesley had

* Journal of Bennett.

failed to grasp it. There he sat from hour to hour, conscious that men's gaze was fixed upon him as one who was qualified, nay, called upon, to speak with authority, and whose silence would be inexplicable. Canning, who waited restlessly to hear him with that solicitude and sympathy which a great actor alone can feel in a comrade whose success is linked with his own, could not contain his vexation as he came out: 'You entered the House the most expected man in England; you leave it self-undone.' *

“ Mr. Torrens thus accounts for this sudden failure to use a great opportunity :—“ When he should have risen to answer Holland or, Erskine some unaccountable irresolution came upon him, and he let fall the occasion without uttering a word.” Mr. Pearce simply states :—“ The Marquess Wellesley fully concurred in the proceedings of his colleagues, and voted in favour of the resolutions of the Cabinet; but his Lordship did not address the House on the question.” There can be little doubt but that his silence injured him greatly in public esteem. It was so unlike the daring proconsul who had made his will law in India. It was so capable of being interpreted as a disinclination to speak against the coming dispenser of power; of hedging to save his place.

“ Nothing,” writes Mr. Torrens, “ could have exceeded the mortification of his friends, except his own. Ill-nature quickly ascribed the cause to be a visit he had paid a few hours previously to Carlton House; and the whisper everywhere went round that he had ‘ratted’ at the last moment for the sake of power. Even his warm admirers shrank from defending his unpardonable silence; they began to speak of his being gone by as a public man, wanting the moral courage that alone can sustain character for consistency. The crowd talked of him next day as a deserter, and his own chagrin was such that he himself confessed in private, should the King recover, his conduct must seem wholly inexcusable.”

The strictures against his moral character were wholly without foundation. His silence may be attributed to a nervousness amounting to a declension of power. It was true he had paid a visit to the Prince, but the visit was

unofficial, and it was marked by harshness and ill-humour on both sides. A great speech would have given him an influence which must have weighed greatly in the negotiations for a new Ministry which would follow the passing of the Bill. His silence, if it did not lose him that influence, weakened it considerably, whilst it certainly did not conciliate the opposite party, for he voted against them. It was not the less, however, the turning point in his career.

It was impossible to say how the assumption of the regency by the Prince of Wales would affect the ministry. It was, however, reasonable to suppose that the Prince would take an early opportunity of conferring power upon the followers of Mr. Fox, still, as at the period when he regarded himself as one of them, in opposition. They were at this time in daily communication with him, and, but for their mutual jealousies, he would probably have been ruled by them. To the surprise of everyone, however, the Prince informed Mr. Perceval, on February 12th, that he had no intention of making any change in the administration. The Marquess Wellesley thus remained at the head of the Foreign Office.

When narrating the occurrences which marked the arrival in England of the great proconsul from his task of ruling India, I stated how his seven years of autocratic sway had rendered him intolerant of those who differed from him to an extent which severely handicapped him in a constitutional government. Never did he make this failing so manifest as in the year upon which we are now entering. More than twelve months of constant association with Mr. Perceval had imbued his mind with a supreme contempt for the abilities and capacity for affairs of that minister; nor did he find, to atone for the shortcomings of the Prime Minister, compensating qualities in

any of his colleagues. He took a strange way, during the year 1811, to show them all the small regard he entertained for their opinions and their persons. After describing in his graphic manner how the administration of foreign affairs, whilst the country was engaged in a life and death struggle with Napoleon, was "to a man of egotistic temperament daily stimulative of the sense of personal ascendancy," Mr. Torrens adds:—"So keen indeed was his" (Lord Wellesley's) "zest for the exercise of far-seeing and far-reaching control in great affairs, that he could not brook the idea of consulting or conferring with those he deemed ineffably his inferiors, though bound up with them in the bundle of official life. For weeks together he abstained from attending the Cabinet, leaving to the head of the Treasury and the Secretary for War the duty of explaining the details of the measures he had concerted with them." That Mr. Perceval and his colleagues should have chafed under such treatment can well be imagined. Nor can it be doubted that the practice should have stimulated the desire to separate from a man, who, whilst actually a colleague, regarded himself in all that related to the conduct of foreign affairs as sole minister.

Wellesley had, however, the satisfaction of noting how well those affairs sped under his auspices. Barossa, Fuentes d'Onoro, Almeida, and Albuera testified, during 1811, to the triumph of the British arms in the Peninsula. He obtained without difficulty, from Parliament, a vote of two millions for the maintenance of the Portuguese army. He complained, nevertheless, that the support he obtained from his colleagues was inadequate, and that in all matters relating to foreign affairs he could not defer to the opinion of the Prime Minister without injury to the public service. He, therefore, as I have just stated,

managed matters pretty much as he liked; never, of his own motion, suggesting the calling a Cabinet Council to consult with him, and generally leaving London when a Cabinet Council was called. He had become, by degrees, once more an autocrat, and he watched with the keenest interest the result of the working of his well-directed and persistent foreign policy. He was much cheered, towards the close of the year, by noticing symptoms on the part of the Northern powers of a desire to shake off the preponderating influence of the French Emperor. They were symptoms which he had foreseen, and for which he took to himself the credit. It was whilst he was holding the seals of the Foreign Office that Spain and Portugal had gathered confidence; Russia and Sweden were shaking themselves free. The awakening of the others would, he was convinced, surely follow. In one quarter of the globe indeed he seemed inclined to trust to chance. It was of great importance to bring to an end the struggle that was being waged between Turkey and Russia, and to prevent the Sultan from embracing in despair the French alliance. No instructions, however, reached Constantinople from the Foreign Office, and it was purely on his own responsibility that young Stratford Canning negotiated the important treaty of Bucharest, which set free the forces of Russia, and ultimately enabled the Czar to ruin the grand army of Napoleon.*

Meanwhile, Wellesley was not content. There were signs in the air that the Catholic question was once more coming to the fore, and on this he disagreed with his colleagues. When Lord Fitzwilliam had given notice of a motion to remove Catholic disabilities, and Lord Liverpool, on the part of the Ministry, had accepted the challenge,

* Mr. S. Lanc-Poole, *Life of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe*.

Wellesley felt he could no longer hesitate. On January 16th, 1812, then, he submitted his resignation to the Prince Regent. The Prince pressed the Marquess to retain his post, and though Mr. Perceval rejoiced at his departure, he told him, at a Cabinet Council, that in the former Cabinet they had all differed from Mr. Canning on the Catholic question, and had yet managed to get on with him. But Wellesley had made up his mind to serve under Perceval no longer. In a paper confidentially circulated to his friends he thus stated the reasons why he considered he could no longer work advantageously to the interests of the country with that statesman as his chief:—

“For a long time past,” he wrote, “his general opinions on various important questions had not sufficient weight to justify him towards the public, or towards his own character, in continuing in office; and because he had no hope in obtaining from the Cabinet, as then constituted, a greater portion of the attention than he had already experienced. His objections arose in a great degree from the narrow and imperfect scale on which the efforts in the Peninsula were conducted: it was always stated to him that it was impossible to enlarge that system. The Cabinet followed Mr. Perceval implicitly; while he thought it perfectly practicable, and that it was neither safe nor honest towards the country or the allies to continue the present contracted scheme. No hope existed of converting Mr. Perceval or any of his colleagues; no alternative therefore remained but to resign; or to submit to be the instrument of a system which he never advised, and which he could never approve. He had frequently with great reluctance yielded his opinions to the Cabinet on many other important points, and in doing so was convinced that he had submitted to opinions more incorrect than his own; and had sacrificed to temporary harmony more than he could justify in point of strict public duty. He was convinced by experience that the Cabinet neither possessed ability or knowledge to devise a good plan, nor temper or discernment to adopt what he thought necessary. To Mr. Perceval’s judgment or attainments he could not pay any deference without injury to the public service. With these views and sentiments he had desired permission to withdraw from the Cabinet, not requiring any change in his own situation, and imploring no other favour than the facility of resignation.”*

* Torrens’s *The Marquess Wellesley*, page 476.

The office which Wellesley had thus resigned was offered to Castlereagh, but that nobleman haughtily declined, saying that he would not be made a stopgap for anyone; but that should the Regent subsequently call upon him to take office, as part of a permanent arrangement, he should be willing to serve. Wellesley, then, continued to hold the seals of the office, and was holding them when, on February 13th, the Regent wrote a letter to his brother, the Duke of York, authorising him to endeavour to procure the co-operation of some of those persons with whom the early habits of his public life were formed:—

“With such support,” the letter concluded, “and aided by a vigorous and united Administration, formed on the most liberal basis, I shall look with additional confidence to a prosperous issue of the most arduous contest in which Great Britain was ever engaged. You are authorised to communicate these sentiments to Lord Grey, who, I have no doubt, will make them known to Lord Grenville.”

The two lords referred to by the Prince declined, however, to coalesce with Perceval or Wellesley, or to agree to any combination which was not prepared to settle at once the Catholic question. Wellesley still continued to press that his resignation should be accepted. The Regent, anxious to keep him, offered him, on February 18th, the Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland. But his proud heart revolted against the idea of serving under Perceval in any capacity, and, the following day, he finally resigned the seals. “The Prince, as usual, was full of emotion, and trusted their separation would not be for long. The retiring Minister adjured him ‘not to make a Government upon the principle of religious exclusion.’”*

Notwithstanding his previous indignant protest, Castlereagh succeeded Wellesley. The Ministry, thus

* Torrens.

constituted, continued in power, with some prospect of permanence, when, on May 11th, Perceval was assassinated as he was entering the House of Commons. This event naturally caused a ministerial crisis. The remaining members of the Ministry recorded their convictions, with one dissentient only, that without help from outside, it would be difficult, if not desperate or impossible, to maintain their position, and Lord Liverpool was commissioned to make overtures to Wellesley and Canning. Mr. Pearce gives at length the minute written by the Marquess Wellesley regarding the interview he had with Lord Liverpool (May 17th). It proves that Lord Wellesley speedily realised that the main difference between the proposed Ministry and that which he had quitted was to be one of personalities only; that Lord Liverpool was to be Prime Minister, and Castlereagh to lead in the Commons; that, likewise, as regarded the Catholics, exclusion was to be the main principle of the Cabinet. He and Canning, then, alike, declined the offers made them. Lord Wellesley stated his reasons for declining with his usual clearness, in a letter he addressed to Lord Liverpool, to be submitted to the Prince Regent. After recording the propositions made him, and the supposition expressed by Lord Liverpool that Lord Wellesley entertained no such difference of public sentiment as would preclude him from acting with the then existing administration, Wellesley thus assigns his reasons why it was impossible* :—

“But it appears from Lord Liverpool’s candid and explicit statement, that upon the important question which regards the laws affecting the Roman Catholics, Lord Liverpool’s opinions remain unchanged; nor is he aware that the sentiments of his colleagues on that subject have undergone any change. I must therefore conclude

* Pearce’s *Memoirs and Correspondence*, vol. iii., page 222.

that the policy which has been pursued respecting the Roman Catholics during the present session of Parliament is to be continued without abatement; the general constituent parts of the present Cabinet are to remain unchanged; the highest and most efficient offices in the State therefore are to be filled by persons who still conceive themselves to be bound by duty, honour and conscience, not only to resist any mitigation of the present condition of the Roman Catholics, but even to prevent the consideration of the laws which affect that large portion of the population of the empire. I cannot concur in the principle on which the present Administration has conducted this important branch of public affairs; on this point I have recently expressed the strongest difference of opinion with the present Administration. The declaration of Lord Liverpool precludes the hope of any such change in the policy of the present Administration towards the Roman Catholics as would satisfy my judgment. This difference is of the utmost importance: without any other obstacle, therefore, this alone compels me to decline the proposition which Lord Liverpool has conveyed to me."

Detailing, then, the differences of opinion which had impelled him to withdraw from Mr. Perceval's Cabinet, Wellesley thus concluded:—

"After such a dispassionate consideration, my opinion is that a Cabinet might be formed on an intermediary principle respecting the Roman Catholic claims, equally exempt from the dangers of instant, unqualified concession, and from those of inconsiderate, peremptory exclusion: the entire resources of the Empire might be applied to the great objects of the war with general consent, upon a full understanding of the real exigency of the present crisis; and concord and union at home might secure ultimate and permanent success abroad."

This letter, a feeble and pointless reply from Lord Liverpool, and a crushing rejoinder from the Marquess, dated May 19th, were published in the journals of the day. Three days after the date of the last letter the Ministers were beaten in the House of Commons by a majority of four.* The following day, May 22nd,

* Mr. Stuart Wortley's motion, imploring the Regent to take immediate steps, in the perilous condition of the country, for the formation of a strong and efficient Government.

Wellesley was sent for by the Prince Regent, and commissioned to inquire from the heads of the two great parties whether any obstacles existed to such a fusion as would meet the wishes of the House. Wellesley asked and obtained permission to state to both sides the principles upon which alone he would undertake the duty. These were, the relief of the Catholics from civil disability, and the vigorous prosecution of the war. It seemed as though, at last, the hour of his triumph had arrived.

But it was not so. From Canning, indeed, he received the most cordial assurances of co-operation. But when Canning, at his suggestion, wrote to Lord Liverpool to inquire whether he or any of his colleagues were prepared to take part in a new administration from which there should be no exclusion on account of past differences, and which Lords Grey and Grenville should be invited to join, he received a curt reply to the effect that all the members of the late Cabinet felt bound, especially after what had recently passed, "to decline the proposal of becoming members of an administration to be founded by Lord Wellesley." Nor did the two friends meet with greater success in their negotiations with the chiefs of the Opposition. Lord Wellesley's task was rendered the more difficult by the aversion which the Regent had expressed with regard to two of its members. "He could forgive Grenville," he had said to Wellesley, "but he would rather abdicate the Regency than see Lord Grey or Tierney in his service." Wellesley, however, entered upon it with his usual ardour. In a communication, dated May 23rd, he told Lords Grey and Grenville that he had received the commands of the Regent "to lay before his Royal Highness the plan of such an administration as he (Lord Wellesley) might deem adapted to the present crisis of affairs . . . that he considered him-

self merely as the instrument of executing his Royal Highness's commands on the occasion, and that he neither claimed nor desired for himself any station in the administration, which it was his Royal Highness's contemplation to form." He concluded by formulating the two principles upon which the new administration would be formed, viz., the adjustment of the claims of the Catholics, and the vigorous prosecution of the war.

The reply of Lords Grey and Grenville was dated the 24th. After stating that they felt it to be the duty of all public men, in such a moment as that then passing, to facilitate, as much as might lie in their power, the means of giving effect to the recent vote of the House of Commons, and of averting the imminent and unparalleled dangers of the country, they referred to the fact "that Lord Wellesley had selected two among the many important subjects which must engage the attention of any man, who could, in such circumstances, be called upon to consider of the acceptance of stations in public trust." They then proceeded to state their views on those points.

With respect to the removal of Catholic disabilities they were in entire accord with Lord Wellesley. They assured him that they would "warmly support any proposal made by any ministers for the immediate consideration of those claims, with a view to their conciliatory adjustment." On the second point, however, the vigorous prosecution of the war, their dissent from the Marquess Wellesley's views, though disguised by spurious phrases, was decided.

"As to the second point," they wrote, "no person feels more strongly than we do the advantages which would result from a successful termination of the present contest in Spain. But we are of opinion that the direction of military operations in an extensive war, and the more and less vigorous prosecution of these operations, are questions, not of principle, but of policy; to be regulated by circumstances in their

nature temporary and fluctuating, and in many cases known only to persons in official stations by the engagements of the country, the prospect of ultimate success, the extent of the exertions necessary for its attainment, and the means of supporting those efforts without too great a pressure on the finances and internal prosperity of the country.

"On such questions, therefore," they concluded, "no public men, either in or out of office, can undertake for more than a deliberate and dispassionate consideration, according to the circumstances of the case as it may appear, and to such means of information as may be within their reach. But we cannot in sincerity conceal from Lord Wellesley, that in the present state of the finances, we entertain the strongest doubt of the practicability of an increase in any branch of the public expenditure."

Lords Lansdowne and Holland wrote likewise to Wellesley, expressing their concurrence in the views of Lords Grey and Grenville. On the other hand, he received the qualified adhesion of Lord Moira, afterwards Marquess of Hastings, and, as Governor-General of India, the next successor to his views on Indian administration; and of Lord Melville.

Wellesley did not regard the letter from Lords Grey and Grenville as putting a stop to the negotiation, and it was consequently continued. It would seem that those two noble lords doubted whether the Regent had been sincere when he gave Lord Wellesley authority to form a united administration. But as day succeeded day, and no such administration was formed, or apparently forming, the discontent throughout the country became marked. Mr. Martin, a member of the House, expressed this feeling, by giving notice of a motion calling for the redemption of the pledge already given, that a strong Government should be formed. To avert the crisis, the Regent then gave (June 1st), full powers to Lord Wellesley, and on the same day that lord addressed a communication to Lords Grey and Grenville, of which the following is the recorded minute:—

"Lord Wellesley stated that he had, on that morning, received full authority from the Prince Regent to form an Administration under his Royal Highness's commands; and that he was specially authorized to communicate with Lords Grey and Grenville on the subject.

"That his Royal Highness entertained no wish to exclude from the proposed Administration any person, or description of persons, who could unite in the principles on which the Administration was to be founded. That the two propositions stated in Lord Wellesley's minute of May 23rd, and subsequently explained in the letters which had passed between Lords Wellesley and Grey, of the dates of the 27th, 28th, and 29th of May, 1812, were intended by his Royal Highness to constitute the foundation of his Administration.

"That his Royal Highness had signified his pleasure that Lord Wellesley should conduct the formation of the Administration in all its branches, and should be First Commissioner of the Treasury; and that Lord Moira, Lord Erskine, and Mr. Canning should be members of the Cabinet.

"That it was possible that a Cabinet formed on an enlarged basis must be extended to the number of twelve or thirteen members; that the Prince Regent wished Lords Grey and Grenville, on the part of their friends, to recommend for his Royal Highness's approbation the names of four persons if the Cabinet should consist of twelve, and of five if the Cabinet should consist of thirteen, to be appointed by his Royal Highness to fill such stations in his councils as might be hereafter arranged.

"That his Royal Highness left the selection of the names to Lords Grey and Grenville, without any exception or personal exclusion. That in completing the new arrangement the Prince Regent has granted to Lord Wellesley entire liberty to propose, for his Royal Highness's approbation, the names of any persons now occupying stations in his Royal Highness's councils, or of any other persons.

"That if the propositions made to Lords Grey and Grenville should be accepted as the outline of an arrangement, all other matters would be discussed with the most anxious solicitude to promote harmony and general accommodation."

That night Canning announced in the House of Commons that Lord Wellesley had been commissioned to form a Ministry, and the names of those who had consented to join it were freely discussed. The hopes formed were, however, soon dissipated. On June the 3rd, Lords Grey and Grenville addressed a joint letter to Lord

Wellesley, in which, after discussing the proposition, they stated that, whilst the times imperiously required “an Administration united in principle and strong in mutual reliance, possessing also the confidence of the Crown, and assured of its support in those healing measures which the public safety requires, and which are necessary to secure to the Government the opinion and affection of the people,” they added that no such hope was presented to them by Lord Wellesley’s project, which appeared to them equally new in practice and objectionable in principle. They, therefore, declined “all participation in a Government constituted upon such principles.”

The Prince Regent eagerly clutched at the opportunity afforded him by this letter to withdraw from Wellesley the commission he had given him; and although negotiations were continued for a few days longer, the Prince’s commission being transferred to Lord Moira, there was never any valid hope that they would succeed. The result was that the Cabinet of Lord Liverpool, described by the late Lord Beaconsfield as the “Arch-Mediocrity,” was formed. It held office for the fifteen years that followed.

Lord Wellesley’s mission was concluded on June the 3d. That night, in the House of Lords, he stated that he had that day tendered his resignation of the authority confided to him; that he had failed in consequence of “the most dreadful personal animosities, and the most terrible difficulties arising out of complicated questions;” that he had solicited and obtained permission to tell the House all the circumstances connected with his negotiations; but that he would advise the peers not to call for any such disclosure, being convinced that it would be harmful to the public interests. Lord Grenville concurred in the advice. Lord Moira, whilst urging that he had

been an humble instrument of conciliation, expressed a hope that Wellesley would admit that he had not been actuated by personal animosities. To this Wellesley bowed assent, and the evening terminated. Moira, however, renewed the discussion on the 5th, by stating that the term "dreadful personal animosities" was capable of being applied to the highest quarters; that he was able to contradict any insinuation of that sort; that the noble Marquess had been entirely unshackled, no individual having been named by the Prince, or any seat reserved. Lords Grey and Grenville disputed this last assertion, and appealed to the memorandum of June 1st to bear out their view. Moira replied to the effect that there had been misapprehensions on both sides.

Wellesley was not present when Moira had made this interpellation, but the following Monday, after Lord Liverpool had announced his appointment as First Lord of the Treasury, he rose to state that he had authority to explain every part of the course he had pursued. Assuring the House that he had attempted to form a Government on three great principles, viz.—the adjustment of the Catholic claims, the vigorous prosecution of the war, and the union to that end of the best men of all parties, he added that the term he had used on June the 3rd, "dreadful personal animosities," had been used advisedly, and was meant to apply to Lord Liverpool and his colleagues in the Administration just formed, for it was their conduct that had rendered all his efforts impossible. Called upon by Lord Harrowby to explain fully all he meant by the charge, Wellesley replied in his most telling style. Referring to the insinuation that after the death of Perceval he had circulated reasons for his antecedent resignation, which had made further acting with him impossible, he added:—

"The facts are simply these. When I resigned my office, his Royal Highness, with a benignity peculiar to him, requested me to retain it until the expiration of the restrictions upon the Regency. I obeyed his commands, but finding that, previous to the expiration of the restrictions, Mr. Perceval had recommended two or three times my immediate supersession, I did, in conversation with the Lord Chancellor, say that it was unmannerly to have done so. There were many other reasons for my wishing to resign. The vilest calumnies were circulated on the subject. I was charged with extravagant ambition, and with bargaining for power. This was all calumny. I simply asked leave to resign. There are many expressions in the statement"—the statement which had been circulated as to his reasons for resigning—"manifestly not mine. Some of my friends who were anxious about the cause of my retirement took down in writing expressions dropped in private conversation, some of which I would now recall, but which I would not substantially retract. A publication was uniformly refused. I was horror-struck at seeing it published at the time; and I would have given any sum to have it recalled. The paper was not mine. It may be a trifling thing to talk of language, but it was not couched in language which I should have used in a document intended for the public eye at a moment when the country had lost a man of the most irreproachable character, of the most perfect integrity, and full of every private virtue. But all this does not make it necessary that I should acknowledge him to be possessed of that power and frame of mind which marks out a man for the conduct of great public concerns. It can be no insult to any man to say that he is not qualified for the highest office in the State. I highly respect and esteem my noble friend opposite—for so I must still call him—but it does not follow from that that I am bound to consider him as a fit man to be placed at the head of the Government. In the Cabinet I endeavoured to act as far as I could with cordiality; but I did imagine until now that I had shown sufficient ill-humour to convince my coadjutors of the different opinions I entertained. I may perhaps be thought blamable in allowing the publication of the correspondence regarding the late ministerial negotiation. If I have erred, I have erred from habit, for it is a very ordinary practice with me to satisfy the public by authentic information upon subjects they regard with painful anxiety. But I am not aware that in the letters on either side there is one word which ought to be withheld."

It was the common opinion that the patched-up Cabinet presided over by Lord Liverpool would have but a brief existence. Lord Castlereagh was untried at the Foreign

Office, and he was still handicapped in public opinion by the failure of Walcheren. To add to his difficulties, the House of Representatives at Washington passed, June the 18th, a secret resolution declaring the two countries to be at war. This did not, indeed, become known in England until after the prorogation; but, whilst Parliament was still sitting, one or two defeats, or victories equal to defeats, seemed to presage the downfall of the Ministry. In June, Canning carried against the Government a motion pledging the House to take the subject of the relief of the Catholics into consideration early in the following session. The numbers were 235 to 106. On July 1st, Wellesley proposed, in the Lords, an identical resolution. He made, on this occasion, perhaps the most brilliant speech he ever made, and was defeated only by one vote, the numbers being 125 to 126. At this crisis, his brother stepped in to save the Ministry. The victory of Salamanca, gained over Marmont (July 22nd) just at the moment when Wellington's retreat before that general had filled England with dismal presages as to the result of the war, whilst reflecting a momentary gleam upon him as the most strenuous supporter of the policy which was so well succeeding, turned the thoughts of the nation into a different channel.

"The importance of the event," writes Mr. Torrens, "at the moment Napoleon was about to open his long-meditated campaign against Russia, could hardly be exaggerated; and for Wellesley the sense of pride, satisfaction, and delight was ineffable. For days he was overwhelmed with inquiries and congratulations. He could afford to forgive all his enemies and forget all his disappointments now. Liverpool wrote to acquaint him that an early *Gazette* would notify his brother's advancement to a Marquisate, a fact which he at once communicated to Lady Mornington, then in her seventieth year. London vied with Madrid in ebullitions of popular joy: for three nights the town was illuminated. Curious to observe the characteristics of the scene, upon the second night Wellesley, accompanied by

his son and his private secretary, drove in an open carriage to Whitehall, where he was recognised and cheered vociferously. In the excitement of the moment he addressed a few words of cordial thanks to the crowd. The horses were taken, in spite of his remonstrances, from the carriage, and he was drawn in vicarious triumph, to St. Paul's, on to the Mansion House, and then back to his own residence in Piccadilly: the populace insisting more than once on his addressing them."

It is quite possible, as Mr. Torrens states, that as he watched the glare of the illuminations die out, the fear may have crept over him "that the part of pre-eminence in great affairs he had aspired to play had come to an end." His splendid achievements in India, never thoroughly appreciated by his contemporaries, had been cast into the shade by the newer and more recent triumphs of his younger brother, who, now too, would take precedence of him as a peer. Of the three great aspirations of his life, one had been accomplished; he had consolidated the British Empire in India. The second, the vigorous prosecution of the war in Spain and Portugal, thanks to the genius of the general whose great merit he had been the first to discern, and to his own indefatigable efforts in Parliament, was marching to assured triumph. The third, on which he had risked his political fortunes in England, the perfection of the Union consummated by his great political master, William Pitt, by the passing of the great measure of reconciliation which that master had made part of his original scheme, was to be accomplished only at the close of his political lifetime. He had struck a great blow for it in 1812, and had failed. His brother's victories had, as I have said, diverted the thoughts of the nation into a different channel, and the Liverpool Ministry, pursuing the foreign policy which Wellesley had inaugurated, became daily stronger from the results which that policy procured for the country.

Simultaneously, the position of the most influential and earnest supporter of that policy, opposed, as he was, on the question which he considered the most vital of the day, that of Catholic Emancipation, first by the Ministry, afterwards by the brother whose early fortunes he had pushed, diminished equally in importance. In a word, the question with which Wellesley had associated himself became dwarfed in the presence of the triumphs which his brother achieved and of their consequences. Thus it happened that, as the star of Wellington rose high in the horizon, the star of Wellesley paled.

CHAPTER XI.

NINE YEARS OF EXCLUSION.

1813-1822.

The Peace—Commercial difficulties—Lord Wellesley's Protest in favour of cheap food—He opposes the continuation of war—He advocates the reduction of popular burdens—The Catholic Emancipation question—Wellesley becomes Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.

A GENERAL election at the close of 1812 confirmed the choice of the Prince Regent. The Liverpool Ministry was safe for seven years. The hopes of the Catholics were dashed to the ground, and their cause was indefinitely shelved. But Wellesley did not lose heart. Associated with Canning on the one side, and the leading Whig magnates on the other, he laboured at the advancement of the cause with an energy which belongs to men with whom the conviction of the justice of the work on which they are engaged is absolute. Meanwhile, his brother's triumphs in Spain, and the terrible retreat from Russia which annihilated the army of Napoleon, were bringing about the results which Wellesley and Canning were almost alone in foreseeing in 1809-10, as the sure consequences of a vigorous prosecution of the war. The first, and at the time, the most important of these results

was the Peace of Paris (April, 1814). Then followed the Treaty of Ghent, which restored peace between Great Britain and the United States (December, 1814): and then the Hundred Days (March 20th to June 29th, 1815). The last period afforded to Arthur Wellesley the opportunity of greatly increasing his fame and his influence. Waterloo secured the peace of Europe for nearly thirty-three years.

But with the peace which Waterloo had secured (November, 1815) began the embarrassment of the Ministers. And it is due to them to admit that never were men so little prepared and so slenderly qualified to grapple with the industrial crisis which was inevitable on the conclusion of a long war.

"The peace of Paris," wrote a great statesman of our own time,* "found the government of this country in the hands of a body of men of whom it is no exaggeration to say that they were ignorant of every principle of every branch of political science. So long as our domestic administration was confined merely to the raising of a revenue, they levied taxes with gross facility from the industry of a country too busy to criticize or complain. But when the excitement and distraction of war had ceased, and they were forced to survey the social elements that surrounded them, they seemed, for the first time, to have become conscious of their own incapacity. These men, indeed, were the mere children of routine. They prided themselves on being practical men. In the language of this defunct school of statesmen, a practical man is a man who practises the blunders of his predecessors."

The caustic severity of this description is equalled only by its truth. The first difficulty which the Ministry had to encounter was that connected with the regulation of trade. On the termination of hostilities, the blockades which had disarranged the commercial system of the world were removed, and it was hoped that, without any interference on the part of the Government, trade and

* Lord Beaconsfield.

commerce would naturally return to their old channels. But under the restrictions imposed by the war there had grown up an artificial system which had greatly benefited the landed interest, and which the landed interest therefore resolved, if they could, to perpetuate. The price of wheat, for instance, had averaged, during the ten years between 1804 and 1814, 90s. per quarter. Under the influence of the conviction that the newly-made peace would cause the market to be glutted with corn from foreign countries, tempted by the high prices ruling in England, the representatives of the landed interest in Parliament, prominent amongst whom were the Ministers and their supporters, made preparations to regulate the corn trade by law. In July, 1814, a Committee of the House of Lords recommended that so long as the average price of wheat should be under 80s. per quarter, the ports should be completely closed against supplies from other countries; that until the price should reach 80s. per quarter, if it were below it, foreign corn should be absolutely prohibited.

A resolution arrived at by one of the Houses of Legislature, though it had not actually become law, in the interests of one class of the community, and that the class whose influence was predominant in that assembly, was sure to be unpopular. It is not then surprising that the news that the Committee of the House of Lords had made recommendations which would materially enhance the price of food in a country just emerging from a life-and-death struggle, should have caused great dissatisfaction, even tumults, in the metropolis; in the centres of manufacturing industry; and in the large towns generally. The distress in the north and in the midlands was great already. The proposals of the House of Lords promised to increase it. Leeds, Manchester, and Birmingham

warmly remonstrated against the consideration of the proposal. But those great towns were unrepresented in Parliament, and their remonstrances were unheeded by the Government. In the following session a Bill was introduced in the Commons to give effect to the Lords' recommendations. It was indeed warmly opposed; but the House, by large majorities, rejected every amendment which would have mitigated the harshness of its action. The Government, well aware of the unpopularity of the measure, displayed their anxiety by calling out the military, and even by closing the Strangers' gallery, during the time it was debated. At length, on March 10th, the Bill was passed by a large majority.

In the House of Lords the same men who had warmly taken up the cause of religious freedom appeared as the advocates of cheap food. Prominent amongst them was the Marquess Wellesley. During the term of his proconsulship in India, that lord had noticed the evil effects of the trade-monopoly which the Company then enjoyed; and he had imbibed a strong leaning in favour of the principle of unrestricted competition. He regarded, then, with a feeling bordering upon horror, the proposals of the Government to restrict, even to prevent, the importation of food at a time when such importation was more than ever necessary; he opposed it with all his force; and, when, he and his friends were beaten, as they were by a large majority, he drew up, in conjunction with Lord Grenville, a protest embodying the objections which he entertained.

This protest, signed by two Royal Dukes (Sussex and Gloucester), by the Marquess of Buckingham, by Lord Grenville, Wellesley, Essex, Torrington, Douglas, Montfort, King, and Carlisle, may be read with profit, even at the present day. It proclaimed the principle that:—

"Public prosperity is best promoted by leaving uncontrolled the free current of national industry:" that "the great practical rule of leaving all commerce unfettered applies more peculiarly, and on still stronger grounds of justice, as well as of policy, to the corn trade than of any other;" that "monopoly is the parent of scarcity, dearness, and uncertainty," and that "to confine the consumer of corn to the produce of his own country is to refuse to ourselves the benefit of that provision which Providence itself has made for equalizing to man the variations of season and of climate." The expression of dissent thus concluded:—"But whatever may be the future consequences of this law, at some distant and uncertain period, we see with pain that those hopes must be purchased at the expense of great and present evils. To compel the consumer to purchase corn dearer at home than it might be imported from abroad, is the immediate practical effect of this law. In this way alone can it operate. Its present protection, its promised extension of agriculture, must result (if at all) from the profits which it creates by keeping up the price of corn to an artificial level. These future benefits are the consequences expected, but, as we confidently believe, erroneously expected, from giving a bounty to the grower of corn by a tax levied on the consumer."

It was impossible to put the case more tersely.

Lord Wellesley had strongly opposed that clause in the Treaty of Fontainebleau, which guaranteed to Napoleon the sovereignty of Elba. He foresaw that it would be impossible to chain the eagle within sight of the scene of his triumphs. With equal wisdom, in my humble judgment, he opposed the renewal of the war after the escape of Napoleon from his island prison. The recognition of Napoleon as a constitutional sovereign on the throne of France was the one chance for the consolidation of the benefits for the revolution; for the extinction of its errors. The campaign of 1815 did indeed, as I have said, give to Europe thirty-three years of peace; but they were years of oppression for the peoples of the Continent. The consequences to France were, not, as it was pretended, to close, but to keep open, the door of Revolution. That door is open still: and that it is so is due to the

fact that in 1815 Europe intervened to impose upon France a dynasty which the nation had deliberately rejected.

That Lord Wellesley fully apprehended the evil of the course which the Government pursued on this occasion is clear from the speech which he delivered on the discussion of the Regent's message, announcing the renewal of the war (April 7th, 1815). As, in 1814, he had foreseen the evils which would result from the Treaty of Fontainebleau, so, the following year, did his prescient brain gauge the unfortunate results for France which the unjust policy of Europe would produce.

After the conclusion of the war, Wellesley acted with the party which displayed an anxiety to relieve the burthens pressing on the people, and which had been greatly increased by the policy pursued with respect to the importation of food from abroad. In 1816, he urged the diminution of the military charges. In 1817, again, he made an urgent appeal to Parliament for the reduction of the burthens which weighed most severely on the manufacturing classes in particular, and on the people generally :—

"When he saw," he said, "the condition of all ranks of his Majesty's people, and looked back to their exertions, their patience, their loyalty, their confidence in Parliament, and their present misery, he was utterly at a loss to conceive by what criminal forgetfulness of their duty Ministers could have withheld the most solemn assurances of an immediate and strict inquiry into the causes of such tremendous misfortunes, and a pledge of every possible relief." Again, urging the absolute necessity for retrenchment, he said: "The scandalous profusion could not go on. Parliament must do its duty. There was no longer a refuge to be found from the cries of the hungry—the furnished population. The army must be reduced. He had no hesitation in saying that, with every regard to the dignity of the Crown, to the maintenance of our rank and security of our Empire, it might be greatly reduced."

To this task he adhered : the lightening of the burthens

which pressed on the people. It was a theme which he never wearied of urging. It was because he had this aim so much at heart that he opposed the Bill, introduced and passed in 1817, for the suspension of the *Habeas Corpus* Act, cautioning the Ministers "not to fortify the persuasion—vainly felt, he hoped—that all these propositions, all these rumours of peril, were merely meant to divert the attention of Parliament from the duty of retrenchment and economy which it had to perform."

That year was not, however, absolutely barren to him. He enjoyed the satisfaction of witnessing the passing of a Bill opening all ranks of the army and navy to Catholics and Dissenters. The House of Lords would not go further. His minority of one, of 1812, was increased, in 1817, to a minority of 52; whilst the majority of 129 in the Commons was changed into a minority of 24. A new Parliament, summoned in 1818, displayed, indeed, sentiments somewhat more liberal. The year following the majority against the Catholic claims in the Commons was reduced to two; whilst in the Lords it fell to 41. In that year the misgovernment of the Cabinet culminated in the event known in history as the "Manchester Massacre." The country seemed really in danger; and though Wellesley recognised that that danger was due to the mischievous character of the legislation, he felt that in the crisis which had been provoked he could not withhold his support from the Crown. He made, then, at this period, a powerful speech in favour of the measures essential, in his opinion, for the maintenance of public order proposed by the Government.

On January 29th of the year following, George III. died. In 1821 the Catholic Relief Bill passed the Commons by a majority of 11, whilst in the Lords the majority against it was decreased by two. In December

of that year the Grenville party * joined the Government, and Lord Wellesley was nominated Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. It should be mentioned, before quitting this period of exclusion, that the Marchioness had died on November 5th, 1816. Her death did not greatly affect her husband, for, for some time, the husband and wife had agreed to disagree. Probably, like his colleagues in the Perceval administration, she had found his autocracy unbearable.

* The most important members of the Grenville party consisted of the Marquess of Buckingham, Lord Grenville, Thomas Grenville, Charles Wynne, Dr. Phillimore, Sir George Nugent, Sir Watkin Wynne, William Freemantle, with occasional assistance from Plunkett. The Marquess Wellesley had acted generally with this party since the conclusion of the war.

CHAPTER XII.

THE VICEROYALTY OF IRELAND.

1822-1827.

Conditions of the Union—The state of Ireland—Lord Wellesley's reception—His appointments—Coercive measures and measures of relief—Secret societies—Riot in Dublin—"The bottle plot"—Improvement of Wellesley's position—His second marriage—Resignation of the Lord Lieutenancy.

It is quite possible that if the bigotry of George III. had not interfered, in 1800-1, with the great measure of Union designed by Mr. Pitt—if, that is to say, the King had not forbidden the passing of the great measure of emancipation, the bestowal of which would for ever have identified in the minds of the vast majority of the people of Ireland the act of Union with an act of grace—there might have been no Irish question at the present moment. The cry for the repeal of the Union in the third decade of the present century owed almost all its force to the fact that in the minds of Catholic Irishmen the Union was identified with breach of contract. In his secret negotiations to ensure the passing of that measure, Mr. Pitt had pledged himself and his sovereign to the abolition of religious disabilities as its first consequence. The refusal of George III. to allow Mr. Pitt to redeem that pledge was the "original sin" which tainted the hearts of the Irish Catholics. The concession, which would have been welcomed as an act of grace in 1800-1, was regarded as

wrung from the fears of England in 1829. It was the refusal to make it when it was due as part of a contract, one half of which had been carried through, that sowed the seeds of distrust of England which has ever since marked the feelings of the Irishmen towards the Government of the United Islands.*

Mr. Pearce thus describes the state of Ireland at the period when the Marquess Wellesley was sent there as Lord Lieutenant:—

“During the year 1821, the population of a great portion of Ireland was in a state of open insurrection. Neither life nor property were safe; formidable bodies of armed men, bound together by secret oaths, spread terror and desolation through the country; they committed their depredations by night, robbing houses of money and arms, taking away horses, and, night after night, firing the residence of parties who had become objects of vengeance. The mail coaches were intercepted and plundered on the King’s high road; and the royal troops were upon several occasions, under cover of night, encountered in the open country. Neither the terrors of a numerous army nor the threatenings of the law were of any avail. Even the zealous efforts of the Roman Catholic clergy to restore tranquillity, had no effect upon ‘Captain Rock’ and his ‘Whiteboy’ following.”

That this picture was not overdrawn is proved by record of the “Annual Register,” dealing with the state of the island at the beginning of 1822. In that trustworthy periodical Ireland is described as:—

“a tempestuous scene of violence, iniquity, and disorder. . . . In vain had the military force been augmented in the disturbed districts; in vain had the judges and ministers of the law performed their function with stern severity; in vain had many of the deluded wretches atoned on the scaffold for their crimes; the country was still in the same insecure and unquiet state; the outrages instead of ceasing were multiplied in number, and became more audacious in character. Nearly the whole of Munster was in a situation into which it is difficult to conceive how a civilized country could fall; it was not afflicted by foreign invasion, or had not been the seat of protracted civil war.”

* *Memoirs of Richard, Marquess Wellesley*, vol. iii., page 314.

This description might in many respects apply to the Ireland of 1880-6. There is, however, one striking difference. If, on the one side, the Irish had, in 1822, a real grievance; if they could complain with justice that the English had not kept the compact made by Mr. Pitt on their behalf in 1800; it was a remarkable fact, on the other, that the Catholic clergy, still under the ban of disability, having before their eyes the favoured Protestant establishment, used all their endeavours to restore and maintain law and order. In 1880-6, when the real grievance had become "ancient history," when there was no rival establishment to disturb their equanimity, the Catholic clergy threw all their energies to support the cause which was equally maintained by violence, by bloodshed, and by disorder.

It was not open, in 1822, to the Marquess Wellesley to apply to Ireland the principle which the Government of the present day is attempting to enforce. "Twenty years of resolute administration of the law" is an efficacious remedy only when grievances based on injustice have been removed. Such grievances exist no longer in Ireland. In 1822, they were undisguised, open, palpable; and, what was worse, there seemed but a small chance that any of them would be redressed. Under such circumstances no one can wonder that a wild, untutored race should have recognised its only remedy in violence.

The Catholic question had been apparently advancing, so much in public opinion in England that when Lord Wellesley accepted the office of Lord Lieutenant of Ireland he did so with the hope that the disabilities against which he had so long struggled would be shortly removed. His nomination seemed to encourage that belief. It did not seem logical that a nobleman who had combated so earnestly for the complete carrying out of

the whole contract of 1800, would accept office unless he felt assured that he would shortly be able to announce the assent of the King's Government to the measure necessary to its completion. He was received, then, at Dublin with the greatest enthusiasm: by the Catholics, because he was known to sympathise with their just aspirations; by the Protestants, because of the services which he and his brother had rendered to the country; by the masses, because he was an Irishman, the brilliancy of whose career reflected on Ireland.

Almost the first act of the new Lord Lieutenant was an act of conciliation. The appointment of Attorney-General had become vacant. The late holder of the office, Mr. Saurin, had made himself obnoxious by his violent antipathy to the Catholics. The appointment of his successor was practically in the gift of Lord Wellesley, and he bestowed the office on Mr. Plunkett (afterwards Lord Plunkett), a member of the House of Commons, who had exerted all his powers of splendid eloquence to promote the cause of Catholic Emancipation. The Solicitor-General, Mr. C. K. Bushe, held similar views on that question; but Lord Wellesley was hampered by the fact that the Chief Secretary, Mr. Goulburn, and the Lord Chancellor, Lord Manners, upheld the cause of exclusion. The hopes which had been kindled by the appointment of Mr. Plunkett were strengthened a few months later by the nomination of Mr. Bushe to be Chief Justice, in place of Chief Justice Downes retired.

"The appointment," writes Mr. Pearce, "was well calculated to inspire confidence in the administration of justice. It marked a new era—when the King's Government announced that violent partisanship and indecent political zeal were no longer to be qualifications for the judicial office."

The description I have given of the condition of Ireland

in the early pages of this chapter, have disclosed the vastness of the task which Wellesley had undertaken. Handicapped, as he was, by the continued refusal of the Parliament of Great Britain to pass the one measure which would have rendered other legislation easy, he bent all his energies to devise such plans as would ensure the restoration of public order. Beginning by openly discouraging Orange Societies on the ground that all societies, organised for political purposes, employing secret oaths and signs, were hostile to the spirit of the British Constitution, and that associations based on the principle of religious exclusion acted as deadly poison to the public happiness, he showed his impartiality by applying the same rule to the rival society of Ribbonmen. Examining, then, with all the thoroughness of his nature, the actual state of the country, he came to the conclusion that the existing law was insufficient to meet the evil. In his despatch to the Home Government he stated, as the conclusion he had arrived at from an examination of the cases, papers regarding which he forwarded, that "no additional military force, no improvement or augmentation of the police, would now be effectual without the aid of the Insurrection Act; with that aid it appears to me to be rational to expect that tranquillity may be maintained, confirmed, and extended throughout Ireland." This Act and an Act suspending the operation of the *Habeas Corpus* Act were passed with but little opposition by Parliament, and, armed with these, Wellesley was enabled to take measures so prompt and decisive that, before Parliament rose for the recess, he was able to report that the insurrection had been effectually crushed. There remained still the alleviation of the sufferings of the large number of peasants who had been reduced to the very verge of starvation by the disorders of the

country. The retiring Commander-in-Chief, Sir David Baird, reporting the progress made by the wise measures of Lord Wellesley towards the pacification of the country, had added that his reports from Galway indicated the presence of great suffering caused principally by the want of means of the sufferers to purchase food. "Hundreds of half-famished wretches," he had added, "arrive almost daily from a distance of fifty miles, many of them so exhausted by want of food that the means taken to restore them fail of effect from the weakness of the digestive organs, occasioned by long fasting." Before Sir David penned that report, the Government, warned of the evil, had taken measures to meet it. The Parliament of the United Kingdom had, on the representations of Lord Wellesley, granted £300,000 to alleviate the distress; subscriptions in England, headed by the City of London, had yielded £350,000; the local subscriptions reached £150,000; and Lord Wellesley subscribed £500 from his private purse.

Open insurrection had been put down; food had been found for the starving; there still remained the more difficult task of combating the secret societies. It was a task from which Lord Wellesley did not flinch. In November, 1822, he forwarded to the Home Government a letter from Mr. Plunkett giving details of the working of a secret society, based on the principle of religious exclusion, which was working great mischief, and for association with which the law did not sufficiently provide.

"I fear," wrote Mr. Plunkett, "that in five or six counties, great numbers of the lower classes have been involved in it; some of them from a love of enterprise and ready disposition for mischief; ~~some~~ a principle of counteraction to exclusive associations of an opposite character; but most of them, I should hope, from terror on the one hand, and the expectation of impunity on the other."

He recommended, then, the application to Ireland of the 39th Act of George III., giving power to transport for seven years all who might be proved to be members of the association, without the necessity of establishing the fact of administering or taking the oath. In a despatch dated the following January, addressed to Mr. Secretary Peel, who had become Home Secretary in January of the same year, Lord Wellesley, whilst indicating the measures he was pushing for the reform of the police, the revision of the magistracy, and the improvement which had been effected in the administration of the law—whilst reporting the progress which had been made in Limerick and in Clare, and the amount of amendment still required in Tippetary, in King's County, and in Roscommon; how Ulster was happily exempt from disorder—urged special attention to the suggestions he had made “for the more effectual restraint of this system of mysterious engagements, formed under the solemnity of secret oaths, binding His Majesty's liege subjects to act under authorities not known to the law, nor derived from the State, for purposes undefined, not disclosed in the first process of initiation, nor until the infatuated novice has been sworn to the vow of unlimited and lawless obedience.” He urged, further, the renewal of the Insurrection Act for another year.

The energetic mind which had consolidated British India, had thus, diverted to a new channel, accomplished much with means not always sufficient. Whilst economising expenditure, he had reformed the magistracy; established the Irish constabulary on a basis which made them efficient supporters of the law; relieved the starving population; and discountenanced by all the means in his power the religious animosities which had contributed so largely to the disturbed condition of the island. Had he

been empowered to announce, as a spontaneous gift from the Crown, the grant of that one measure of conciliation for which he had so long combated, he might have given to his work in Ireland the same solidity as that which had characterised his work in British India. But here he was powerless. Canning, indeed, still fought with varying success for the old principles. But in the breasts of the majority of the Cabinet, and in the Royal Palace, bigotry still reigned rampant. Nor was it the least of the great Marquess's annoyances to feel that one of the most prominent of the opponents of toleration was the brother who had gained so much glory on the field of battle.

Bigotry, especially Irish bigotry, is always in extremes. Not content with excluding the Roman Catholics from all share in the Government of a country of which, then, they constituted nearly four-fifths of the population, the Protestant party was always anxious to display visible signs of its ascendancy. When, then, July 12th, the anniversary of the battle of Aughrim was approaching, the leaders of that party announced their intention of decorating the statue of King William III., the symbol of their triumph in 1691-2. To prevent a ceremony which, made in the manner in which it was proposed to make it, would have been offensive to many, O'Connell addressed a letter in the public papers to Lord Wellesley, calling upon him to prohibit the display. It would appear that Lord Wellesley hoped that his own well-known opinions against such action, and the advice tendered by the King to the leaders of the dominant party to the same effect, would have produced the result desired by O'Connell. He abstained, then, from issuing a manifesto which might have been construed as identifying himself with a party, and was content, for this time, to watch the course affairs would

take. The usual disturbances ensued. The decorations put on by one party, were torn off by the other. Rendered wiser by experience he took occasion, when another anniversary of a similar character was approaching, to issue a proclamation, in which, recapitulating the events of July 12th, he forbade, by the mouth of the Lord Mayor, the "decoration of the statue, or the affixing thereto of any emblem, ornament, or device. Not only, however, did the partisans of bigotry disobey this order, they treated it as though it had been an infringement of the Constitution. The Common Council called a meeting and passed a censure on the Lord Mayor for having issued the proclamation, and the majority pledged themselves to disobey its provisions." When the morning of the anniversary, November 4th, dawned, and the partisans of bigotry proceeded to redeem their pledge, they found a body of police drawn round the statue, supported by a patrol of horse. They made the attempt, nevertheless, and for two days Dublin was traversed by angry mobs committing disorder of every kind. Still, the statue remained undecorated; and, when, on the third day, the Orange mob made a final attempt to effect their purpose, the soldiers were called out and order was restored.

The action of Lord Wellesley in this matter affected to a considerable extent his popularity with the party which theoretically called itself the party of order, but which was, in fact, the party of intolerance. When he visited the theatre the following month he was received with mingled cheers, groans, and hisses. When, on the band playing "God save the King," he rose to his feet, several missiles were thrown into the Vice-regal box, and a large quart bottle was flung from the gallery at his head. It only just missed him. Had it struck him, it would probably have killed him on the spot. Legal steps were

taken to bring the rioters to justice, but the Grand Jury ignored the Bill of indictment preferred against them. Lord Wellesley, badly advised, had them prosecuted for conspiracy to murder, instead of on the less serious charge of aggravated riot; a mistake which Canning lost no opportunity of ridiculing in conversation.

Notwithstanding this unfortunate business, which was followed by a quarrel with the Irish Chancellor, Lord Manners, Lord Wellesley steadily advanced in the esteem of the moderate men on both sides. Public meetings were held in Dublin to congratulate him on his escape: and his friends in England, even those in the Ministry, approved of his conduct. It is pleasing to find in a letter addressed to him from England such expressions as these:—*

“I dined with Lord Sidmouth a few days before I left town. He was in high spirits on the subject of your administration in Ireland, and upon the present state of that country.” . . . “Your administration has risen a step higher every time a despatch is received from you with any proposed arrangement or improvement of system, and there is no complaint of silence on your part.” . . . “I think I perceive that the tone of the Opposition will be particularly civil towards your Excellency personally, and that they will admit that you have done as much as could be expected from you *under the circumstances*; but they are preparing a very sharp attack upon Ministers for not satisfying the Catholics.” . . . “Meanwhile, it is satisfactory to observe that all parties seem to feel that Ireland is doing well in your hands. The Duke of Grafton, having served in Ireland, often talks about it, and he said he admired your management of the affair of the statue extremely.” Alluding to Lord Wellesley’s suppression of the secret associations, the same writer, in a letter dated the 3rd of February following, thus expressed himself:—“I am happy to say that all classes in Ireland and in this country begin within the last ten days to understand rightly the nature of the contest in which your Excellency is engaged. I now consider the battle as fought and won, and I heartily congratulate your Excellency and Ireland upon the result . . . The question was, were the natives to be excluded from (even)

* From Colonel M. Shawe, dated December 14th, 1822.

eligibility to any place of emolument and trust, and were they to be monopolized by a privileged class, who also claim the privilege of insulting periodically the proscribed order of the community. I hope there is an end to this state of things, at least as far as the useless insults go; and if your Excellency were to effect no more in Ireland, it would be a glorious work, and lay the foundation of all future improvement."

The weakness of Lord Wellesley's position, it cannot be too often repeated, arose from the fact that the superstructure which he raised with so much care and so much skill, had no foundation. Religious intolerance continued to deprive four-fifths of the population of their rights. Until those rights should be conceded, work, however beneficent, could only produce a temporary effect. Lord Wellesley's sentiments were tolerant and liberal; but he had to administer a country, the constitution of which was intolerant and illiberal: nor was there any guarantee that his successor would not be a reactionist. The Tithe Bill of 1823, however, was for a time a marked success, though the birth of the Association in the following year inaugurated a new era in Irish agitation.

In October, 1825, Lord Wellesley married for a second time. Mr. Pearce thus describes the event:—

"In the month of October, 1825, his Excellency was married to Mary Anne, daughter of Richard Caton, of Baltimore, in the United States of America, and widow of Robert Patterson, Esq., a lady distinguished for her beauty, elevation of mind, and dignity of manners. . . . She was the granddaughter of the celebrated American patriot, Carrol of Carrolltown, who signed the declaration of independence; but though of republican parentage, she had a patent of nobility from nature, which the illustrious bridegroom, however proud of his lineage and ancestral honours, esteemed far above the tinsel of hereditary distinctions. Her title lent her no grace she did not pay back again."

The Marchioness was a Catholic.

The same year Lord Francis Leveson Gower brought

forward in Parliament a measure for the endowment of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland. Men in those days had not conceived the idea of the disendowment of the Church of the minority, and there can be little doubt that the measure of Lord Francis, as tending to "level up" the Catholics, would, at that conjuncture, have been attended with the happiest results. The House of Commons would not listen to it. The wisdom of bigotry again prevailed, and an opportunity was thrown away of conciliating the most influential body of men in Ireland. I may be permitted to add that a similar opportunity was again lost in 1869, when the time for dealing with the establishment of the minority could no longer be postponed. Had the principle of "levelling up" been then substituted for the system of "levelling down" it is certain that the state of Ireland would never have become so dangerous as it has been since the priesthood became irrevocably dependent on the people.

Amongst other reforms which had distinguished the administration of Lord Wellesley, besides those already referred to, may be mentioned, the removal of various obnoxious and oppressive imposts—the remission of the Union duties, a great boon to the commerce of Ireland—an inquiry into the state of education—the establishment of petty sessions—the appointment of assistant barristers—the extension of public works—and the diffusion of sentiments of moderation and toleration amongst all with whom he came in contact. But, such is human nature, his very tolerance, his very virtues, made him unpopular with both sides. The Orangemen distrusted him for his efforts on behalf of the Catholics: the Catholics could forgive neither his suppression of secret societies, nor his inability to concede to them their rights. When, on the resignation of Lord Liverpool, in January, 1827, Canning

became Prime Minister (April), the hopes of the Marquess that something might be done for the Catholics revived. But the one thing essential to the well-being of Ireland had not been done when Canning died the following August. Even before that much to be lamented event Lord Wellesley had found the prolongation of the situation intolerable. The condition of Tipperary and Munster was becoming worse and worse. In the former "the system of combination and terrors" was "more completely established and organised than ever before." The attempts to grapple with the Association failed signally, the Bill for its suppression being met by the simple device of founding a new association on the ruins of the old. His term of office expired during 1827, and he was anxious to be relieved. "Lord Wellesley," wrote his Chief Secretary, William Lamb, on December 15th of that year, "waxed more and more impatient to be relieved of his office. His successor had been some time announced, and men's eyes were turning to the new Viceroy, Lord Anglesea, whose influence was already discernible in the horizon. The position of superseded satrap did not suit the conqueror of Típu Sáhib." *

Towards the end of December, then, he resigned his office in the hands of a Commission of Lords Justices, and returned to England.

* *Torrens's Memoirs of Viscount Melbourne.* Vol. i. p. 290-1.

CHAPTER XIII.

LORD STEWARD OF THE HOUSEHOLD, AND AGAIN
LORD LIEUTENANT OF IRELAND.

1830-1834.

Return to England—Fresh disappointments—Speech on Catholic Emancipation—Passing of the Bill and fall of the Tory Government—Lord Stewardship of the Household—Again Lord Lieutenant of Ireland—Renewal of the Coercion Act and its consequences—Lord Wellesley becomes Lord Chamberlain—His retirement from public life.

THE Marquess Wellesley returned to England to fight once more the battle of Catholic Emancipation. But, before he could buckle on his harness, he was subjected to two bitter disappointments. In an audience which the Prime Minister, Lord Goderich, had had with the King, on December 18th, he had recommended the addition of Lords Wellesley and Holland to his Cabinet.* The King made no reply. * A few days later the same proposal was submitted by the Premier in a letter, which was seen by Mr. Huskisson and Lord Lansdowne, but to which a postscript, which they did not see, was added, to the effect that domestic circumstances affecting the health of one most dear to the writer rendered him sometimes incapable of continuing to perform the duties of his station." The King naturally regarded the postscript as

* *Memoirs of Lord Melbourne.* Vol. i. pp. 299-300.

the kernel of the letter, and, by the advice of Lord Lyndhurst, sent for the Duke of Wellington. This was disappointment the first. The second may or may not be conjectural. It was said that Lord Wellesley believed that his brother would name him to the King as the most fitting statesman to become Prime Minister, and that the Duke's acceptance by himself caused an estrangement which was never subsequently healed.*

Be that as it may, the undaunted Marquess did not the less strive to promote the object which had now become the main object of his life. That year (1828) the House of Commons, on the motion of Sir Francis Burdett, had carried by 272 votes to 266 a motion for a committee on the claims of the Catholics. When the motion reached the Upper House its chief opponents were the Lord Chancellor and the Prime Minister, the Duke of Wellington. Wellesley did not decline the combat. Replying to the Lord Chancellor, he said that he supported the claims of the Catholics from solemn conviction founded on long and studious attention to the operation in Ireland of—

“the laws enacted for their exclusion. The result of his experience was a thorough impression that those laws did not tend to the security of the Church and State, as was fondly imagined, but only produced danger to what they had been designed as a safeguard. . . . He would ask any person acquainted with the condition of Ireland, whether it was in a state likely to lead to a conciliatory termination, or calculated to effect the desired stability to the Church, or to secure the re-establishment of harmony and peace!”

He concluded by declaring that whilst he regarded the continuation of the disabilities as a positive danger, he was ready to consent to the provision of such securities

* Torrens's *Melbourne*, p. 300. • Bulwer's *Life of Lord Palmerston*, p. 213.

against the misuse of emancipation as would satisfy the Government and the people.

His brother rose to reply. After expressing the pain he felt at having to differ in opinion from one "whom he so dearly loved, and for whose opinions he entertained so much respect and deference," he thus stated the reason why he could not agree with him:—

"My noble relative says that our security will be found in the removal of the securities which now exist. I say that the securities which we now enjoy, and which for a length of time we have enjoyed, are indispensable to the safety of Church and State."

The reply, in fact, was an assertion of the *non possumus*: the security of the realm will be shaken if we accord to Catholics the same rights as are enjoyed by their Protestant brethren. When the Duke of Wellington spoke those words, the cause he was upholding was tottering to its fall. He possessed many great qualities, but he wanted prescience. The principle which he asserted in so uncompromising a manner, in June, 1828, he himself proposed to abandon in February, 1829. In that month he inserted, in the speech from the Throne a paragraph, in which Parliament was recommended to consider whether the disabilities of the Catholics might not be removed. In the March following the Catholic Relief Bill passed the Commons; in April it passed the Lords. The cause which the Marquess Wellesley had so long and so persistently advocated had triumphed at last.

A year later George IV. died. In the September following, the Duke of Wellington, as confident an opponent of reform as he had been of the Catholic claims, made a public declaration to the effect that the House of Commons needed no reform. The House elected in consequence of the demise of the King did not share

that opinion, and promptly placed the Government in a minority.* The Duke then resigned, and Lord Grey formed a Ministry from the old Whigs, the followers of Canning and Grenville, and an ultra-Tory or two: To Lord Wellesley was assigned, for the moment, the post of Lord Steward of the Household. He had for some time been convinced of the necessity of reform, and although he took but little part in the discussion, he voted for the great measure which transferred to the middle class a share in the Government of the country. The question was not finally settled till June, 1832, when the Bill was passed in the Lords by 106 to 22. Early in the following year Wellesley was again sent to Ireland as Lord Lieutenant.†

The circumstances under which the measure of justice had been granted to the Catholics had robbed it of more than half its value. That which would have been accepted with gratitude as a free gift was scorned when it was given grudgingly and under compulsion. Lord Wellesley, then, did not find the condition of Ireland improved. Again were secret societies rampant; again in many districts was disaffection paramount. The law was insufficient to punish the criminals. To meet this state of things the Home Government had introduced and carried an Act, called a Coercion Act, but which was really an Act to put down outrage. This Act was about to expire. The terms of its renewal were being arranged by the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant, the Right. Hon. Edward Littleton, and the Marquess Wellesley. But their hands were in a great measure tied by the orders of the Government in England,

* The occasion was a motion on the Civil List, which was carried against the Government by 233 to 204.

† *Pearce's Life and Correspondence of the Marquess Wellesley.*

and the growing apprehensions of William IV. respecting their Irish policy. "Could Lord Wellesley," wrote Littleton,* "have exercised an unfettered judgment, his enlarged and vigorous mind would soon have remodelled institutions, and have put each party and interest in its right place in Ireland, and have given contentment, order, and strength to that part of His Majesty's dominions."

The Act, as at the time in existence, contained not only what were called Curfew Clauses, and the granting of power to the Lord Lieutenant to proclaim districts, but likewise a power to prohibit county meetings for the purpose of petitioning, and clauses which, from their nature, were called Court-Martial Clauses.

Regarding these clauses, and the power to prohibit meetings, there was a difference of opinion in the Cabinet. At first, Lord Wellesley himself had considered these clauses indispensable, but he modified his opinion, and made his change of view so strongly felt that ultimately the Bill was passed without them. This change of front, however, was the indirect cause of the downfall of the Grey Administration, though Lord Wellesley, who had acted under the belief that the Cabinet was finally unanimous, was, of course, not to blame for the intrigues of Lord Brougham and the want of tact of Mr. Littleton. *

Armed with these limited powers, Lord Wellesley used them with great leniency, though with firmness and discretion. But he had many difficulties to contend with. In his first administration he had been baffled, as I have pointed out, by the fact, that he was working compulsorily on a vicious basis. In his second administration the basis was sound, but the mode in which it had been rendered so had given encouragement to the agitator, and had afforded him

* Lord Hatherton's *Memoir and Correspondence relating to Political Occurrences in June and July, 1834.*

room to hope that the energy which had carried the repeal of Catholic disabilities in the teeth of a powerful Government, might procure the repeal of the Union. Very patiently, however, Wellesley used all the means at his disposal to combat this agitation, and he so far succeeded that he effected an enormous improvement in the condition of the country.

The dismissal of the Whig Ministry by the King, in November of 1834, interrupted Wellesley's plans for the pacification of Ireland. He at once resigned the office, carrying with him the respect of friends and political opponents. Lord Melbourne, who had succeeded Lord Grey as Prime Minister in July, of 1834, had written to him to say that he knew no man alive more equal to the work of solving the problem of Irish government, or more capable of effecting the solution, whilst Lord Grey and Sir Robert Peel had alike rendered testimony to his decision, his energy, and his efficiency.

When, in April, 1835, Lord Melbourne became for the second time Prime Minister, Wellesley, who, in conjunction with Lord Holland, had been most active in representing to him the necessity of an active campaign against Sir Robert Peel, wrote to him to offer to resume his old post in Ireland. It had been well for that country had Lord Melbourne acceded, but political ties had compelled him to offer the Viceroyalty to Lord Mulgrave, and he therefore wrote to Wellesley to propose that he should accept the office of Lord Chamberlain. Lord Wellesley accepted it for the moment, but within a few days he threw it up in disgust. The reasons for his resignation have never been exactly explained, but there can hardly be a doubt that the preference shown towards an absolutely untried man was very prominent among them, and that disgust at O'Connell's ascendancy

was another. Greville significantly noticed that, "when Lord Harrowby said that if he had been Mulgrave he would rather have been torn in pieces than have marched under the banners displayed at the Viceroy's entrance." Lord Wellesley loudly cheered him. He was in his seventy-fifth year. He retired, then,

"full of honours and years, to spend the evening of his days in the enjoyment of the society of a numerous circle of friends, and in those classical studies and elegant pursuits which, at all periods of his life, had been his solace and delight—conscious that his actions would live in the page of history, and that when he was laid beneath the clods of the valley, his name would be gratefully remembered by his country."

It does not, however, appear that he deliberately abandoned public life. Otherwise there would not be much point in the story told by Greville, that Lord Wellesley was accustomed to deliver to a solitary listener elaborate dress rehearsals of the speeches which he had no longer the nerve to deliver in the House of Lords. But, in addition to his extreme self-consciousness, there was another reason for silence. His dislike of the policy of Lord Melbourne's Government became rapidly developed, and before his death he had placed his proxy in the hands of Sir Robert Peel. Now, there was no lack of oratory on the Tory side of the House, and Lord Wellesley may have felt himself abundantly justified in resting on his laurels.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE SUNSET OF LIFE, CHARACTER.

Literature and conversation—Recognition of his services by the Court of Directors—His last public utterance—His death—Character—Estimates of his oratory—His real greatness.

THE great Marquess survived his retirement from office a little over seven years. The sunset of his life was happy and peaceful. The energetic mind which had taken a leading part in trying to solve the political questions of the preceding fifty years found congenial employment in literature and conversation. In both he excelled. His odes and poems, published in a small volume when he was in his eighty-first year, exhibit a wonderful freshness and strength. They were dedicated to Lord Brougham, "*amico suo dilectissimo*,"* in words which displayed all the regard and admiration he felt for the versatile talents of the man who became, to him, in his declining years, that which Canning had been in his middle life.

Very felicitous were the lines he wrote in reply to a

* The dedication ran: "Viro Eximio Henrico Brougham, &c. &c., Qui nostræ ætatis Decus ac Lumen, non linguam modo acuit exercitatione dicendi, sed et ipsam eloquentiam locupletavit graviorum artium instrumento; ornatus uberrimis artibus, omni laude cumulatus Orator; omnium rerum magnarum atque artium scientiam consecutus; ejus rerum cognitione efflorescit et redundat oratio; Qui et humilia subtiliter, at magna graviter, et mediocria temperate potest dicere; Qui Docet, Dilectat, Movet. Amico Suo Dilectissimo Has Primitias Juvenis, et Reliquias Senis D. D. D. Wellesley."

beautiful Latin ode, sent him by the Provost of Eton, on the occasion of the placing of his bust in the hall of that famous college; they ran:—

Affulsit mihi supremæ meta ultima Famæ.
Jam mihi cum Lauro juncta Cupressus erit:
Mater amata, meam quæ fovit, Etona juventam,
Ipsa recedentem signat honore Senonæ.

He himself thus rendered these into English:—

On my last steps Fame sheds her purest rays,
And wreaths with Bays the Cypress and the Yew;
Eton, blest guardian of my youthful days,
Greets my retiring age with honours new.

Not less happy were his lines on the occasion of the erection, in 1841, of a civic statue of his brother by the citizens of London; the same which occupies a place in front of the Royal Exchange:—

Conservata tuis Asia atque Europa triumphis
Invictum bello Te coluere Ducem,
Nunc umbrata geris Civili tempora Quercu,
Ut desit famæ gloria nulla Tuæ.

which he thus translated:—

Europe and Asia, saved by thee proclaim,
Invincible in war thy deathless name;
Now round the brows the Civic Oak we twine,
That every earthly glory may be thine.

Lord Wellesley shone specially in conversation. His good things were repeated, often, indeed, appropriated. In a charming volume,* published whilst I was writing this sketch, there is recorded an instance in which the appropriator without acknowledgment was his intimate friend, Lord Brougham. *The passage runs thus:—

* *Notes of Conversations with the Duke of Wellington.* By Philip Henry, Earl Stanhope.

"As a proof how brilliant is still Lord Wellesley's wit, Lady Burghersh told me that he had remarked on the evidence before Lord Roden's Committee and Lord Normauby's reckless opening of the Irish jails: 'It is only because Lord Normanby is so much used to theatricals—he has exchanged the customary attitudes of Mercy and Justice on *his* stage—he has made Mercy blind and Justice weeping.' I was much surprised, and Lady Burghersh was not less so, when I told her that this was precisely the most brilliant and beautiful point in Lord Brougham's speech on Lord Normanby, and that he had used it without any acknowledgment." Lady Burghersh was not aware of this before. She said she remembered mentioning Lord Wellesley's *bon mot* to Brougham, and that Brougham had answered, 'Ay, Lord Wellesley told me that himself.' "

A very happy incident of the declining years of the Marquess Wellesley was the generous and practical recognition of his splendid services by his old masters, the Court of Directors and the Court of Proprietors. Lord Wellesley had always been a poor man. The pension which he had received from the Company did not suffice to meet an expenditure which, like the nature of the man, was always lavish. How he had declined to increase his means at the expense of the army, on the occasion of the capture of Seringapatam, has been recorded in an earlier chapter of this book. Towards the end of his life his means had become more and more straitened, the greater part, if not the whole, of his pension having become "annexed" by his creditors. Under these circumstances the Court of Proprietors, recollecting the great things the Marquess had accomplished for the splendid Empire of which, in a sense, they were the owners, passed a resolution, November 27th, 1837, to place in the hands of the Chairman, the Deputy-Chairman, and two other persons, as trustees, the sum of £20,000, to be applied for the use and benefit of the Marquess. A little later, the Court of Directors gave another proof of the estimation in which they held his

services, by directing the distribution to their servants in the three Presidencies of copies of the despatches of their famous Proconsul. A little later still, the year before he died, they expressed to him their desire to place a marble statue to his honour in the India Office, as "a public, conspicuous, and permanent mark of the admiration and gratitude of the East India Company." At the meeting of the Court at which this proposal was discussed, the Chairman, Mr. William Butterworth Bayley, thus expressed himself regarding the services of Lord Wellesley in India:—

"The Marquess Wellesley arrived in India at a period when the country was surrounded with peril, when the peace and security of that country were exposed to the most imminent dangers from within and from without, when it required a man of his great talents to rescue it from danger. It was his glorious destiny, to place the British Empire in India in a position of honour and safety which it had never before attained. His energetic mind, embracing in one comprehensive view all the elements of Indian power, enabled him to combine them for the benefit alike of that country and his own."

After dwelling at some length on the unerring and intuitive judgment with which Lord Wellesley had selected his instruments, imbuing them with his own spirit, and dwelling on the generosity with which he ascribed to them the success which had followed obedience to his orders, the Chairman proceeded:—

"The result of his Lordship's measures was to place the British Empire in India on a basis of permanent security, to drive from that country the European influence which they had most reason to dread, to elevate the British character in native estimation, and to make the British Government the paramount dominant power among the States of India. The wisdom of this policy had been tested by time and approved by experience."

Referring, then, to his patronage of learning, and to the desire he had shown to promote such legislative

action as would give to those connected with the Government the advantages of which he himself had made so noble a use, the Chairman thus concluded:—

“Such is the man for whose statue a *niche* in this room is claimed—the defender of India in a crisis of extraordinary peril and difficulty; the consolidator of our Empire; the promoter of learning; in war and in peace alike distinguished by all the qualities which could command respect. Brilliant beyond comparison as was his administration, that was his smallest praise. It was on the ground of the solid benefits of which it was the source that the Proprietors are now invited to perform an act of liberal justice, which he sincerely thought would be as honourable to the East India Company as to the distinguished object of it.”

The same sentiments were echoed by succeeding speakers. The Deputy Chairman, Mr. George Lyall, referring to the attacks to which the noble recipient of the proposed honour had been subjected during, and subsequent to, his career in India, thus felicitously expressed his own sentiments and the sentiments of those around him:—

“Undoubtedly Lord Wellesley, like most other great men, has experienced the truth of Mr. Burke’s observation, that ‘obloquy is an ingredient in the composition of all true glory;’ but happily his Lordship has long outlived the ephemeral calumnies and unfounded prejudices by which at one time he was malignantly assailed, and has now before him in his declining years the cheering prospect of his untarnished fame descending with unsullied lustre to future ages.”

The resolution was carried unanimously, and a letter embodying the resolutions passed was transmitted to the Marquess. It seems only fitting that his reply, the last of his political utterances, should be given at length. Dated, “Kingston House, March 18th, 1841,” it runs thus:—

“Gentlemen, so high is my estimation of the transcendent honour conferred on me by the unanimous resolution of the whole body of the

East India Company, that my first emotion was to offer up my thankful acknowledgments to the Almighty power which has preserved my life beyond the ordinary limits of human nature, to receive a distinction of which history affords so few, if any, examples. Three years have elapsed since this great and powerful body conferred on me a signal mark, not only of honour, but of generous and affectionate consideration. The wisdom of that great body does not deem the value of public services to be diminished by the lapse of time: it is for weak, low and frivolous minds, incapable themselves of any great action, to take so narrow a view of public merit. True wisdom will ever view time as the best test of public services, and will apportion its rewards accordingly. I, therefore, consider the former act of the East India Company as greatly enhanced in value by the deliberation which preceded it. The present consummation of their justice and wisdom is marked by the same spirit of deliberation, reflecting equal honour on those who confer and on him who receives this high and glorious reward. At my advanced age, when my public career must be so near its close, it would be vain to offer any other return of gratitude, than the cordial acknowledgments of my deep sense of the magnitude and value of this unparalleled reward. May my example of success, and of ultimate reward, encourage and inspire all the servants of the East India Company to manifest similar zeal and devotion in the service of the Company, and of the British Empire in the East, and may their continued efforts preserve and improve to the end of time the interest of that great charge, so long entrusted to my hands."

Referring, then, to the high character of Mr. Lyall, and affectionately reminding Mr. Bayley of his pleasant connection with him in India, quoting also the reply he had given to an address delivered to him by the inhabitants of Calcutta on the conclusion of the first Maráthá war,* Lord Wellesley thus concluded:—

* "The just object of public honours is not to adorn a favoured character, nor to extol individual reputation, nor to transmit an esteemed name with lustre to posterity; but to commemorate public services, and to perpetuate public principles. The conscious sense of the motives, objects and results of my endeavours to serve my country in this arduous station inspires me with an unfeigned solicitude that the principles which I revere should be preserved for the security of the interests now entrusted to my charge, and destined hereafter to engage my lasting and affectionate attachment."

"May, then, the memorial by which you are pleased to distinguish my services, remind you of the source from which they proceeded, and of the ends to which they were directed, and confirm the principles of public virtue, the maxims of public order, and a due respect for just and honest government."

The Marquess Wellesley survived the honour thus bestowed upon him just eighteen months. He died at his residence, Kingston House, Brompton, on the morning of Monday, September 26th, 1842, in the eighty-third year of his age. In compliance with the desire expressed in his will, the funeral took place in the chapel of Eton College, and his remains were deposited within the precincts of that ancient seminary. As a tribute of respect to his memory, the Queen commanded that neither the military, nor Her Majesty's private band, should perform at the Castle during the ceremony. All the shops near the College, and the shutters of private houses, were closed, and remained so till after the funeral. The title expired with the illustrious man who had won it.

"Lord Wellesley," writes Mr. Pearce, "was, in private life, a steady friend,—a man of the finest susceptibilities, the highest sense of honour, generosity bordering on profuseness, and of the most gentle and affectionate disposition. During his latter years, one who knew him well observed that, 'next to his books, nothing so refreshed his mind as the intercourse with those friends in whose society and converse he delighted.'"

"His person was small and symmetrical—his face remarkable for intellectual beauty—and his whole deportment elegant and dignified. He possessed a fine manly voice, and delivered his sentiments in public with great perspicuity and effect."

But Lord Wellesley was all that Mr. Pearce describes him, and much more. He was essentially a many-sided man: one who could not fail to excel, whatever might be the task to which he applied himself. He was a doer as well as a thinker. His presence was remarkable. He took a clear idea of the subject in hand, and directed all

his energies to carry it straight through to a successful issue. With him difficulties were simply obstacles to be overcome, and when he had complete command of the resources available to him, he invariably overcame them. His forecast of political events was almost always true. Witness his dealings with Tipu Sultán; with the Maráthás; his insistence on continuing the war with Napoleon when Napoleon was at the very height of his power, and it seemed as though with one wave of his wand he could overwhelm the Peninsula; his early recognition of the justice and policy of conceding the Catholic claims. He has been called vain. If to be conscious of possessing great powers, and to take no heed to conceal that consciousness, is to be vain, the Marquess Wellesley was vain. But that vanity was accompanied by a generosity rarely witnessed except in men of the very first order, the generosity which would claim for the subordinates who had faithfully carried out his instructions the fullest credit for the act accomplished. No wonder that earnest men loved to serve under such a master.

He was fond of display. But in the positions he occupied, especially when holding at a very critical period the high office of Governor-General of India, display was policy. Doubtless he became habituated to it, and possibly it became to him a necessity. Still, one can afford to treat with the ridicule it deserves, the remark of the poet Rogers, recorded in the book from which I have already quoted: * "I think, said Rogers, that the most remarkable contrast that history affords is between the Duke of Wellington and Lord Wellesley, the one scorning all display, the other living for nothing else." The man who made that remark could have known little of the real Lord Wellesley; of the far-sighted statesman.

* *Conversations with the Duke of Wellington.* Earl Stanhope.

who consolidated the British power in India. It may even be doubted whether the man who is described as "scorning all display" would have made the success in India, which the man who "lived for nothing else" accomplished. I have mentioned the remarkable forecasts of the great Marquess. It is a fact equally remarkable that the forecasts of his brother were as faulty as his were correct. It is impossible to read Lord Stanhope's interesting book without being struck by the inability the Duke invariably displayed to take a correct view of the political questions then looming in the future. The fact was that the man whom Rogers described as living solely for display, possessed a vivid imagination; the Duke of Wellington had not one particle of that great gift. "Wanting imagination," wrote Disraeli of Peel, "he wanted prescience." The remark applies equally to the Duke of Wellington. As a politician he failed completely. He failed because he was deficient in that one quality, the possession of which enabled his brother to vanquish innumerable difficulties in India, and to gauge more correctly than the majority of his contemporaries the great questions which occupied the minds of Englishmen.

"As an orator, the Marquess Wellesley fell short of the standard which he attained as a clear-headed and accurate thinker. His brother, the Duke of Wellington, spoke of his powers as a speaker in a manner which does not certainly imply admiration.* He said:—

"Lord Wellesley had the power of speaking, but used it very seldom. It was always his view—and he never was satisfied unless—he made the very best speech in the debate. Now there, I think, he was wrong—the thing to think of is not one's speech, but one's object. . . . So seldom did Lord Wellesley speak, that I never heard him

* *Conversations with the Duke of Wellington.* Earl Stanhope.

in all my life but once.* There was one famous speech he made in the House of Commons before he went out to India; he was supposed to have been a very long while preparing it, so much so that Mr. Pitt said of him that he was the animal of the longest gestation ever known in the world."

Different in its conclusion, as well as in the language in which it was expressed, was the opinion of Lord Brougham:—

"The excellence of Lord Wellesley's speeches," he wrote, "has been mentioned. The taste which he had formed from study of the great Greek exemplars kept him above all tinsel and vulgar ornaments, and made him jealously hold fast by the purity of our language; but it had not taught him the virtue of conciseness; and he who knew the *De Coronâ* by heart, and always admitted its unmeasured superiority to the second *Philippic*, and the *Pro Milone*, yet formed his own style altogether upon the Roman model. That style, indeed, was considerably diffuse; and the same want of compression, the same redundancy of words, accompanied, however, by substantial though not always needful sense, was observable, though much less observable, in his poetical pieces, which generally possessed very high excellence. It is singular to mark the extraordinary contrast which his thoughts and his expressions presented in this respect. There was nothing superfluous or round-about in his reasoning—nothing dilatory or feeble in the conception which produced his plans. He saw his object at once, and with intuitive sagacity; he saw it in its true colours and real dimensions; he, at one glance, espied the path, and reached his end. The only prolixity that he ever fell into was, in explaining or defending the proceedings thus concisely and rapidly taken. To this some addition was not unnaturally made by the dignity which the habits of viceregal state made natural to him, and the complimentary style which, if a very little tinctured with Oriental taste, was very much more the result of a kindly and generous nature."

But it was neither his oratory, nor his political foresight in English politics, nor his long advocacy of the claims of the Catholics, nor his just and impartial govern-

* The Duke was speaking in the year 1839. He must have referred to the speech already quoted, advocating the Catholic claims made by the Marquess Wellesley in the Lords in 1828, and to which he replied.

ment of Ireland, which have secured for the Marquess Wellesley an eternal place amongst the great men of England; amongst the makers of the British Empire. It is for his Indian Administration that posterity will love, reverence, and honour his name. If Clive, by his expulsion of the French from southern India, and by his conquest of Bengal and Bihâr, laid the foundation of the coming Empire; if Warren Hastings, by his transactions with the Nawâb-Wazîr of Oûdh, by the promptitude with which he despatched troops to rescue Madras from the clutches of Haidar Âli, and by the vigour with which he combated the projects of the Marâthâs in western and central India, extended its borders and increased its *prestige*; it was Wellesley who welded it into one mass, who consolidated it, who gave it the imperial form which it has since retained. It was Wellesley who, finding it but the equal of each of two independent Native Powers, made it predominant and paramount. It was Wellesley who, finding British *prestige* at its lowest point, raised it to its highest. He alone did it. He chose his instruments, trusted them, and gave them the fullest credit for the actions which he had inspired. His far-sightedness, his directness of purpose, his unflinching resolution astonished men's minds. Those qualities overbore all opposition. In him the natives of India, princes, traders, and peasants, recognised the typical *Ἀναξ* *Ἀνδῶν*, the king of men, whose word no one dared to dispute. Throughout the vast peninsula of which he made a British dependency his name is still remembered and revered. Tradition speaks to this day of his generosity, his splendour, his king-like qualities. For the natives of India there had not been his equal before, and certainly the palace which he built in Calcutta has never since been tenanted by a superior. That palace gives

shelter to his statue alone. Those of his successors are, with but one exception, exposed to the dust, the rain, the heat, of the Calcutta *Maidán*.^{*} Its right to occupy, singly, that place is incontestable. No one can look at it unmoved. The features, clearly cut in the purest white marble, give unmistakable evidence of the great thoughts which, put in action by an inflexible will, worked out the predominance and the consolidation of the British Empire in India.

^{*} *Maidán*, literally a plain, the open space between Chauringhi and the river, constituting the lungs of Calcutta.

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